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Chapter 1
Introduction
The relationship between economic growth and the environment is and prob-
ably will be, at least in the near future, one of the most important themes
in economics. Both in academic discussions and in the public opinion it is
often argued that gains in social welfare are only feasible at the expense of
increasing environmental degradation. On account of this and to prevent an
ecological disaster, environmentalists commonly postulate that growth has to
grind to a halt. In the political debate, however, economic growth is still one
of the principle topics. Therefore, it seems that there is a conflict of interests
between economic growth and environmental protection. Recently, however,
research in the field of environmental and resource economics has found evi-
dence that increases in income do not necessarily lead to rising environmental
pressure in the long run. In fact, under certain conditions economic growth
may favour the environment. The literature on the Environmental Kuznets
Curve (EKC) deals with this potentially non-monotonic relation.
There are several reasons why a closer investigation of the issues of eco-
nomic growth and environment and of their interconnections, respectively, is
worthwhile. First, economic growth by itself is an important subject. Due
to ongoing growth the standard of living has improved significantly over the
past centuries. This can be shown by taking income as a rough indicator for
well-being. For example, in Switzerland real GDP per capita in 2004 was
1
2 INTRODUCTION
more than fifteen times higher than it was in 1850 and more than thirty five
times higher than in 1500 (Maddison, 2003; GGDC, 2005); and the everlast-
ing quest for growth is well documented by past and current scientific and
political discussions. Second, the environment provides several important and
necessary services to human well-being not captured by income: it generates
amenity values, serves as a source of renewable and non-renewable resources
for economic activities (e.g. energy, fossil fuels or simply water) as well as
a sink for waste and pollution. Third, economic development and its reper-
cussions on the environment are inseparable. Economic activities harm the
environment inter alia in the form of air and water pollution, precarious nat-
ural resource extraction, loss of biodiversity and the greenhouse effect. For
example, anthropogenic emissions of air pollutants in Switzerland have shown
a drastic increase since the 1950s. In 1985, nitrogen oxides emissions had in-
creased more than fivefold and non-methane volatile organic compounds had
more than quadrupled compared to 1950. Most pollutant emissions reached a
maximum between 1960 and 1985 and subsequently decreased due to the im-
plementation of abatement measures. An exception is carbon dioxide which
has not yet reached a clear turning point (SAEFL, 1995). Of course, the
pollution of the environment has repercussions on the effectiveness and the
availability of the described environmental services as well as on the accumu-
lation potential of man-made capital. For example, heavy air contamination
– by leading to an increased level of lead found in the blood – can negatively
affect learning abilities and cause a decline in the average intelligence quo-
tient. The negative consequences of environmental degradation on human
capital formation has been observed in cities with serious air pollution, e.g.
in Mexico City and Seoul (Margulis, 1992; WHO/UNEP, 1992). Finally, eco-
nomic growth is not only driven by but also induces structural change and
technological progress, both of which can be pollution-increasing as well as
pollution-saving. In addition, increases in available income allow society, on
the one hand, to spend more on abatement. On the other hand, there is also
more money available to invest in potentially polluting activities. As a result
3of these manifold interactions, the fundamental question arises of whether
economic growth without excess pollution – that is, sustainable growth – is
feasible in the long run.
Despite their close interrelationship with economic growth and their im-
portance for society, environmental issues were, for a long time, not ade-
quately addressed in the economic literature on growth. It was not until the
1960s and 1970s that resource depletion and pollution were incorporated into
growth models in the neoclassical tradition. Since this type of growth model
relies on exogenously driven growth (exogenous technological progress, ex-
ogenous population growth), it is not particularly suited to the investigation
of the inherent dynamic relation between economic growth and the environ-
ment.1 With the emergence of the endogenous growth theory in the 1990s,
environmental aspects could be dealt with in a framework where investments
in capital stocks (physical, human and knowledge capital) are determined en-
dogenously, i.e. as the result of economic decisions and incentives. The crucial
point for sustainable development is to what extent technological progress,
i.e. the accumulation of knowledge and human capital, is able to increase
the efficiency of natural resources and to positively affect the substitutability
between natural resources and man-made capital.2
Both the neoclassical and the endogenous growth models normally fo-
cus their attention on a monotonic, i.e. either increasing or decreasing,
relationship between economic progress and the environment. In the last
decade however, a strand of literature that focuses explicitly on potentially
non-monotonic relations between growth and environmental degradation has
emerged and has attracted considerable attention from theorists as well as
policymakers. One of the most-used and most popular concepts with which
this non-monotonic pollution-income relation can be analysed, is the so-called
1See Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Clark (1990) for treatments of exhaustible and
renewable resources in this context.
2Bretschger (1999) and Smulders (1999, 2000) provide surveys on endogenous growth
models which incorporate the environment, pollution and/or natural resources.
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Environmental Kuznets Curve.
The EKC literature was initiated in the early 1990s by a paper of Gross-
man and Krueger (1993, first published in 1991) investigating the environ-
mental impacts of a North American free trade agreement. These authors
found empirical evidence that emissions of a number of air pollutants rose
with income at low levels of income, but reached a turning point around
USD 5.000 (1985 PPP$) and further economic progress then led to decreas-
ing environmental degradation. Almost contemporaneously and apparently
independently, Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) and Panayotou (1995, first
published in 1993) reported similar results. The eventual decoupling of en-
vironmental pressure from economic growth results in an inverted U-shaped
pattern between income and a measure of pollution. Following the origi-
nal Kuznets Curve between income and income inequality (Kuznets, 1955),
Panayotou (1995) labelled the hump-shaped pollution-income relation the
Environmental Kuznets Curve.3
For the appraisal of the feasibility of sustainable development and for
possible policy implications, the validity of the EKC hypothesis is of utmost
importance. If, on the one hand, the hypothesis does not apply, i.e. if eco-
nomic growth inescapably results in increasing extraction of natural resources,
rising quantities of waste and emissions etc., the growth potential could be
limited, as propagated by the Club of Rome and others (see e.g. Meadows et
al., 1972). As a result, one could argue that economic growth must come to
a halt in order to save the environment and even in order to save economic
activity itself from collapse (Panayotou, 2000). On the other hand, if the
EKC hypothesis applies, i.e. if an eventual decoupling of the environment
from economic growth can be achieved, the reasoning could be quite differ-
ent. At the extreme, some go so far as to argue that “in the end the best –
and probably the only – way to attain a decent environment in most coun-
3Copeland and Taylor (2003) argue that this relationship should be referred to as the
Grossman-Krueger-Kuznets Curve, since their 1993 and 1995 papers stimulated the acad-
emic interest and research in this area.
5tries is to become rich” (Beckerman, 1992). As a consequence, environmental
regulations – by reducing economic growth – could be counterproductive and
growth enhancing policies would be the panacea for an intact environment.
Such extreme positions, however, neglect important facts. “Growth op-
timists” should bear in mind that the carrying capacity of the environment
as a sink for waste and pollution and the natural regeneration rate of nat-
ural resources are limited. Thus, environmental degradation can cause ir-
reversible damage once certain ecological thresholds have been crossed and
economic growth can no longer act as a remedy for environmental degrada-
tion. “Growth pessimists” should keep in mind that economic growth is an
inherently dynamic process and not a ceteris paribus affair. Everything that
grows also changes its structure (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2000). Economic
growth not only has a scale effect, but (at least) also a composition and tech-
nique effect. In other words, during the growth process, few things remain
unchanged and most things change continuously; for example, the input re-
quirements, the technologies used or the range of goods produced and services
offered today are far removed from those of a century ago. For viable policy
recommendations, substantiated knowledge about the factors driving the re-
lationship between pollution and income development is decisive. So far, the
EKC literature has mostly focused on empirical analysis. Yet, the driving
forces underlying the inverted U-shaped pollution-income relation have still
to be identified and the general validity for a broader range of pollutants
remains to be confirmed.
Reviewing the huge number of empirical EKC studies one finds mixed
evidence. For flow and local pollutants that have an immediate adverse ef-
fect on the environment and/or on human health the EKC pattern is mostly
confirmed. For example, for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides the vast ma-
jority of studies report a hump-shaped pollution income relation, even though
the reported turning points differ substantially. Other examples for local, but
high-risk pollutants are lack of clean water and sanitation. In these cases, the
EKC (with a very low turning point) or even a monotonically decreasing pat-
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tern is almost without controversy. For stock and global pollutants such as
carbon dioxide and for aggregate measures of pollution, however, the empir-
ical evidence is less clear and less promising. Here, in the majority of cases,
a monotonically increasing relationship is observed. In addition, the results
are often fairly sensitive to functional form assumptions, data selection or the
use of emissions versus concentrations. The special issues of Environment and
Development Economics 1997 and Ecological Economics 1998 and especially
the recent review article by Lieb (2003) provide comprehensive surveys of the
empirical EKC literature.
Common to the empirical strand of the EKC literature is the fact that
most estimations are based on ad hoc specifications and reduced form equa-
tions relating an indicator of environmental degradation to income and a
vector of other explanatory variables such as openness to trade, measures of
structural change, population density and geographical, i.e. country-specific
variables. Due to the reduced form specification, these estimations are not
able to identify the underlying mechanisms affecting the pollution-income
relation. They are rather black box estimations. Usually, empirical EKC
studies ex post resort to possible underpinnings of the suggested functional
relationship.
A (non exhaustive) list of the given explanations includes the following
aspects. (i) With rising income the demand for environmental quality in-
creases. Lieb (2003) provides no less than three arguments in support of
this proposition. First, not until the basic human needs have been met will
additional resources be spent in favour of the environment. But only rising
income makes these resources available. In addition, with rising income, non-
material goods usually become more important. The amenity value of the
environment constitutes such a non-material good. Second, education and,
with it, environmental awareness, the fear of environmental health hazards
and the concern for reduced life expectancy all increase with income. Finally,
due to rising wages the opportunity costs of lost work-days caused by health
problems rise with income. As a result, individuals are likely to express their
7changed priorities in the political progress, e.g. by voting for stricter en-
vironmental regulations. (ii) The technological aspect can encompass both
increasing returns to scale in abatement and technological progress. With in-
creasing returns to scale in abatement average abatement costs are declining.
Hence, a growing economy is more likely to be able to abate an increasing
part of its pollution. Technological progress – either incremental or discrete
– can lead to more environmentally friendly production technologies so that
the same amount of output can be produced with both less (natural) resource
inputs and less waste or pollution as a by-product. Of course, technological
progress is not automatically pollution-saving. Especially, at early stages of
economic development, technological progress may indeed increase pollution-
and resource intensities. However, with increased environmental awareness
it seems not unlikely that R&D endeavours are targeted at environmentally
friendly technological progress. (iii) During the growth process the structure
of an economy changes. People living at the subsistence consumption level
do not cause much pollution. With increasing saturation of the agricultural
potential, pollution starts to increase. This increase in pollution is intensified
by subsequent industrialisation. Eventually, the service sectors takes on the
leading role and pollution may fall. Thus, structural change can be in favour,
or to the disadvantage of, environmental quality depending on the develop-
ment status of an economy. (iv) It is often argued that developed countries
relocate dirty industries to poorer countries with laxer environmental regu-
lation thereby reducing domestic pollution but not overall pollution. Since
pollution is not lowered but only reallocated one can argue that only an il-
lusion of sustainability is created (Rees, 1994). The reallocation of pollution
comes inescapably to an end as soon as the poorest countries would like to
source out their dirty industries. The migration of polluting production from
rich to poor countries is often referred to as the pollution haven hypothe-
sis. The counteracting factor endowment hypothesis, however, suggests that
dirty production, which is usually capital intensive, is located where capital
is more abundant, i.e. in developed countries (Antweiler et al., 2001). Which
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of these two counteracting effects dominates, is mainly an empirical question.
(v) Finally, the downturn of an EKC for a specific pollutant may be the result
of a substitution process between different pollutants. By reducing the emis-
sions of a targeted pollutant, the emissions of another – not yet considered or
known – may rise. As a result, the effect of the substitution on overall envi-
ronmental damage can be ambiguous. Ongoing substitution between different
pollutants would result in overlapping EKCs (see also Chapter 3).
Only in recent years have a rising number of theoretical papers on the
EKC been published. These studies contribute to the EKC debate by iden-
tifying diverse mechanisms leading to a nonlinear relationship between eco-
nomic development and environmental degradation. Within the theoretical
EKC literature two major strands of papers can be distinguished. Both of
them concentrate on technological aspects as the main reason for the EKC
pattern (see (ii) on page 7). The first class of models stresses shifts in the use
of production technologies as the main cause of the hump-shaped pollution-
income relation. In Stokey (1998), the dirtiest but most productive technol-
ogy is used at low levels of income. The economic reason is simply that the
marginal utility of consumption is higher than the marginal disutility of pol-
lution. Economic growth is accompanied by increasing environmental degra-
dation. After a critical threshold is passed (due to decreasing marginal utility
of consumption and increasing marginal disutility of pollution), cleaner but
less productive technologies are implemented and a decoupling of economic
growth and environmental degradation occurs. In Jones and Manuelli (2001)
there is again a range of technologies which differ according to their produc-
tion costs and their pollution intensity. The technology options and, in the
end, also the pollution path depend on the type of pollution regulation. With
eﬄuent charges as the instrument of pollution control, a non-monotonic pol-
lution path results, in particular the pollution path is N-shaped. However,
if regulation restricts the choice of technology, i.e. if a minimum standard
is set, pollution monotonically increases over time. In the model outlined in
Chapter 3, technology shifts can, but need not be environmentally friendly.
9It is rather argued that during initial phases of economic development tech-
nology shifts lead inter alia to more pollution. As the process of economic
development proceeds and the individuals become aware of environmental
degradation, technology shifts become more environmentally friendly.
The second class of theoretical EKC models focuses on the abatement
technology, which captures the fact that pollution can be alleviated by devot-
ing resources to improving environmental quality. In Selden and Song (1995),
abatement is zero initially and starts to increase once economic development
has created enough consumption and environmental damage (through capital
accumulation) to merit expenditures on abatement. Similar results are pre-
sented by Chimeli and Braden (2002). Formulating a simple growth model
with environmental quality (as a stock variable) the authors show that cap-
ital accumulation dominates at early stages of economic development and
environmental effort is of secondary importance. Subsequently abatement
becomes more relevant and attracts more resources, and economic growth
declines. John and Pecchenino (1994) draw comparable conclusions using an
OLG model. Again, the economy eventually switches from a corner solu-
tion with no environmental effort and increasing environmental degradation
to a solution where abatement is positive and economic growth goes along
with increasing environmental quality. Brock and Taylor (2004) extend the
Solow growth model to include emissions, abatement and a stock of pol-
lution. Assuming an appropriate rate of external technological progress in
abatement, they show that an EKC may result along the transition to the
balanced growth path. In a widely cited paper, Andreoni and Levinson (2001)
focus on the characteristics of the abatement technology. Assuming that the
abatement technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, the authors show
that an inverted U-shaped pollution-income relation results. This approach
is remarkable since it “does not require dynamics, predetermined patterns
of economic growth, multiple equilibria, released constraints, political insti-
tutions, bundled commodities, irreversible pollution, or even externalities”
(Andreoni and Levinson, 2001, p. 271). The EKC results solely from the in-
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teraction of the polluting economic activity and the technological properties
of the abatement function.
For the sake of completeness, one should mention a third class of mod-
els which emphasises structural changes within an economy, see de Groot
(1999) [see (iii) on page 7]. However, the underlying mechanism is restricted
to developing countries and does not apply to mature economies, since their
intersectoral shifts have been relatively small in recent decades (de Bruyn,
1997). As a result, this mechanism has not attracted great attention in the
EKC literature. Moreover, it should be noted that most approaches stress
the importance of a sufficiently high income elasticity of demand for envi-
ronmental quality [see (i) on page 6]. It can be shown, however, that a high
income elasticity for environmental quality is indeed helpful for an EKC con-
formable pattern, but it is neither sufficient nor necessary (McConnell, 1997).
As a matter of fact, the decisive point is not that environmental quality has
an income elasticity which exceeds unity (luxury good) but that its elastic-
ity is positive (Lieb, 2002). Empirical estimations confirm that the income
elasticity of environmental quality is less than unity (Kristro¨m and Riera,
1996).
Outline of the Study
The present study is tripartite: a broader survey of growth models with trade
and the environment is followed by two sections on the EKC. The first of
these deals with theoretical aspects, while the second consists of an empirical
investigation.
Chapter 2 tries to clarify how the sustainability of environmental quality
relates to economic growth and how this relationship is affected by increasing
globalisation. With the additional focus on trade, this chapter goes beyond
the main objective of this study. This is important since international trade
affects growth and the environment through a number of channels. The chap-
ter consist of a comprehensive literature survey on theoretical models dealing
11
first with economic growth and the environment, second, with trade and eco-
nomic growth and finally, with trade, growth and the environment. This
step-by-step procedure is indicated since few contributions directly analyse
environmentally sustainable growth in an open economy context. This is re-
markable since the intersection of these three issues is interesting per se and,
in addition, highly policy relevant.
International trade, market integration or simply globalisation has been
and still is high on the political agenda as well as being an important re-
search topic in academia. In the public opinion, environmental problems are
generally perceived to be negatively linked to the degree of globalisation. For
example, the strong protests during the 1999 WTO ministerial conference in
Seattle were partly motivated by concerns for the environment.
It is unchallenged that international trade has an effect on economic
growth. However, the direction is ambiguous. If a country has comparative
advantages in “traditional” sectors, which do not exhibit extensive positive
spillovers, and thus specialises in these industries, intersectoral resource real-
location can counteract, offset or even outweigh the growth-enhancing scale
and technique effects. The technique effect is based on the transnational ex-
change of goods, services, ideas and human resources. In this context, the
process of knowledge diffusion is important. If knowledge is rather a local
public good or if international knowledge diffusion is time intensive the tech-
nique effect may be limited in scope. Empirical investigations show that the
importance of knowledge transfers depends inter alia on the size of a country;
smaller countries rely more on international knowledge exchange (Coe and
Helpman, 1995).
The effect of trade on the environment is perhaps even more complex. On
the one hand, trade allows countries to export domestic pollution by outsourc-
ing polluting industries to regions with weak or un-enforced environmental
regulation. Provided that the same technology is used for production, the
outsourcing has no effect on the environment. But it can trigger increases
in transportation and, thus, harm the environment. On the other hand,
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trade indirectly affects the environment via the growth nexus. Since neither
the impact of trade on growth nor the effect of growth on the environment
are unambiguous, the indirect effect of trade on the environment is also not
evident from the outset, but depends on the relative strength of the scale,
technique and composition effects. Thus, without a clear understanding –
both in theoretical and empirical terms – of the dynamic interactions be-
tween trade, growth and the environment, the question of whether trade is
good or bad for the environment can not be answered.
After this broad review, the subsequent chapters focus on the relationship
between environmental quality and economic growth, while the aspect of
trade and globalisation plays only a minor role. This is not because trade is
of secondary importance in this context but rather because the subsequent
models and investigations focus on different main objectives. In particular,
Chapters 3 to 6 investigate the relation between the environment and growth
in the context of the EKC hypothesis. These chapters present, on the one
hand, empirical evidence, but also analyse the suggested pollution-income
relation within theoretical frameworks.
As stated above, theoretical EKC models either stress technology shifts or
focus on an abatement technology. The model analysed in Chapter 3 belongs
to the first type of EKC models. This model adds to the existing EKC lit-
erature, since it not only treats income and technological changes in general
as endogenous but also endogenises the direction of technological change. In
particular, after an initial zero pollution phase, economic incentives change
in such a way that profit maximising firms switch from a clean to a pollut-
ing production technology. These intrasectoral shifts constitute the second
new feature of the model. The direction of technological change reverses
once environmental degradation has attracted the public’s attention and en-
vironmental regulation is present. To avoid the pollution tax, firms find it
profitable to adopt a new, clean technology. This again initiates intrasectoral
shifts – this time, from dirty to clean firms. The emphasis on the significance
of intrasectoral shifts caused by environmental regulation for the downturn
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of the EKC mirrors the reality fairly well. Empirical decomposition analyses
have shown that intrasectoral shifts are more relevant with respect to explain-
ing EKC patterns than intersectoral shifts (de Bruyn, 1997 and 2000). For
example, the substantial cutbacks of nitrogen oxides and sulphur dioxides
emissions in Switzerland can be attributed for the most part to the inter-
action of environmental regulation, intrasectoral substitution processes and
the implementation of more environmentally friendly production technologies
(see e.g. SAEFL, 1995).
A model of the second class, i.e. a model with an explicit abatement tech-
nology, is analysed in Chapter 4. The abatement technology employed origi-
nates from the Andreoni and Levinson (2001) paper and is characterised by
increasing returns to scale. In contrast to Chapter 3, here the main objective
is not to present a new mechanism which generates a hump-shaped pollution-
income relation. The chapter rather expands a given basic model setup to
explore two interesting issues in a dynamic context. The first objective is to
analyse the economic determinants of the turning point, i.e. the income level
associated with the decoupling of environmental degradation from economic
development, within a theoretical framework. Not surprisingly, the degree of
increasing returns to scale in abatement and the desire for a clean environ-
ment have a large influence on the turning point. The higher the degree of
the increasing returns to scale in abatement and the higher the preference for
a clean environment, the lower is the resulting turning point. In addition,
negative external effects of polluting consumption increase the turning point,
while positive external effects associated with environmental effort tend to
reduce the critical level of income. The dependency of the turning point on
these two market failures raises the question of how effective different environ-
mental regulations are in correcting these market failures. The answer to this
question constitutes the second objective of this chapter. Interestingly, the ef-
fectiveness of different public environment policies depends on the preference
structure of the individuals. If individuals attach a high value to environmen-
tal quality, a policy measure that impedes pollution, i.e. a tax on (polluting)
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consumption, is more effective than a measure that is supportive of cleaning
up, i.e. subsidy on environmental effort. However, the reverse is true, if in-
dividuals do not care much about the environment. The economic reason for
this result is that the importance of the market failure associated with pol-
luting consumption increases with the desire for a clean environment, while
the importance of the market failure associated with environmental effort is
independent of this preference parameter.
Furthermore, it is shown that the proposed model is compatible with
a number of stylised facts on economic growth, i.e. the so-called Kaldor
(1961) facts, and on economic growth and the environment. In particular,
abatement costs are constant, emission intensity declines and the peak of
absolute emissions is temporally delayed with regard to the decline in the
emission intensity.
Chapter 5 deals more generally with the modelling of pollution in the
EKC literature. The particular focus is on those models of the second class
where net pollution is defined as the difference between gross pollution and
abatement. A closer inspection of this type of pollution modelling is advisable
since these models often imply that pollution becomes negative in the long
run. This is, of course, a highly implausible, but far reaching prediction. If a
specific model suffers from incorrect predictions in the long run, then even its
results for the short and medium run can be questioned. After a delineation
of two existing approaches to avoid negative pollution, a new solution is
introduced. It is argued that the perpetual existence of increasing returns to
scale in abatement is questionable. In fact, it is more plausible that pollution
abatement becomes relatively more resource intensive as the last speck of
pollution must be tackled or as the potential for learning-by-doing has been
largely exploited. On the basis of these considerations, the concept of fading
increasing returns to scale is proposed. Basically, the abatement technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale but their degree ebbs away with increasing
environmental effort. With such a specification of the abatement technology
non-negative pollution levels can be achieved also in the long run.
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In the last chapter of this study, an empirical investigation on Environ-
mental Kuznets Curves for Germany is presented. Its fundamental questions
reads: Do Environmental Kuznets Curves exist for a single country? Thus, in
contrast to the majority of empirical EKC studies, the estimations are based
on time series data and not on a cross-section of countries. Albeit the EKC
is sometimes regarded as a cross-section concept, a time series analysis seems
to be more than warranted. The following arguments and findings are sup-
portive of this position. An EKC found by cross-country estimations could
result from the coexistence of two different and independent relationships: a
monotonically increasing pollution-income relation in poorer countries and a
monotonically decreasing relation in richer countries (Vincent, 1997). The
combination of these two relations would result in a pseudo EKC. In other
words, pooling heterogeneous countries in one and the same panel can bias the
estimates (Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2005). Finally, is has been shown that
even for relatively homogeneous countries the estimated pollution-income re-
lations might differ substantially. Analysing nitrogen oxide and sulphur diox-
ide, List and Gallet (1999) report fairly heterogeneous turning points for the
different US states. In the case of nitrogen oxide, the highest is more than
fifty three times higher than the lowest. The corresponding figure for sulphur
dioxide is twenty three. The problem of the homogeneity assumption within
a broad spectrum of countries can be summarised in a nutshell by a quotation
of Harberger (1987): “What in the world do Thailand, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Zimbabwe, Greece, and Bolivia have in common that merits their being
put in the same regression analysis? Answer: For most purposes, nothing at
all.”
The estimations of Chapter 6 are based on emissions data of eight different
air pollutants for Germany. The results of the traditional reduced form regres-
sions indicate a hump-shaped pattern only for nitrogen oxide and ammonia.
The other six pollutants, however, do not show clear-cut and significant re-
sults. Besides the use of time series data a second feature of the estimations
in this chapter is noteworthy. In order to deal with the non-stationarity of
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the variables used, a modified error correction model is employed in a second
step. The modification concerns the supposed underlying long-term rela-
tionship. To give consideration to the EKC hypothesis this relationship is
assumed to be non-linear, i.e. either quadratic or additionally with a cubed
term. Again estimations are run for all eight pollutants and in different varia-
tions, i.e. with and without additional regressors beside income. Even though
the results are more supportive of the EKC hypothesis, the above stated fun-
damental question cannot be conclusively answered. The overall picture of
the estimations is somewhat fuzzy. However, since the results of cross-country
and panel data estimations cannot be confirmed without restrictions, the in-
vestigations of this chapter back up the demand for further research with
regard to the questions raised.
Chapter 2
Sustainable Growth in Open
Economies∗
2.1 The Dynamic Perspective: International
Sustainability
2.1.1 Introducing Dynamics
International environmental economics can be conducted both in a static and
in a dynamic mode. This chapter introduces the dynamic approach view.
We analyse the impact of international trade and the natural environment
on long-term economic development. In the literature, there are hardly any
contributions which cover environmental economics, trade, and growth at the
same time. Most of the papers in this field concentrate either on the inter-
action between (i) international trade and the environment (for a survey see
Schulze and Ursprung, 2001a-c), (ii) economic growth and the environment
or (iii) trade and economic growth. To obtain a comprehensive view of the
intersection of all three issues, we proceed in the following manner. In the
first section, we focus on economic growth and the natural environment by
∗Published in Schulze and Ursprung (2001). This chapter represents joint work together
with Lucas Bretschger (ETH Zurich).
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introducing the most important concept in this field: sustainability. Sec-
tion 2.2 demonstrates how endogenous growth theory identifies sustainable
development paths. We present the predictions of different growth models,
which also portray changes in the natural environment. The international
aspects are introduced by considering open economic growth models in Sec-
tion 2.3. Building on the insights of modern growth theory, we discuss the
literature which analyses the impact of trade relations, trade policy, and the
international division of labour on the sustainability of growth in Section 2.4.
Empirical results are presented in 2.5. The concluding section summarises
the results and identifies important issues which emerge from the discussion
and remain for future research.
2.1.2 The Sustainability Paradigm
The “Brundtland report” defines sustainable development as “development
that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission,
1987). Development, thus, includes not only rising aggregate consumption or
output, but also environmental quality, social factors, and the distribution
of income. Taking such a broad view, economic theory can make substan-
tial contributions to several focal points. The most important concept in
economics is individual welfare, which is usually captured with the help of
utility functions. Realistic utility functions include not only consumption
but also environmental quality. In a dynamic set-up, the final objective of
any normative theory of economic growth is the long-term development of
individual utility.
If the above definition of sustainability is interpreted in economic terms,
a sustainable growth path can be characterised by non-declining welfare be-
tween generations, where welfare is measured as average individual utility (see
Pezzey, 1989 and Bretschger, 1998c). By demanding constant or increasing
welfare over the long run, sustainability is more than survivability, which only
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requires consumption to be kept above some subsistence minimum. Both fair-
ness and efficiency criteria are crucial ingredients of sustainable growth paths.
Efficiency considerations, which underlie the positive and normative view of
environmental policy, are, of course, at the heart of economic theory. Con-
cerning fairness, i.e. the intra- and intergenerational distribution of income,
the main contribution of economics is to investigate the relation between
ethical constraints and the development of welfare.
2.1.3 Fairness Criteria
One should distinguish carefully between efficient allocations of resources –
the standard focus of economic theory – and socially desired allocations that
may reflect intergenerational as well as intragenerational equity concerns. Due
to physical limits and ethical constraints on resource use, a sustainable devel-
opment path may not be the same as the efficient path predicted by standard
economic theory (see Pezzey, 1989 and Toman, 1994). For example, it might
be optimal from today’s perspective to use considerable amounts of natural
resources. But this resource use might not be fair for future generations if it
causes individual welfare to decrease in the far future (see Beltratti, 1996).
Furthermore, it should be noted that incorporating environmental values in
decision-making per se will not bring about sustainability unless each gen-
eration is committed to transferring to the next sufficient natural resources
and capital assets to make development sustainable. Put another way, the
problem of intergenerational equity must be viewed as an issue of ethics that
is distinct from economic efficiency in the Pareto sense (see Howarth and Nor-
gaard, 1992). For sustainability, one has to take the distribution of welfare
between present and future generations into account. One possible solution
is to alter the welfare criterion, which is the guideline for optimisation today.
Chichilnisky (1977) proposes a welfare function which is a convex combina-
tion of a discounted sum of instantaneous utilities and a minimum condition
for future utility levels. A more straightforward procedure is to include the
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additional element of intergenerational fairness in optimising by excluding
all efficient development paths which lead to declining average utility in the
future. To do so, the sustainability criterion is imposed as a prior constraint
on the maximisation of individual utility. Consequently, each successive gen-
eration ensures that the expected welfare of its children is no less than its
own perceived well-being (see Howarth, 1995).
2.1.4 Focusing on Capital Stocks
While individual welfare considerations are usually restricted to flow vari-
ables, some authors argue quite forcefully that capital stocks should be the
primary focus in the debate. Emphasising the quality of the natural envi-
ronment, sustainability is interpreted as “requiring some constancy in the
stock of natural environmental assets” (see Pearce et al., 1990). In this con-
text, “weak” and “strong” sustainability have become widely used terms.
Weak sustainability means that any form of natural capital can be run down,
provided that proceeds are reinvested in other forms of capital, for example
man-made capital. Strong sustainability, however, requires that the stock
of natural capital should not decline (Pearce and Atkinson, 1998). In this
context, one distinguishes between the requirement to conserve every single
natural resource and the requirement to conserve an aggregate natural capital
stock which leaves room for certain substitution possibilities.
In order to put the theoretical principles of strong sustainability into prac-
tice, one can lay down two main rules for the use of renewable natural re-
sources. First, the harvest rates should equal the regeneration rates. Second,
the waste emission rates should be in line with the natural assimilative ca-
pacity of the ecosystem. For non-renewable natural resources, the problem
is quite different. A strong management proposal is formulated by Turner
(1988). He argues that talking about sustainable use of a non-renewable re-
source is useless because any positive rate of exploitation will lead to the
exhaustion of the finite stock. However, it should be noted that the effect of
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exhaustion of certain stocks on welfare is by no means obvious; at least, it is
not directly given for all natural resources. It might be that utility remains
constant even with a decreasing stock of certain resources or that several
(very special) resources do not have an impact on utility at all. Nevertheless,
the following arguments in favour of strong environmental sustainability are
relevant (see Pearce and Atkinson, 1998). First, there is uncertainty about
the value of the elasticity of substitution between natural resources and man-
made capital. Second, there is an asymmetry between the different types
of capital with respect to reversibility: once certain critical natural capital
stocks are lost, they cannot be re-introduced. Put differently, a constant stock
of certain natural resources can be necessary because natural threshold and
irreversibility effects may severely limit the trade-offs that can be allowed be-
tween different resources without threatening sustainability (see Pearce et al.,
1988 and 1990). Third, the scale effects from the loss of critical natural cap-
ital are not known and, finally, consumers have an apparent “loss aversion”
that arises when certain natural resources are depleted.
The arguments in favour of strong sustainability given above should make
us more cautious about depleting natural capital, but the issues raised do not
add up to a complete justification for implementing this criterion. Pezzey
(1989), for example, expresses that trade-offs between natural and man-made
resources can, in principle, be calculated if appropriate weights are used. A
“quasi-sustainable” use of non-renewable resources can be achieved by limit-
ing their rate of depletion to the rate of creation of renewable substitutes (see
Daly, 1990). The concentration on natural capital stocks has been challenged
because this view does not consider intertemporal efficiency. According to
Dasgupta (1995), any stock concept is a “category mistake” because it mixes
up the determinants of human well-being and the constituents of well-being.
This means that capital stocks may influence welfare directly or indirectly
but they are not the final argument in the utility function.
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2.1.5 Sustainability in International Perspective
The final goal expressed by the notion of sustainability is non-decreasing wel-
fare between generations. Taking the special attributes of natural resources
into account, it is appropriate to supplement this general goal with an inter-
mediate target concerning certain requirements for the state of the natural
environment. The higher the probability of irreversibilities and the larger
the uncertainties about aggregate costs of damage, the safer the minimum
standards for the respective natural capital stocks should be (see Bretschger,
1998c).
Allowing for free trade between the economies and considering interna-
tional externalities does not alter the basic concept of sustainability as a
general guideline for policy. It seems to be straightforward to require sustain-
able development for all the regions of the world, which adds up to sustainable
development for the world as a whole. What does change, however, is the
way sustainability can be achieved. The international division of labour can
decrease but also, under unfavourable circumstances, increase the difficulties
in reaching sustainable development. On the one hand, free trade may allow
natural resource use to be diminished in the economies where the associated
costs are the lowest internationally. On the other hand, free trade might
intensify inefficient resource use in certain countries. If, for example, inter-
national prices of a free access natural resource are higher under free trade
than under autarky, trade may cause an overuse of certain natural resources.
A case in point is, for example, tropical timber (see Barbier, 2001).
Simple maximisation of the utility of present generations will generally
not be sufficient to reach sustainable development paths. This is true both
for a single country as well as for the decentralised world economy as a whole.
Present value maximisation incorporates neither the existence of positive and
negative externalities nor the sustainability constraint. It is, therefore, useful
to distinguish between three possible types of development paths: paths that
are reached under free market conditions, paths that materialise when all
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external effects are internalised by economic policy (“optimal paths”), and
paths that are sustainable, that is, exhibit non-declining individual utility
between generations. The free market and/or the optimal paths may be
sustainable in certain cases, but not under all conditions. The following
sections focus on the different links between growth, natural resource use and
trade in detail. Important issues not dealt with in existing literature are
pointed out in the last section of the chapter.
2.2 Natural Resources and Economic Growth
2.2.1 Growth and Sustainability
In this section, we identify the relevant issues which arise when the concept
of sustainability is introduced into several theories of economic growth. In
particular, we aim at analysing the interactions between the state of the envi-
ronment and the achieved growth paths. In older theory of economic growth,
the long-term growth rate is determined exogenously. Only the adjustment
growth to the steady-state can be explained by this theory. The emphasis is on
the accumulation of physical capital which is subject to diminishing returns.
In recent models of endogenous growth, however, the long-term growth rate
is explained endogenously, that is, it depends on the production technique,
preferences, and fiscal policy. Economic decisions carried out under market
conditions induce technical change and endogenously affect the stocks of all
kinds of capital, such as physical, human, public, and knowledge capital.
The mutual relation between economic growth and the environment can be
analysed as well. The relationship between natural environment and long-
term growth is important since there is only little gain in speculating about
hypothetical development paths that have no factual basis. Similarly, any
intuition about the consequences of discounting future well-being is elusive,
unless feasible development paths can be identified (see Koopmans, 1965).
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Thus, a profound study of sustainable growth is not possible without a sound
theory of economic growth, in particular, of endogenous growth.
Decreasing returns
to capital
ODRC
Constant returns
to capital
OCRC
Variable productivity
of inputs used in
dynamic sectors
PID
Variable quantity
of inputs used in
dynamic sectors
Endogenous work/
leisure-decision
QIDL
Endogenous
investment incentives
QIDI
One-sector models
Consumption goods State of the environment
Welfare
Multi-sector models
Figure 2.1: Types of growth models with natural resources
In the following, the different growth models which consider the effects
of natural resources are categorised in Figure 2.1. For each model, the re-
lation between growth and state of the environment will be analysed. The
figure shows that the final objective of the agents portrayed by any economic
growth theory is (individual) welfare. There are, in principle, two channels
which transmit the influence of the environment on welfare. First, there is
a direct impact of the state of the natural environment on personal well-
being, which applies, for instance, to the cases of air quality or the amenities
of the landscape. Here, it is obvious that ceteris paribus a better environ-
ment increases welfare. Second, environmental quality and natural resources
affect the production process and by this, indirectly, future consumption pos-
sibilities. The influence of the environment on the production sector can be
modelled in different manners which we will present in the following. We use
the term “capital” for accumulable (man-made) capital and the terms “nat-
ural resources” and “pollution” for the influence of the environment on the
production sector.
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2.2.2 Applying Different Growth Models
Depending on the assumptions about the marginal productivity of capital,
long-term growth is either an exogenous or an endogenous variable in the
model. Postulating sufficiently decreasing returns to capital, the growth
process peters out in the long term. The assumption of constant returns
to capital, however, renders endogenous growth in the long term feasible; it
keeps savings and investment incentives at a constant (positive) level. In
addition, one can distinguish between one-sector models and multi-sector
growth models. In one-sector models, the production technique is the same
for consumption and investment goods. Multi-sector models usually have a
dynamic sector, for example, research and development or education, and one
or more static sectors for the production of consumer goods. In these models,
the growth rate depends on the characteristics of the dynamic sector. Multi-
sector models which include natural resource effects can further be divided
into models where environmental quality directly alters the productivity of
inputs in the dynamic sector, and models where the quantity of inputs used
in the dynamic sector is affected. The latter is portrayed either by incorpo-
rating leisure into the model, which allows for more or less labour being used
in the dynamic sector, or by varying investment incentives, for example, in
research and development (R&D), which alters the quantity of inputs used in
the dynamic sector.
In the following, we summarise the relevant literature and provide an in-
tuition for the behaviour of the archetype models. We show under which as-
sumptions and conditions (positive) endogenous growth can be realised while
the environmental quality does not deteriorate. Taking the limited preten-
sion of this strand of literature into consideration, such a development can
be called sustainable. In addition, the focus will be on the dynamic effects of
environmental policy. After the general discussion, we will study the growth
effects of a “green tax reform” in particular.
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2.2.3 Model Type ODRC
A traditional approach to modelling the growth process is by way of a one-
sector model with decreasing returns to capital (ODRC). The most prominent
representative of this class is the neo-classical growth model. As a conse-
quence of the decreasing returns to capital, growth can only be explained in
the medium term, that is, only in the phase of adjustment to the long-term
steady state. In the long term, the growth rate is determined by exoge-
nous technical parameters (i.e. by exogenous labour-augmenting technical
progress). This modelling approach in particular encompasses the standard
“Solow”-model with a constant savings rate and the so-called “Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans”-model, which is based on intertemporal optimisation. Using the
“Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans”-approach, the state of the environment can be in-
cluded in the utility function, so that abatement activities become desirable.
A rise in the concern for the environment can be expressed by an increased
weight of the environment in the utility function or by the introduction of
taxes to internalise the negative externalities of pollution. According to the
assumptions regarding the production function, more environmental care does
not affect the growth rate in the long run in this setting. But environmental
policy leads to a different steady-state. If the use of capital generates pollu-
tion, the environmental policy induced steady state is characterised by a lower
capital intensity. This is due to an increase in the price of capital relative
to the other production factors. This price increase is a consequence of the
environmental policy, which is aimed at a less polluting production process,
that is, a taxation of the polluting production factors, namely capital (see
Gradus and Smulders, 1993).
Now assume, alternatively, that the natural environment has an impact on
capital formation, since a natural resource is used in the production process.
With increasing exhaustion of this natural resource, its price is assumed to
rise such that the quantity used in production decreases over time. This
is the standard assumption given that the natural resource stems from a
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fixed stock, that is, an exhaustible (non-renewable) resource. If, in the one-
sector approach, all inputs, notably capital, natural resources, and labour, are
treated symmetrically, growth is only sustainable if the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the inputs exceeds a critical value (see Bretschger, 1998a). With
a constant savings rate as in the “Solow”-model, the critical value is exactly
equal to unity. For the corresponding Cobb-Douglas production function,
Stiglitz (1974) shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for a constant
level of consumption (with no technical change) is that the share of natural
resources is less than the share of capital. Formulated in terms of the re-
quired savings, the consumption level can be sustained exactly, provided all
returns on the natural resource are used for capital accumulation. This is
the so-called “Hartwick-rule”. However, if savings are realistically assumed
to depend on interest rates as in the “Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans”-model, the
critical value must be strictly larger than unity. This is necessary to obtain
constant incentives for investments, which means constant returns to capital
when the quantity of capital is increased over time. A value that is larger
than unity leads to a decreasing share of natural inputs and an increasing
share of capital of total income.
The prerequisite of elasticities of substitution between natural and other
inputs being larger than unity has attracted severe criticism. Many authors
have argued that physical laws limit the extent to which physical capital can
substitute for the natural capital stock. On the other hand, not only physical
capital but also human and knowledge capital should be considered. For
the last two capital components, the restrictions of material balances do not
apply (see Smulders, 1995a). In addition, in a multi-sector model further
substitution possibilities emerge, namely the substitution between sectors,
which results in a new determination of the critical values for the elasticity
of substitution (see the QIDI-models below).
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2.2.4 Model Type OCRC
Up to now, we have seen that if we assume decreasing returns to capital one
cannot explain the long-term growth rates. From now on, we will therefore
assume constant returns to capital to obtain an endogenous growth rate.
In the one-sector approach (OCRC), this specification leads to the so-called
“Rebelo”-model of economic growth theory, which, in our case, is supple-
mented by the natural resources and pollution aspects. Again, the use of
capital is assumed to be polluting and the state of the environment is in-
cluded in the utility function, so that abatement activities are desirable. As a
consequence of the one-sector structure, no resource-saving knowledge can be
generated and therefore no transition to a less polluting production process
is possible. There is just one production factor in the model, namely cap-
ital. The term “capital” is sometimes interpreted in a broad sense, so as
to include physical, human, and knowledge capital. In the “Rebelo”-model,
however, capital is introduced as an aggregate variable so that we have no
explicit substitution possibility for any form of input. Income can be used
for consumption, capital investments or cleaning activities. Let us first as-
sume that factor productivity is not affected by environmental quality. Under
the specification of this model, a decrease in pollution due to a tighter en-
vironmental policy (or an exogenous rise in the disutility of pollution) gives
rise to more cleaning activities and, therefore, to a crowding-out of consump-
tion and investments. The crowding-out of investments reduces the growth
rate; therefore, a negative relation between growth and environmental care
emerges (see Gradus and Smulders, 1993). However, welfare is higher in the
new steady-state because of a better environmental quality.
The dismal consequences of this model will no longer materialise as soon as
there are productivity effects of natural resources or substitution possibilities
in production. If one gives up the assumption that the environment does
not affect the factor productivity, a different result can be obtained. As
before, more concern for the environment leads to more abatement activities
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and, consequently, to a better environmental quality. But now, assume that a
cleaner natural environment implies an increase in the productivity of capital.
This positive effect boosts the growth rate. If the positive effect is high
enough, the negative crowding-out of growth-generating investments brought
about by abatement activities can be offset. Thus, an increasing growth
rate and a cleaner environment can be reached under these assumptions (see
Smulders and Gradus, 1996).
Aside from the productivity effect, the substitution effect between several
input factors is another possible ingredient in the one-sector approach. As-
sume a production sector with capital, natural resources, and labour as inputs,
where the assumption of constant returns to capital still holds ceteris paribus.
(This is an extension of the “Rebelo”-model.) The resulting production func-
tion has increasing returns to scale. But this property does not change the
results on input substitution as compared to the case of decreasing returns to
capital. The reason is that a decreasing input of the natural resource affects
the return on capital negatively such that the ceteris-paribus condition does
not hold in this case. Regarding the effects of capital accumulation which
is accompanied by a decrease in the use of natural resources, the return on
capital decreases over time. Thus the behaviour of the ODRC-model carries
over to the OCRC-model in this case.
To conclude discussion on one-sector models, one can summarise that
a direct connection between the long-term growth rate and the state of the
environment only exists if constant returns to capital are assumed. Whether a
cleaner environment or a more moderate use of natural resources, respectively,
is compatible with an increasing growth rate depends on whether one assumes
factor productivity gains from a better quality of the environment.
2.2.5 Model Type PID
We now turn to multi-sector models. First, we analyse models in which the
environment may alter the productivity of the inputs used in the dynamic
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sector (PID) where growth is generated. Many authors focus on the so-called
“Uzawa-Lucas”-model. This model has a production sector producing con-
sumption and investment goods and an education sector, where skills (i.e.
human capital) are generated. Growth is driven by human capital accumula-
tion, that is, without advancements in the education sectors, growth peters
out. As before, assume the use of capital to be polluting. What is the effect
of environmental policy, for example, of the internalisation of pollution, in
this case?
In this simple setting, environmental policy influences only the marginal
value of physical capital but not the efficiency of human capital in the ed-
ucation sector. Therefore, the growth rate of the economy remains unaf-
fected by environmental policy. However, the capital intensity decreases in
the steady-state due to changed relative prices of capital components. As in
the one-sector case, the price increase is a consequence of the taxation on the
polluting production factors. The only direct way to stimulate growth is a
rise in the productivity in the education sector. A further possibility (which
is in fact valid in all growth models) would be a decline in time preferences.
This applies here because lower time preferences lead to more education and
therefore to an increased output in the future. But normally, the size of
the discount rate is not explained by economic theory, that is, it remains an
exogenous variable.
If, however, one extends the “Uzawa-Lucas”-model in the sense that pol-
lution also affects learning abilities, that is, the marginal returns to education,
the effects of environmental quality on the growth rate are different. Assume
pollution to decrease learning abilities (which has been observed empirically
in regions with heavy pollution of the air, for example in Mexico City). Con-
sequently, investments in human capital become less efficient with higher
pollution. Similarly, it can be assumed that the depreciation rate of human
capital is increased by higher pollution. As above, more environmental care
leads to more abatement activities and to a better environmental quality. But
now, the output per unit of human capital rises as a consequence of environ-
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mental policy which stimulates human capital accumulation and, thereby, the
growth rate of the whole economy. This positive effect can normally not be
offset by the crowding-out of investments due to more cleaning activities. The
result is a higher growth rate and less pollution (see Gradus and Smulders,
1993).
Another version of the “Uzawa-Lucas”-model does not include physical
capital at all. Moreover, in this pure human capital version, growth is driven
by human capital accumulation. Pollution is assumed to have a negative
impact on both the productivity in the final goods sector and the acquisition
of skills. In other words, the engine of growth is again impaired by pollution.
Positively formulated, a cleaner environment due to higher pollution taxes or
more concern for the environment leads to an increased productivity in the
learning sector and, therefore, to a higher growth rate (see van Ewijk and van
Wijnbergen, 1995).
Now let us consider the Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) model in which
the environment affects the production function of consumption goods in two
different ways. Environmental quality is, on the one hand, modelled as an
input factor. It is introduced as the stock of natural capital which provides
productive services to economic activities. The stock of natural capital has
a natural regeneration rate, which increases the stock. On the other hand,
the stock is diminished by the use of natural resources in production (or by
“pollution”, respectively). As a further element of this approach, resource-
saving technologies can substitute for the use of natural resources (or for
“pollution”). These technologies are generated in the learning sector. Also,
the learning sector is using natural resources as an input.
Two different cases can then be distinguished: one in which only the
environment (meaning the natural capital stock) enters the utility function
and another in which the environment enters the production function too.
In the first case, more concerns for the environment give rise to a declining
productivity of both kinds of man-made capital, that is, physical capital
and resource-saving knowledge. This is because natural resources and man-
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made capital are substitutes, so that a decline of one input decreases the
productivity of the other. As a consequence, we have falling rates of return
on investments and a declining growth rate. This effect varies positively with
the influence of natural resources on production of consumption goods and
negatively with the influence of physical capital on production in the learning
sector. In the second case, lower resource use exerts a strong positive impact
on factor productivity in final goods production in the long run. This effect
varies positively with the production shared of natural and physical capital,
and negatively with the impact of natural resource use on capital productivity.
An extension of this first approach is to assume that natural resources
are essential for the production of consumption and private capital goods as
well as for the production of public knowledge. In this case, a tighter envi-
ronmental policy results in a reallocation of economic activity away from the
pollution-intensive private goods sector towards the production of knowledge,
which is assumed to be a substitute for pollution. Furthermore, anticipating
the future benefits of a better environment and a increased productivity of
accumulated assets due to better public knowledge, consumers demand more
final goods. These two effects result in a fall of private capital accumulation.
In the long term, however, more and more environmentally friendly technolo-
gies are developed, so that the private goods sector recovers gradually. Taken
together, the tighter environmental policy leads to a higher rate of return
and a higher growth rate which is sustained by higher investments in private
capital, knowledge capital, and natural resources; for transitional effects see
Bovenberg and Smulders (1996). In a special case of this model, the environ-
ment is assumed to be a pure investment good. Using this specification, the
long-term behaviour does not change, but growth also rises in the short term.
Due to rapidly accruing productivity gains, the crowding-out of investments
in man-made assets can be offset immediately (see Smulders, 1995b).
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 33
2.2.6 Model Type QIDL
In the previous section we have looked at multi-sector models in which the
influence of natural environment on the production sectors and, therefore, on
the growth rate occurred through factor productivity changes. As already
mentioned, there is another way to model growth effects of the environment.
We now assume that the production sector and the growth rate are influ-
enced by environment-induced changes in the quantity of inputs used in the
dynamic sector of the economy.
In many growth models, the available working time of the individuals
is constant, that is, a fixed labour supply is assumed. For example, in the
Uzawa-Lucas approach, time can only be spent either on the production of
final goods or on studying, but leisure is disregarded in this model setup.
Including leisure in the model (which leads us to the QIDL-model) means
that the available time for productive activities is no longer constant, since
leisure is not productive. However, leisure enters positively in the utility
function.
The question now arises as to whether the introduction of leisure affects
the time allocation. In particular, we have to ask if a tighter environmental
policy, for example, the introduction of a pollution tax, increases the time
spent in education. A higher pollution tax leads to more abatement activities
which requires resources from the consumer sector. Decreasing consumption
leads to higher marginal utility of consumption. To equate marginal utility of
leisure and of consumption, households choose to increase studying time and
to decrease leisure. Put differently, individuals aim to counteract reduced
consumption possibilities by reducing leisure time, while, indeed, spending
more time studying, which increases human capital accumulation and the
growth rate. Therefore, one conceivable result of this model setup is that
a tighter environmental policy has a positive impact on economic growth
(Hettich, 1998).
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2.2.7 Model Type QIDI
Another mechanism of varying quantities of inputs used in the dynamic sector
works through investment incentives (QIDI). In multi-sector models man-
made capital is not only an input into production but also an output of specific
sectors in an economy. This fact has a large influence on the sustainability
results. By modelling this double role of capital, one can show that it is the
substitution between primary inputs (such as labour and natural resources)
as well as the substitution between different sectors of the economy that
matter for long-term development. To derive this effect, it is assumed that
the dynamic R&D-sector is relatively extensive in the use of natural resources.
Regarding the incentives to invest in the capital-producing sector, that is,
in the R&D-sector which produces knowledge capital, there is a cost and a
reward effect. Following an increase in the price of natural resources, costs
in the dynamic sector decrease, provided that labour is a bad substitute for
the natural resource (see Bretschger, 1998a). So, viewed from the cost effect,
a low elasticity of substitution between primary inputs does not prevent the
economy from remaining on a sustainable growth path. In standard growth
models, which use monopolistic competition to determine the rewards of the
dynamic sector (e.g. R&D), rewards of investments remain unaffected by
natural resources (see Bretschger, 1998a). If, however, capital (e.g. knowl-
edge capital) can substitute for natural resources, the rewards for investments
increase with rising prices of natural resources. In this case, the positive in-
centive effect of rising resource prices on capital investments is strengthened.
Thus, it can be demonstrated that, while in a one-sector set-up of the
model, growth is only sustainable if the elasticity of substitution between
natural and other inputs is larger than unity, in multi-sector models the elas-
ticity may be smaller than unity in some sectors without making growth
unsustainable. This suggests that the trade-off between long-term economic
development and the protection of the environment is, under realistic assump-
tions, smaller than commonly postulated.
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2.2.8 Green Tax Reform and Growth
A widely discussed issue today is the combination of an increase in environ-
mental taxes and a parallel decrease in taxes on other factors, the so-called
“green tax reform” [for an extensive survey of open economy models analysing
the effects of such a tax scheme, see Smulders (2001)]. In the contribution
of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), there are two channels through which an
environmental tax reform may yield not only an improvement in the envi-
ronment but also a higher growth rate, that is, a so-called “dynamic double
dividend”. The first channel is effective due to a positive environmental ex-
ternality on production; the second channel operates by a shift in the tax
burden away from the return on capital accumulation towards profits. The
second channel, contrary to the first, only works if the elasticity of substitu-
tion between pollution and other inputs is not too high, so that the base of
the pollution tax is inelastic.
Considering several taxes simultaneously, Hettich (1998) and Hettich and
Svane (1998) investigate the interactions between public finance, endogenous
growth, and the environment. Whereas in both models human capital ac-
cumulation in the education sector is assumed to be the engine of growth,
Hettich (1998) treats leisure as an endogenous choice variable and Hettich
and Svane (1998) assume leisure to be given exogenously. Without govern-
mental intervention in favour of natural resources the effect in both models is
that pollution is too high, too few abatement activities are undertaken, and
final goods production is too capital intensive.
In the endogenous leisure model, a pollution tax, contrary to a tax on
consumption, capital or labour, leads to increased long-term economic growth
as well as increased welfare as long as the tax is below the Pigouvian level.
One reason for the positive effect of the pollution tax on growth is that
leisure is reduced in favour of studying time. Consequently, more human
capital is accumulated and the growth rate increases. In the model with
given leisure, factor income taxes reduce growth. A pollution tax, however,
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leads to a stimulation of the growth rate if the productive spillovers of a better
environmental quality are high enough. Due to the increasing quality of the
environment, welfare is improved as long as pollution exceeds the optimal
level.
If the labour market is added to the model, one can analyse not only the in-
teractions between environmental quality and long-term growth, but also the
employment effects (see the approach of Nielsen et al., 1995). These authors
assume a further (rather special) ingredient, namely that the productivity
of pollution abatement activities varies negatively with environmental qual-
ity. Two kinds of exogenous changes are considered. First, if there is a shift
towards more concern for the environmental quality, the optimal pollution
tax rate increases, whereas the optimal level of abatement expenditures de-
creases due to the falling productivity of pollution abatement activities. The
employment effect is ambiguous, that is, it depends upon the tax regime.
Second, the tax regime may shift from a command-and-control tax regime,
under which the firms can pollute the environment free of charge up to the
limit given by the standards, towards a pollution tax regime, under which
environmental property rights are assigned to the public and all firms are
forced to pay for the services from the environment. This change implies
an improved efficiency of environmental regulation. As a consequence, both
the growth rate and consumer welfare increase, without any adverse effect
on environmental quality. In addition, there are employment gains since the
pollution tax revenues allow a reduction in the labour tax.
2.3 Development in Open Economies
2.3.1 Trade and Dynamics
Trade theory is mainly concerned with static models. If capital accumulation
is introduced, a middle-term adjustment process to the steady-state with the
help of the neo-classical growth model can be analysed. Another possible
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direction in research is to look at the consequences of exogenous growth on
the foreign trade position of a country. Here, how international trade is
affected by economic growth abroad (increasing consumption demand from
foreign economies) or by domestic growth (better production conditions in
the domestic economy) can be studied. But as in the closed economy, the
prediction of sustainable development paths in open economies requires a
theory of endogenous growth.
As has become clear in the last section, endogenous growth requires con-
stant returns to capital. Constant returns are normally motivated by the
existence of positive spillovers, for example, knowledge spillovers in the sense
of learning-by-doing. Furthermore, spillovers are assumed to increase with
the extent of economic activity. Taking the example of research, this means
that current research is the more productive the more research has already
been carried out in the past (see Romer, 1990). Put differently, the greater
the knowledge capital is, the greater the advantage for future additions be-
comes. The same is true for other capital components like human capital and
public infrastructure. Therefore, it is decisive for the international division
of labour in what way the economies of scale of a country can be shared by
the other countries, and inversely, in what way each individual country can
participate in the economies of scale of the other countries (see Grossman and
Helpman, 1991).
2.3.2 Scale and Reallocation Effects
Since the possibilities to exploit scale effects are broader in the international
context, new growth chances arise from the establishment of outward rela-
tionships. The international transmission of knowledge certainly provides
such prospects. If knowledge arises as a side product of different kinds of
investments, the size of the geographical spread of the knowledge spillovers is
important for the dynamics of open economies (see Young, 1991; Ben-David
and Loewy, 1998; Bretschger, 1997). Positive spillovers are also effective
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in the accumulation of other factors like public services and human capital.
Typically, however, the effect of public services is limited to the geographical
region which belongs to the political unit considered. Human capital is inter-
nationally mobile only if skilled labour migrates over the country boundaries.
In reality, the share of internationally mobile skilled labour is small in compar-
ison to the total amount of skilled labour. If economies of scale remain partly
or totally limited to a country or a region, distinct specialisation patterns
arise in the interregional and international division of labour. A country or
region can gain economies of scale in special industries which are not or barely
existent in other places. By analysing the history of clearly defined regions of
economic specialisation, one may be able to show how such specialisation, for
example, in financial services, heavy industry locations, high-tech commodity
production, etc., is generated via accumulated scale effects. The beginning of
such a development can often be traced to rather accidental circumstances.
Another crucial point in the transition from autarky to free trade is the
trade induced change in the intersectoral factor allocation (see Bretschger,
1999). After the opening of an economy to free trade, a country with com-
parative advantage in traditional production will specialise in this field. In
contrast, countries with comparative advantage in research or in high-tech
production will use more resources in these sectors (while becoming a net-
importer of traditional goods). If the positive spillovers are of different inten-
sity for the different sectors and, additionally, are not fully international in
scope, resource reallocation caused by trade has an impact on growth. If the
learning-intensive sectors which generate extensive spillovers increase in size,
the growth rate rises, while in the opposite case, the growth rate decreases.
Trade thus might, under unfavourable conditions, decrease the growth rate
(see Grossman and Helpman, 1991 and Bretschger, 1997).
To evaluate the consequences of international trade for sustainability, the
environmental dimension needs to be added. In the following section we there-
fore introduce pollution and the use of natural resources into open economy
growth models.
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2.4 Trade, Growth, and the Environment
In this section, we look at models of open economies which take the environ-
ment and long-term growth into account. In particular, we are interested in
the interactions between trade, economic growth, and the environment. Thus,
the link between the environment and growth on the one hand and between
trade and growth on the other hand need to be considered simultaneously.
Obviously, this is a challenging subject and only some of the immanent is-
sues have been dealt with so far. In this section, we will discuss the existing
literature and consider the remaining issues in Section 2.6.
2.4.1 Small Open Economies
A representative model of a small open economy is constructed as follows (see
Elbasha and Roe, 1996): there are two final output sectors and a research and
development sector; output is produced with primary inputs and differenti-
ated intermediate goods . The output of the R&D sector consists of patents
which contain the knowledge to produce new intermediate goods. Pollution
can either be assumed to be caused by final output or by differentiated inter-
mediate goods. The small open economy grows at a rate which is different
from the world growth rate because of somewhat specific assumptions, such
as the assumption of no trade in intermediate goods. In the model, trade
alters the relative prices of final goods and, thereby, the dynamic behaviour
of the whole economy.
In accordance with the R&D-models of endogenous growth of the closed
economy, one finds that, in this setting, long-term growth increases with a
country’s endowments in primary factors. This is due to the fact that a larger
resource base leads to a larger research sector and increased spillovers. More-
over, the growth rate increases with the degree of market power of patent
holders since this means increasing incentives for R&D-investments. The ef-
fects of environmental policy on growth depend on the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution of consumption. If this elasticity is greater than unity,
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growth of output is reduced after a tighter environmental policy has been
implemented. If this elasticity is less than unity, a tighter environmental
policy promotes growth. Finally, if it is equal to unity (logarithmic utility
function), growth remains unaffected. A high elasticity of substitution means
that agents find it optimal to choose a low level of environmental quality (see
Aghion and Howitt, 1998). According to empirical literature, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is close to unity. According to Elbasha and
Roe (1996), it is less than unity, so that the relation between environmental
quality and growth would be positive in this model.
The effects of trade on the environment and welfare are ambiguous. They
depend on the price elasticities of the supply of traded goods, on the terms
of trade-effects on growth, and on the pollution intensities of the different
sectors. Numerical exercises suggest that trade worsens the environmental
quality but enhances welfare.
The added value of this model compared to static approach consists in
including the dynamic dimension in the determination of welfare. Being able
to treat, in a consistent framework, the effects of trade on the environment
and on growth simultaneously, policymakers become better informed about
the whole variety of consequences of different trade policy measures.
Whether an endogenously growing small open economy is able to imple-
ment an independent environmental policy crucially depends upon the tax
system (see Hettich and Svane, 1998). Under a residence-based income tax,
which discriminates between domestic-source and foreign-source income, it
is possible to implement an independent environmental policy which has an
impact on the domestic interest rate. The impact of a change in the in-
terest rate can only be fully captured in a dynamic setting. While a static
model will only provide information on the input mix at a certain point in
time, a dynamic model is able to show the influence of the interest rate on
intertemporal decisions determining the growth rate. By using a residence-
based income tax, a country is thus able to determine its own growth rate.
Under a source-based tax system, however, where the after-tax interest rate
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equals the world interest rate, the government can no longer implement its
own first best environmental policy.
2.4.2 Comparative Advantage
Considering the supply of natural resources, labour, and capital in rich and
poor countries, Anderson (1993) explains why exports of backward countries
will first be concentrated in primary products. In a second stage of devel-
opment, according to his contribution, the comparative advantage of lagging
economies will gradually shift to manufactures and, eventually, to services. In
this way, it is possible for later-industrialising countries to export their way
out of poverty. This development process is, however, often hindered by gov-
ernment interference. Governments of poorer economies tend to discriminate
against the primary sectors and in industrialised countries declining industries
tend to be protected. In many cases, protectionist trade policy measures are
claimed to address environmental problems (Schulze and Ursprung, 2001c).
The agriculture and mining (coal) sectors are, however, policy fields in which
good examples of trade liberalisation is liable to improve the state of the en-
vironment and, thereby, the basis for international sustainable development
(see Anderson, 1993 and Ervin, 2001).
2.4.3 North/South-Relations
A different effect of environmental policy on R&D-driven growth, results if
only certain countries are able to innovate, whereas others are not. This
asymmetry underlies in the so-called dynamic “North/South”-models, which
divide the world in a dynamic and innovative region, called “North”, and a
less developed region, called “South”. Bretschger (1998b) analyses the effects
of an environmental policy undertaken by the North on worldwide natural
resource use which causes global pollution and on the growth rate of the world
economy. To determine economic activities in the South, two versions of the
displacement of production from the North to the South are considered. In the
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first version, the South imitates the product designs of the North (“imitation
hypothesis”). In the second version, the North has the opportunity to shift
the production to the South (“production shift hypothesis”).
Rather surprisingly, the results obtained are very similar for the two ver-
sions. Under realistic parameter constellations, a decreasing pollution in the
North (achieved by environmental policy) is not offset by an increasing pol-
lution in the South. Even in cases where pollution in the South rises as a
consequence of an increased economic activity in the South, the worldwide
positive effect of Northern environmental policy on nature is still guaranteed.
The growth effect of the decrease in pollution in the North is ambiguous. It
is dependent on the flexibility of the production process, which is measured
by the elasticity of substitution between natural resources and labour (being
the other primary production input). If this elasticity is small, the world-
wide growth rate increases. This is due to the cost effect in the dynamic
sector and corresponds to the QIDI-models (see above). If this elasticity is
large, worldwide growth decreases. According to the results of this model,
the slowing-down of growth does not, in most cases, mean that the growth
rate becomes negative. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the imitation
effect, compared to the production shift effect, has a larger impact on the
environment but a weaker one on growth. Worldwide sustainability is a very
likely outcome under all possible scenarios. Thus, free trade among different
world regions does not, in general, appear to endanger the goal of worldwide
sustainability.
2.4.4 International Cooperation
It is obvious that international agreements on environmental standards have
growth effects (see van der Ploeg and Ligthart, 1994). The non-cooperative
outcome of a differential game for a global economy is characterised by an ex-
cessive use of (renewable) natural resources due to the apparent international
environmental externalities. International policy cooperation results in a re-
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duced use of resources, lower growth, increased welfare, and an improved envi-
ronmental quality, unless there are positive international knowledge spillovers
in production and/or international spillovers in public spending. However,
the opposite result concerning environmental quality and growth cannot be
excluded. If there are international knowledge spillovers in production and
if public spending in one country benefits productivity in other countries as
well, optimal international policy coordination can harm environmental qual-
ity and boost the economic growth rate. These results are derived under
the assumptions that (i) the period of commitment is equal to the planning
horizon, (ii) only two countries are involved in negotiating and (iii) the coun-
tries are identical. For a detailed discussion of these assumptions see Schmidt
(2001).
2.4.5 Trade and Resource Growth
The impact of free trade on welfare in economies with open access renewable
natural resources is analysed in Brander and Taylor (1997a and 1997b). The
authors establish that the pattern of trade and the structure of production
depend on a simple ratio of the biological resource and the country’s labour
endowment growth rate. Aside from the resource good, manufactures are
consumed. For a broad range of parameter values, the resource exporting
country will not fully specialise in producing the resource good. The steady-
state utility levels fall in this country as a consequence of a move to free trade
because the open access externalities are aggravated by trade, that is by an
improvement in the terms of trade. While the intuitive link from low resource-
management standards to increased resource exports and lower welfare can
be portrayed in this model, the authors show that this link does not emerge
under various conditions. If we assume that harvesting the resource becomes
more difficult as the stock is depleted, productivity in harvesting rises with an
increasing stock. A well-managed resource is then relatively cheap in the long
run and a conservationist country may well be able to obtain a comparative
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advantage in the resource good. According to the authors, when introducing
trade with a country that has a very poor resource management, the conser-
vationist exports the resource good and both countries experience an increase
in welfare. If, on the other hand, the non-conservationist country overuses
its resource to a lesser extent, the result is reversed and the conservationist
country is not compensated for its resource management but experiences a
welfare loss, as does the non-conservationist country.
2.5 Empirical Evidence
Summarising the behaviour of the surveyed models, the impression of an
ambiguous relation between the state of environment and economic growth
emerges. The more complex models, which include elements such as different
sectors, international trade, and abatement activities, suggests a negative
relation between natural resource use and long-term growth. Under these
circumstances it is paramount to look at the empirical relation between the
income level and the state of the environment and, in addition, to compare
the natural resource use and the growth performance of different countries.
2.5.1 Environmental Kuznets Curve
Looking at the correlation between per capita income and the pollution of
the environment in an international comparison, pollution seems to follow
a hump-shaped pattern, the so-called “environmental Kuznets curve” (see
Grossman and Krueger, 1995 and Grossman, 1995). Structural changes in
the composition of aggregate output, the replacement of old capital by new
capital, and environmental policy are the most important reasons for decreas-
ing pollution after a certain stage of development is reached (see McConnell,
1997). The inverted U-shaped pattern especially applies to certain regional
pollution effects, such as urban air quality and water quality in rivers, where
abatement is relatively inexpensive. However, it does not apply to global pol-
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lution effects such as greenhouse emissions, to commercial energy consump-
tion or to municipal waste (see Moomaw and Unruh, 1997 and Rothman,
1998). In addition, it has been shown that highly developed countries have
been able to reduce their energy requirements by importing manufactured
goods which used to be produced in the domestic economy at earlier stages of
development (see Suri and Chapman, 1998). So the observed improvements
in environmental quality might therefore well be a consequence, at least in
part, of the increased ability of consumers in wealthy nations to distance
themselves from polluting production.
2.5.2 Natural Resources and Growth
As has become clear from the theoretical analysis, economies with abundant
natural resources do not need to grow faster than countries with only few
natural resources. Sachs and Warner (1995) show for the period 1971 - 1989
that economies with a high initial GDP share of natural resource exports
tend to have low growth rates during the subsequent period. This negative
relationship holds even after controlling for initial per capita income, trade
policy, government efficiency and investment rates, which are all considered to
be important in explaining the growth rate. The authors mention motivation
problems of individuals who get rich easy, increased rent-seeking behaviour
in resource-abundant economies and the decrease of the manufacturing sec-
tor as possible explanations for their findings. The last argument refers to
the motivation underlying industrialisation policies in the 1940s and 50s and
the discussion of the so-called “Dutch Disease”. The special attributes of
industrialisation are the high intensity of backward and forward linkages to
the rest of the economy and the intensity of learning externalities, that is of
positive spillovers. In some estimations, the authors find modest support for
the Dutch Disease hypothesis.
Gylfason et al. (1999) investigate the dynamic implications of natural
resources endowments on per capita growth by approximating the supply of
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natural resources with the size of the primary and secondary sector, in which
primary goods (agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining) are produced by
using an alternative technology. In a cross-section estimation with the ex-
planatory variables initial GDP, initial share of the labour force employed in
the primary sectors, external debt in proportion to GDP, real exchange rate
volatility, initial primary and secondary school enrolments, and an Africa
dummy, the authors find a statistically significant negative relationship be-
tween the size of the primary sector and the average rate of growth. The
explanatory power of the eduction variable is reduced when primary sector
employment or primary sector exports are used as additional explanatory
variables. This seems to support the hypothesis that a preponderance of the
primary sector production tends to inhibit economic growth by discouraging
investments in human capital or research and development. However, the
measure for natural resource supply is very broad in this study. Moreover,
the measure does not discriminate between natural resource problems and
the well-known structural problems of farming and mining.
2.6 Lessons and Open Issues
2.6.1 Some Lessons
In the public debate, economic growth, the globalisation of markets, and the
increasing specialisation of regions or countries are often viewed as major
threats to the sustainability of long-term development. The surveyed litera-
ture reveals, however, that this negative view is not appropriate. Growth and
free trade provide a variety of options for solving the current environmental
problems. To be sure, the existence of different options does not mean that
present generations automatically choose a sustainable development path. It
should also be remembered that environmental problems are the consequence
of market failures which are already present in a static representation of the
closed economy. These inefficiencies may well be aggravated by free trade
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and economic growth, which has to be taken into account when formulating
appropriate policy measures. Finally, for sustainability, the requirement of
fairness regarding future generations has to be added explicitly to the general
policy guidelines.
Most contributions to the literature in the field of environment, growth,
and trade focus on the first two aspects and thus neglect the international
dimension. What lessons for sustainability can be learned from this limited
approach, and what results can be generalised for the general topic of sustain-
ability in open economies. The most important lesson from the combination
of growth theory and environmental economics is that economic growth and
environmental care are compatible in principle. This statement is valid inde-
pendent of the observation that certain natural resources are over-used in the
present situation. Pollution is due to market inefficiencies and the current use
of exhaustible resources hardly satisfies intergenerational fairness considera-
tions. To better preserve the natural capital stock, it is therefore necessary to
reduce the use of certain natural resources. On the other hand, sustainability
requires that welfare does not decrease in the future. The decreasing amount
of natural inputs therefore needs to be sufficiently compensated for by the ac-
cumulation of man-made inputs consisting of different forms of capital. The
greater the saving effort of the present generation is, the easier the substitu-
tion of natural resources in production and consumption becomes. But saving
means consumption renunciation and this renunciation is economically attrac-
tive only if the proceeds from saving and investment are sufficiently high. An
adjustment of the relative prices under the title “removal of external costs”
is already advisable in the name of present-day environmental protection.
However, with internalisation, we obtain optimal development paths but sus-
tainability is not yet guaranteed. Even stronger measures and an additional
acceleration of the substitution of natural resources in the production are
necessary for future generations not to fall back to a lower utility level on
optimal growth paths.
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Traditional one-sector models conclude that conditions for the sustain-
ability of long-term development are favourable, provided that the elasticity
of substitution between the natural resource and accumulated capital is high.
Moreover, the existence of substantial positive spillovers is shown to be advan-
tageous for sustainable growth. These preconditions may well be disputed. It
is for this reason that an additional mechanism has to be emphasised in this
context. This mechanism, which is represented in multi-sector models only,
is the continuous reallocation of resources between the different sectors of an
economy. Learning-intensive sectors should increase their share of aggregate
production while natural resource-intensive sectors should gradually shrink
over the course of time. If one proceeds the realistic assumption that natural
resource intensity and learning intensities are negatively correlated between
the different economic sectors, intersectoral reallocation of resources becomes
one of the most powerful instruments to achieve sustainability. In this way,
sufficient new knowledge capital and human capital, which substitute for the
natural resources in the long term, can be formed. New knowledge also allows
one to realise a massive increase in efficiency when using natural resources.
The impact of trade on economic growth is determined by scale and re-
source reallocation effects. Analogous effects are working in the context of
sustainable growth. The main difference is that economic growth often gen-
erates positive externalities while environmental problems generate negative
externalities. Scale effects induced by international trade unambiguously sup-
port capital accumulation and thus the mechanics of economic growth. If the
accumulation of capital harms the natural environment, it is necessary to
tighten environmental policy according to the increased growth rate. On the
other hand, it is possible that the additionally accumulated capital is a sub-
stitute for the use of natural resources, as is the case for human or knowledge
capital. Then, a higher growth rate improves the conditions for sustainable
development. One should note that the internalisation of the economy has,
in the case of scale effects, only an indirect effect on the natural environment
through the effect on growth. For the various resource reallocation effects
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caused by trade, the impact on the environment and sustainability is more
direct. The positive aspect of internalisation is that the principle of com-
parative advantage in international trade may improve worldwide conditions
for knowledge production and for abatement of environmental damage. As
relative costs of these activities are not the same across countries, sustain-
ability can be achieved at the lowest economic cost, by means of international
labour division. On the negative side, there are cases where trade decreases
the quality of the natural environment through the induced change in relative
prices. As seen above, in small open economies and in the case of open-access
renewable natural resource, this result can emerge under realistic scenarios.
Nevertheless, in the case of renewable resources, if productivity positively
depends on the natural capital, strong resource management rules increase a
country’s international competitiveness. Considering the global climate as a
renewable natural resource, it becomes obvious that such a productivity in-
centive is not effective everywhere. For the greenhouse problem, the external
costs are global but the effect of a single polluting country is small in com-
parison to the whole world. A comparable productivity mechanism cannot
be assumed for non-renewable natural resources either, if the current use is
found to be non-sustainable. The only way to decrease the worldwide use
of these resources consists of international policy coordination (see Schmidt,
2001 and Congleton, 2001).
The lesson for environmental policy consists in the finding that appro-
priate tax instruments, usually summarised under the heading of “green tax
reform”, can improve the protection of the environment as well as produce
additional economic growth. This double effect is made possible by a dou-
ble market failure, consisting of negative environmental externalities and of
positive externalities (such as positive knowledge spillovers) in the growth
sectors. Of course, direct instruments for internalising the positive spillovers
could be implemented as well. If this is the case, the growth stimulating
effects of the green tax reform are radically diminished. If direct internali-
sation is not under-taken, possibly for political reasons, the indirect way of
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correcting the growth deficit by increasing costs in growth-extensive sectors
is effective and efficient. In this way, the government can provide benefits
to spillover-intensive sectors without having to favour specific sectors or spe-
cific research projects. Thus, the allocation of resources within the dynamic
sectors remains the decision of the firms.1
One should also note here that even a globalised world does not require
all sustainability policies to be implemented at the international level. If
environmental externalities are purely local or regional in nature, free trade
and economic growth cannot be used as arguments against environmental
policy. Regional or local policy measures are efficient in open economies, if
certain conditions are observed. For example, given the mobility of capital,
the tax system needs to be especially designed in order to be effective. In
particular, if capital taxes are to be used to reduce pollution via production
(capital), a residence-based tax system is called for. Otherwise, the pollution
tax has no effect on the environment.
The lesson emerging from the analysis of North/South-models is that the
shift of production from the North to the South as a consequence of en-
vironmental policy in the North is minimal under reasonable assumptions.
The reason is that the production shift itself is not free. Rather, it requires
resources of the South if Northern products are copied; it even includes North-
ern resources, when production is actively relocated by Northern firms. In
addition, every shift from North to South sets Northern resources free which
can, for example, be used for additional knowledge production. The conclu-
sion is that environmental policy needs to be adjusted to conditions pertaining
to trade and growth. An appropriately adjusted environmental policy is still
highly effective in bringing about sustainable development paths.
A different conclusion must be drawn for trade policy. Generally speaking,
trade policy is not a good instrument to achieve global sustainable growth.
Many existing restrictions on free trade, for example in agriculture and coal-
1On the “double dividend” issue, see Smulders (2001).
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mining, are not in favour of sustainable development. Lowering the barriers
between countries, by intensifying the forces of comparative advantage, de-
creases natural resource use and increases knowledge accumulation. In gen-
eral, free trade enhances the substitution process of natural resources which
is crucial to achieve sustainability. The reason that trade is blamed for cer-
tain problems regarding the long-term development is that trade can, under
certain conditions, amplify problems that are already present in autarky. It
is obvious that an adequate solution to these homemade problems serves to
obtain both the benefits of a better environment as well as the gains from
trade.
An important related issue is the promotion of international knowledge
diffusion. The non-rivalry property of knowledge and the massive progress in
communication technologies represent favourable preconditions for a success-
ful international transmission of knowledge and thus for promoting worldwide
growth. International policy coordination is appropriate whenever externali-
ties cross national borders or the exhaustion of natural resources has world-
wide consequences. Global environmental problems like the greenhouse effect
require global policy coordination. Especially in the case of rain forest pro-
tection (Barbier, 2001) and the protection of specific species (biodiversity),
the losers from preservation should be compensated. Knowledge and capi-
tal transfers to poorer countries which are abundant in the supply of these
natural resource are also good development policy instruments. If knowledge
transfers are effective, Third World countries are in a better position to realise
sustainable development paths.
2.6.2 Issues Remaining for Research
Sustainability is not only a worldwide political objective, environmental qual-
ity and economic growth are also both largely influenced by the economic rela-
tions between economies and world regions. We are thus led to conclude that
combining elements of growth theory, international trade, and environmen-
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tal economies represents a very promising field for further economic research.
Many existing results of growth theory are only valid for closed economies.
For open economies, one should try to confirm, reject, or refine the exist-
ing results. In any case, whether working with models of closed or open
economies, in the future more effort should be spent on investigation which
kinds of capital, under which circumstances, substitute for natural resources.
Only with a solid grasp of this substitution process can we ever hope to ob-
tain appropriate results for open economies in particular. The instances in
which economic growth and environmental protection complement each other
should be better identified by further research. Whenever pollution dimin-
ishes the productivity in the dynamic sectors, such as education and research,
abatement measures reduce pollution and promote growth at the same time,
which is an especially favourable constellation to implement environmental
policy.
The findings applying to small open economies need to be generalised
to capture large open economies with flexible prices and wages. It would
be of great advantage to have a generally accepted model for international
sustainability analogues to the traditional 2 x 2 x 2 trade model. Such a
framework could intensify and focus the discussion on certain crucial top-
ics which proved to be very productive in other strands of economic theory.
The different forms and impact of international knowhow transfers also re-
quire more careful study in the future. Moreover, a more subtle analysis of
the implementation of environmental policy should be a focus of further re-
search. For example, the joint implementation of environmental policies in
the international community seems to be one of the most efficient ways to
obtain worldwide sustainable development. To be successful in this area, the
dynamic consequences of such agreements should be better understood.
A further issue is the treatment of risk. Since information on the im-
pact of economic activities on the ecosystem is incomplete, the methods of
decision-taking under uncertainty should be better integrated in the theory
of sustainable growth in open economies. For example, uncertainty and ir-
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reversibility may provide guidelines for the substitution of natural resources
which greatly differ from the ones obtained under complete information. This
applies especially to the sustainability objective of intergenerational fairness
whose policy implications crucially depend on the available information with
respect to the long-term development prospects.
Therefore, economic theory should aim at improving our understanding
of the future consequences of environmental policies today.
f
Chapter 3
Economic Growth and the
Diffusion of Clean Technologies:
Explaining Environmental
Kuznets Curves∗
Production often causes pollution as a by-product. Once environmental
degradation becomes too severe, regulation is introduced by which society
forces the economy to make a transition to cleaner production processes. We
model this transition as a change in “general purpose technology” and investi-
gate how it interferes with economic growth driven by quality-improvements.
The model gives an explanation for the inverted U-shaped pollution-income
relation found in empirical research for many pollutants (Environmental Kuz-
nets Curve). We provide an analytical foundation for the claim that the rise
and decline of pollution can be explained by policy-induced technology shifts
and intrasectoral changes.
∗ This chapter represents joint work together with Sjak Smulders (Tilburg University)
and Lucas Bretschger (ETH Zurich).
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3.1 Introduction
An old, classical and recurring theme in economics is the relationship be-
tween economic growth and concern for environmental problems. It ranges
from the physiocrats’ focus on land, Jevons’s coal question and the Club of
Rome’s doomsday scenarios, to the current greenhouse gas problem. The
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is one of the most-used concepts to
analyse the pollution-income relation and has recently attracted considerable
attention. Empirical EKC studies find evidence for an inverted U-shaped
pollution-income relation for many pollutants, in particular for short-lived
air and water pollutants that have local and immediate effects.1 The theoret-
ical EKC literature explains the hump-shaped pollution-income relation from,
among others, scale economies, income-induced policy changes and exogenous
shifts in the nature of growth.
In the paper at hand, we study the relationship between endogenous eco-
nomic growth and pollution in a model in which pollution problems first
gradually build up with the introduction of new technologies, new materi-
als and new energy sources. Environmental degradation attracts the public’s
attention and triggers a regulatory response in the form of a pollution tax.
Finally, firms adopt cleaner technologies to minimise costs. We use the model,
first, to give an integrated explanation for the EKC, second, to analyse how
technological change may drive pollution reductions when the economy grows
and, third, to show how intrasectoral – rather than intersectoral – shifts ac-
company the adoption of pollution-reducing technologies.
We differ from the existing theoretical literature on the EKC since we
treat changes in technology as endogenous. In particular, innovation oppor-
tunities and incentives not only determine the growth rate of income, but also
1For example sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides or suspended particulate matter. For a
survey of the empirical evidence see e.g. the special issues of Environment and Development
Economics 1997 and Ecological Economics 1998, or the recent review articles by Stern
(2004) and Lieb (2003).
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whether technological change is pollution-using or pollution-saving. Usually,
the theoretical EKC literature assumes either exogenous income (Lieb, 2002;
Andreoni and Levinson, 2001), exogenously given factor endowments that
determine income (Copeland and Taylor, 2003 chapter 3) or exogenous tech-
nological change (Brock and Taylor, 2004). Previous results, however, have
pointed out that the source of growth and the nature of technology deter-
mines whether economic growth and pollution are linked or delinked. What
is missing in the theoretical EKC literature is an explanation of why and how
the sources of growth change and how they are related to pollution problems.
To make both income and technology endogenous, we use a Schumpeterian
endogenous growth model. Other endogenous growth models have studied
the link between income and pollution, but have neglected temporal shifts
in the direction of technological change as resulting from profit incentives.2
For example, Stokey (1998) generates the EKC in a model with exogenous
technology. Aghion and Howitt (1998) have extended her model by intro-
ducing endogenous technology, but focus on balanced growth only and do
not distinguish between pollution-using and pollution-saving technological
change. Finally, de Groot (1999) models an EKC with technological change
as a learning-by-doing process.
Besides the shifts towards cleaner production technologies a second mech-
anism is often stressed in explaining the decoupling of environmental degra-
dation from economic growth: changes in the composition of production.3
Shifts between agriculture, manufacturing and services as well as intersec-
toral shifts within manufacturing have been relatively small in recent decades
in developed countries, see Torvanger (1991) and de Bruyn (1997). An ex-
ception is the US, where dramatic shifts towards cleaner industries have been
observed at the end of the last century (Ederington et al., 2004). Hence,
2See Smulders (1995a, 2000) for surveys on environmental growthmodels and Bretschger
(1999) for the integration of natural resource use into modern growth theory.
3See Copeland and Taylor (1994) for the distinction between scale, composition and
technique effects.
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such composition effects can account for at most a small part of the EKC.
But, there is strong evidence for the importance of intrasectoral change. For
example, Ja¨nicke et al. (1997) report that in 1989 the industrial final energy
consumption of Germany was 30.4% lower than it would have been without
intrasectoral change since 1970. The corresponding figures for Japan and
Sweden are 58.6% and 27.6%.4 Moreover, in empirical decomposition analy-
ses, intrasectoral changes are mostly subsumed under the label “technique
effect”, which usually accounts for the major part of emission reductions.
This effect, however, contains more than purely technological changes. It
also incorporates changes in the spectrum of goods produced in a sector, i.e.
intrasectoral shifts, as well as substitution of inputs and the application of
end-of-pipe technologies, see de Bruyn (2000).
While the literature has often used a decomposition of changes in pollu-
tion in terms of a scale, technology and composition effect, this decomposition
has been purely descriptive, or as a decomposition of the effects of a shock
(notably trade liberalisation shocks, see Copeland and Taylor, 2004). What is
missing is an explanation of how and why the interaction of the composition,
scale and technology effects can generate the EKC pattern. Our contribution
to the theoretical literature on the EKC is an attempt to provide elements of
these missing links. In particular, first we model how incentives arise to in-
vest in pollution-intensive technologies before incentives become in favour of
pollution-saving technologies, and, second, we sort out how over the technol-
ogy lifecycle the balance between (intrasectoral) composition and technique
effects changes so that the EKC arises. To do so, we carefully analyse firm
behaviour under the different technology conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides an
informal overview of the model and presents the general mechanisms produc-
ing EKCs. In Section 3.3, the formal model is introduced. The development
of innovation and pollution in four different phases are analysed in Section
4By contrast, intersectoral change reduced energy consumption by only 13% in Germany
and Japan and by 2.1% in Sweden.
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3.4. In Section 3.5, it is examined to what extend the model accounts for
empirical observations. Finally, Section 3.6 summarises and concludes.
3.2 An Informal Overview of the Model
This section gives an informal overview of the model. In particular, we de-
scribe how technology changes, how firms determine investments in new tech-
nologies and how pollution evolves over time. Because it aims to give intuitive
information about the behaviour of the fairly complex model, this section does
not strictly separate between assumptions, derivations and results. This will
be done in the subsequent sections.
Technology changes along two dimensions. First, firms improve the quality
of their products incrementally. Second, pollution-saving and pollution-using
inventions arise in clusters at discrete times. They can be interpreted as
general purpose technologies (GPT), defined by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995) as technologies that have a potential to affect a large part of the econ-
omy. For example, we can think of energy systems: the use of horsepower,
fossil fuels or nuclear power as source of energy constitute milestones in en-
ergy production. Such technology changes had and have a large impact on
pollution, e.g. in the context of the regional pollution of air and water.5
Both types of innovation, i.e. quality improvements and the adoption of a
new GPT, are costly and require R&D expenditures. Firms choose the type
of innovation that yields highest profits. Since it is costly to adopt new tech-
nologies, diffusion is slow and producers using old technologies may coexist
with producers using new ones. Thus, firms are heterogeneous in terms of
pollution output ratios, prices and output levels. Changes in pollution result
not only from changes in the scale of activity and the technique used within
5GPTs have been studied in endogenous growth literature in the context of Romer’s
variety expanding model (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998) or models of growth based on
inhouse R&D (Nahuis, 2003). We contribute to this literature by modelling GPTs in the
quality ladder framework (Grossman and Helpman, 1991 chapter 4).
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firms, but also from the process of creative destruction in which producers of
one type are gradually replaced by producers of another type.
As our model has to include several technologies, different types of pro-
ducers and different types of product qualities, the framework runs the risk of
becoming very complex. To reduce complexity, we make two simplifying as-
sumptions. First, we set up the model such that only one type of innovation is
being undertaken at a certain moment in time, either quality improvements
or new GPT adoption. Second, at most two types of firms are active at
any point in time. That is, after the occurrence of an new GPT no quality
improvements are undertaken until all sectors have adopted the new GPT.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the model
In the model, we distinguish four phases, of which the main characteristics
are summarised in Figure 3.1. In the first phase, the so-called “green phase”,
only one GPT is available, which causes no pollution. In the second phase,
a new GPT becomes available and is gradually adopted; this defines the
“adoption subphase”. Firms invest in the adoption of the new GPT since it
saves on their labour costs. Once all sectors in the economy have adopted the
new GPT, firms again invest in product quality improvements; this defines the
“improvement subphase”. Yet, to operate the new GPT, pollution cannot be
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avoided. As a result, pollution rises, first, with adoption and, subsequently,
with rising output. The latter is due to the fact that firms, which have
improved their product quality, charge a lower price and produce more than
their predecessors. However, pollution is not yet recognised as a problem.
Accordingly, we call the second phase the “confidence phase”. The third
phase starts once it becomes clear that the new technology is harmful and
once public concern has become widespread. Correspondingly, the third phase
is labelled “alarm phase”. The government responds to the public’s concern
by taxing emissions. As a result, firms cut back production and pollution
decreases. As soon as a new, clean GPT becomes available, a new phase of
adoption starts. We assume that this third GPT allows firms to reduce costs
since it saves on pollution tax expenditures. With its invention, the “cleaning-
up phase” starts. The clean GPT is gradually introduced in the different
sectors of the economy and pollution decreases in the course of time (during
the adoption subphase). Ultimately, all firms have adopted the new, clean
GPT and, therefore, pollution is absent and firms again invest to improve
their product quality (improvement subphase).
Over time, technological change not only affects the level of pollution,
but also market structure. Firms that improve quality drive producers with
lower quality levels out of the market. Similarly, firms that adopt a new GPT
drive producers exploiting the old technology out of the market. The bottom
part of Figure 3.1 indicates the different types of firms that are active in each
phase. In the green phase, all incumbent firms use and improve the first
GPT; we refer to “traditional quality leaders”. The next GPT entails lower
labour costs. Hence, firms that have adopted this GPT are called “labour-cost
leaders” and gradually replace traditional firms. As soon as all traditional
firms are replaced by labour-cost leaders, researchers start inventing blue-
prints to upgrade goods qualities. Firms buying these blueprints replace in
turn the initial cost leaders. As there is no environmental regulation, we call
this firms “unregulated quality leaders”. In the alarm phase, unregulated
quality leaders suddenly become “regulated quality leaders” as they are now
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taxed for their emissions. Once a new clean GPT has arrived, firms that have
adopted this GPT enter the market and replace regulated quality leaders. We
call these firms “first movers”. Once all sectors have switched to the clean
technology, sectors start investing in quality upgrading. As a consequence,
“ecological quality leaders” gradually penetrate the market.
3.3 The Model
There is a continuum of sectors, indexed i, each producing a good that enters
the households’ utility function as an imperfect substitute. Each good can
be produced in a number of varieties. Varieties differ in two dimensions.
First, different qualities, indexed m, of the same good can be produced. A
new generation of the product is of higher quality. Second, the labour input
requirements and pollution output ratios for a given quality level may differ
according to the general technology, indexed j, used.
Pollution hurts households’ utility. Whether a new technology causes
pollution or not is unknown at the time of its introduction. Only when
exposure to the pollutant has been long enough, damages, if any, can be
established and an emission tax is implemented. This increase in production
costs makes it attractive to switch to new production processes with lower
pollution output ratios.
Households
The representative consumer maximises intertemporal utility given by:6
U0 =
∞∫
0
[ln (Ct)−Qt]e
−ρtdt (3.1)
where ρ is the utility discount rate, C is the index of consumption, Q is
harm from emissions, which consumers take as given, and t is a time index.
6Households are modelled exactly as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), but for the
inclusion of damages in the utility function.
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Consumers have Cobb Douglas preferences over a continuum of goods indexed
i on the unit interval. Differentiated products of a given good i substitute
perfectly for one another, once the appropriate adjustment is made for quality
differences:
ln(Ct) =
1∫
0
ln
(∑
m
qimximt
)
di (3.2)
where qim is the quality of the mth product generation in sector i and ximt
is the associated production at time t. Maximisation of utility subject to the
usual budget constraints implies that only the good with the lowest price per
unit of quality is consumed in each sector i. We denote this good by m˜i.
Static utility maximisation implies:
ximt = Yt/pimt for m = m˜i
ximt = 0 otherwise
(3.3)
where Yt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
∑
m pimtximt) di denotes total consumption expenditure and
pimt is the price of good i of quality m at time t.
Utility maximisation also implies that consumption expenditure Y grows
at a rate equal to the difference between the (nominal) interest rate r and
the utility discount rate:
Y˙ /Y = r − ρ. (3.4)
Production
Each producer holds a unique blueprint (patent) for production such that the
market form is monopolistic competition. The blueprint allows the holder to
produce good i at quality m, using technology j.
Unit production costs vary with technology but not with sector or quality.
Production of one unit of output x requires aLj units of labour and emits aZj
units of pollution if technology j is used. Unit costs c for technology j at
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time t are thus given by:
cjt = aLjwt + aZjτt (3.5)
where w and τ denote the wage and pollution tax respectively. Output in
each sector is given by:
xi = Y/pi, (3.6)
that is spending per sector, Y (which equals aggregate spending because the
total mass of sectors is normalised to one), divided by the price set by the
incumbent in the sector, pi.
Within a sector, firms engage in Bertrand competition.7 The leading firm
sets the limit price that equals the cost level of its closest rival corrected for
quality differences. It is useful to distinguish between two (broad) types of
firms: cost leaders and quality leaders. Cost leaders are the first producers in
the sector that have introduced a new general purpose technology. They have
a cost advantage over their closest rival (but produce the same quality level).
Cost leaders using technology j set a price equal to their rival’s cost level
cj−1. Quality leaders are the producers that supply the highest quality level
in the sector. They have a cost advantage over their closest rival in terms of
costs corrected for the quality lead (but use the same technology). A quality
leader using technology j sets the limit price λcj, where λ > 1 represents
the quality difference. Since new blueprints for higher quality levels become
available as a result of the innovation process (with the newest quality level
being λ times the previous quality level developed), quality leaders are always
7The assumption of Bertrand competition among equal-cost producers of perfect sub-
stitutes results in marginal-cost pricing and zero operating profits. These strong results are
debatable and not in line with costly R&D. However, the presence of product differentiation
softens the strongly competitive results of the pure Bertrand competition and results in -
as with Cournot competition - prices above marginal costs and positive operating profits.
This, however, does not compulsorily mean that the presented results hold true for other
assumptions regarding the market structure.
THE MODEL 65
λ ahead. This implies that we may write for the price set in sector i:
pi = λcj if in i a quality leader is active that employs
technologyj
pi = cj−1 if in i a cost leader is active that employs technologyj.
(3.7)
Corresponding profit levels are then given by:
pii =
(
1− 1
λ
)
Y if in i a quality leader is active,
pii =
(
1−
cj
cj−1
)
Y if in i a cost leader is active that employs
technologyj.
(3.8)
Let us now be more specific and distinguish between the three GPTs and six
types of producers already described above. The three GPTs appearing in
the model are indexed j = 1, 2, 3 for the “traditional”, “labour-saving” and
“clean” technology respectively. GPT 1 requires one unit of labour per unit
of output and emissions are zero. GPT 2 requires η < 1 units of labour,
but emits one unit of the pollutant per unit of output. GPT 3 is again a
zero-emissions technology and requires γ units of labour per unit of output.
We assume that GPT 3 improves upon GPT 1, i.e. γ < 1. Hence we may
write:
aL1 = 1, aL2 = η < 1, aL3 = γ < 1, aZ1 = aZ3 = 0, aZ2 = 1. (3.9)
In the green phase and in the confidence phase, there is no tax on pollution,
that is τ = 0, but from the alarm phase onward, emissions are taxed. The tax
is assumed to be constant in terms of the wage, and we then have τ/w > 0.
The six types of producers described in Section 3.2 and the bottom part of
Figure 3.1 are index by k ∈ {T, L, U,R, F, E}, where T denotes “traditional
quality leaders”, L “labour cost leaders”, U “unregulated quality leaders”,
R “regulated quality leaders”, F “first movers” and E “ecological quality
leaders”.
Using equations (3.7) and (3.8) it is now straightforward to determine
prices and profits of each type of producer. Table 3.1 gives the results for
producers of type k.
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Table 3.1: Prices and profits for the six types of producers
k T L U R F E
pk λw w ληw λ(ηw + τ) ηw + τ λγw
pik
(
1− 1λ
)
Y (1− η)Y
(
1− 1λ
)
Y
(
1− 1λ
)
Y
(
1− γη+τ/w
)
Y
(
1− 1λ
)
Y
Total employment in manufacturing, denoted by Lx, can be written as:
Lx = nT
Y
λw
+ nL
Y
w
η + nU
Y
ληw
η + nR
Y
λ(ηw + τ)
η + nF
Y
ηw + τ
γ
+ nE
Y
λγw
γ (3.10)
where nk is the number of sectors with firms of type k.
Total emissions are given by the sum of emissions of labour cost leaders,
unregulated quality leaders, and regulated quality leaders. Hence, aggregate
pollution Z can be calculated as:
Z = nL
Y
w
+ nU
Y
ληw
+ nR
Y
λ(ηw + τ)
(3.11)
Innovation
R&D aims at developing blueprints for improving the quality of a certain
product or blueprints for adopting the latest technology in a certain sec-
tor. The development of a blueprint requires a units of labour, so that the
cost of a blueprint is aw. There are six types of blueprints corresponding
to the six firm types. For example, there are blueprints for higher quality
using the traditional technology (denoted by T ) or blueprints for adopting
the labour-saving GPT 2, denoted by L. We denote these blueprints as type
k ∈ {T, L, U,R, F, E}. The total amount of blueprints developed per period,
or the research intensity ι, is:8
ι =
1
a
∑
k
Lgk, (3.12)
8Since the number of sectors is normalised to one, the number of blueprints developed
equals the fraction of sectors in which innovation occurs.
THE MODEL 67
where Lgk is the amount of labour engaged in developing blueprints of type
k.
The value of a blueprint equals the stock market value of a firm that
exploits the blueprint. Free entry in research guarantees that, whenever re-
search activity is targeted at developing blueprints of type k, the value of a
firm of type k, i.e. vk, equals the cost of the blueprint:
vk ≤ aw with equality whenever Lgk > 0. (3.13)
The value of a firm is determined by the no arbitrage equation which
states that the expected rate of return on stock must equal the return in an
equal size investment in a riskless bond:
pik + v˙k − sk = rvk (3.14)
where sk is the expected value of the capital loss that occurs because of
shocks – technological innovation – to the sector. This capital loss crucially
depends on what type of innovation is going on in the economy: whether it
is quality improvement or adoption and which sectors innovation is aimed at.
To solve the model, we only need to know the risk term for the type of firm
for which new blueprints are developed. In the present model setup, only one
type of blueprints is developed at a certain point in time. Whenever quality
improvements are developed, quality leaders face the risk of being replaced by
a new quality leader. They lose total value of the firm with a probability equal
to the number of blueprints being developed; hence, sk = ιvk. However, when
researchers develop blueprints to adopt the newest technology, cost leaders –
firms that already have adopted the new technology – face no risk until all
firms have adopted the new GPT, such that sk = 0.
Labour market
Labour is supplied inelastically and equals L. Labour demand consists of
employment in manufacturing and total employment in R&D. Clearing of
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the labour market requires:
L = Lx +
∑
k
Lgk (3.15)
Compilation
To round off the formal presentation of the model, Table 3.2 summarises all
variables of the model and the equilibrium conditions of the R&D sector, and
the capital, labour and goods markets.
Table 3.2: Variables and equilibrium conditions
Exogenous Variables
a labour input requirement in R&D η labour input requirement of GPT 2
aLj labour input requirement of GPT j λ quality difference
aZj pollution intensity of GPT j ρ time preference rate
L labour supply τ/w pollution tax in terms of wage
γ labour input requirement of GPT 3
Endogenous Variables
C consumption U utility
c unit production costs v value of a firm
Lg employment in R&D w wage
Lx employment in manufacturing X total output
m product generation x production of a good
nk numbers of sectors with firms Y total consumption expenditures
of type k y spending per wage income
p price of goods Z aggregate pollution
Q harm from emissions ι research intensity
q quality of goods pi profit
r interest rate τ pollution tax
s expected value of capital loss
Equilibrium conditions
vk ≤ aw equilibrium in R&D
L = Lx +
∑
k
Lgk labour market clearing
pik + v˙k − sk = rvk no-arbitrage condition
xS = xD goods market equilibrium
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3.4 Innovation and Pollution in Four Stages
We now discuss the different stages of growth that the economy goes through.
Each stage can be characterised by a state variable, which is the number of
firms of one particular type. This number is inherited from the previous stage
and endogenously changes over time in each stage.
3.4.1 Innovation and Pollution in the Green Phase
In the first phase, the green phase, all active enterprises are traditional firms,
i.e. quality leaders using GPT 1. Innovation is exclusively aimed at improving
product qualities. This reduces the model to the Grossman/Helpman model
(1991, chapter 4). Since the clean GPT is used, there is no pollution at all.
The rate of innovation is given below in equation (3.29).
3.4.2 Innovation and Pollution in the Confidence Phase
General equilibrium dynamics
In the adoption subphase GPT 2 is available for adoption, but has not yet
been implemented in all sectors. Since adoption is costly, i.e. a sector-specific
blueprint must be developed, it takes place only if the returns to this research
investment are large enough. If research were targeted not only at adoption
but also at quality improvement in traditional sectors, we would require piL =
piT for this to be an equilibrium, which only happens by coincidence. If
piL < piT , no adoption would take place (LgL = 0), the confidence phase
would not start and the economy would remain in the green phase. Therefore,
we focus on the more interesting case in which piL > piT so that adoption
takes place without simultaneous quality improvements in traditional sectors.
Accordingly, we assume:
η < 1/λ. (3.16)
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Hence, once the new GPT becomes available, in the beginning all labour in
R&D develops blueprints for adoption so that Lgk = 0 for all k 6= L, aι = LgL,
and LgL+Lx = L. The relevant state variable in this phase is the number of
labour-cost leaders nL, which starts at zero. It increases with the number of
patents developed:
n˙L = ι =
1
a
(L− Lx) (3.17)
As noted above, with adoption only, cost leaders face no risk of being replaced,
i.e. sL = 0. Using equations (3.8), (3.13) and (3.14), we find the following
no-arbitrage equation for adoption:(
1−
cj
cj−1
)
Y
aw
+
w˙
w
= r (3.18)
Substituting (3.4) into (3.18) to eliminate r, substituting (3.10) into (3.17)
to eliminate Lx and taking into account cj/cj−1 = η, nT + nL = 1 and
nU = nR = nF = nE = 0, we find:
y˙
y
= (1− η)
(
1
a
)
y − ρ (3.19)
n˙L =
L
a
− y
(
1
a
)(
1
λ
− µnL
)
(3.20)
where µ = (1/λ)− η > 0 and y = Y/w. Note that y is not per capita income
but spending per wage income. This system of differential equations in nL and
y characterises the dynamics of the first period of the confidence phase. The
resulting phase diagram is depicted in Figure 3.2 by the ι = n˙L = 0 locus, the
lower dy = 0 locus and the curved path to the North East. The area above
the ι = 0 locus is infeasible since it represents negative employment in R&D.
For any point below this locus, innovation takes place, causing the number
of quality leaders nL to increase. The area to the right of the line nL = 1 is
also infeasible since nL represents a fraction of sectors, which cannot exceed
unity. Adoption comes necessarily to an end if all sectors have adopted the
new GPT. It is clear from (3.19) and (3.20) that this will happen in finite
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time. In the diagram, it happens when the nL = 1 line or the ι = 0 locus is
hit. What exactly happens depends on the value y initially takes at the time
that GPT 2 becomes available. At this time, the confidence phase starts at
nL = 0. Variable y has to jump initially such that the boundary conditions
are satisfied. Since consumption is proportional to Lx and Lx is proportional
to y [see (3.10)], consumption smoothing by households rules out a jump in
y in the absence of unexpected shocks. Hence, the end condition for y in
the adoption subphase is given by the initial value for y in the subsequent
improvement subphase, which is determined below.
L + aΡ

1 - Μ
L+aΡ
aΡ
 
1 - Η
ΛL
LΗ
1
dy=0
adaption
Ι=0
dy=0
improvement
y
nL
Figure 3.2: Dynamics confidence phase in the nL, y plane
In the second period of the confidence phase, the improvement subphase,
all sectors have switched to the new GPT. As there is no further possibility
to invent blueprints for adoption and because research is still economically
attractive, inventions are now directed at improving product qualities so that
Lgk = 0 for all k 6= U and LgU +Lx = L. The rate of innovation can be again
expressed as:
ι =
1
a
(L− Lx) (3.21)
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The rate of innovation now reflects the fraction of sectors in which a
new quality leader replaces an incumbent. Since an innovator is indifferent
between replacing a quality leader (firm of type U) or a cost leader (L-firm) –
in both cases, profits equal (1−1/λ)Y – she spreads innovation effort equally
over all sectors. As a result, a fraction nL of the total number blueprints
developed (ι) hits L-firms, which are then replaced by quality leaders. Hence
we have:
n˙L = −nLι (3.22)
At the same time, ι is the probability for an individual quality leader that he
will be replaced and will experience a complete capital loss. Hence, we have
sU = ιvU . Using (3.8), (3.13) and (3.14), we find the following no-arbitrage
equation for quality improvements:(
1−
1
λ
)
Y
aw
+
w˙
w
− ι = r (3.23)
Substituting (3.4) into (3.23) to eliminate r, substituting (3.10) into (3.21) to
eliminate Lx and taking into account nL + nU = 1, nT = nR = nF = nE = 0,
we find:
y˙
y
= (1− µnL)
(
1
a
)
y −
(
L
a
+ ρ
)
(3.24)
n˙L
nL
=
(
1
λ
− µnL
)(
1
a
)
y −
L
a
(3.25)
This dynamic system in the nL, y plane characterises the second period of the
confidence phase. It is saddlepoint stable. Hence, starting at nL = 1, y jumps
to the saddlepath and asymptotically converges to nL = 0 and y = L + aρ.
The path to the South West in Figure 3.2 depicts the dynamic adjustment. As
a result of the determination of the starting- and endpoint of the improvement
subphase, also the starting-point of the adoption subphase can be identified.
Pollution and innovation
During the confidence phase, untaxed emissions rise. This rise in pollution
can be decomposed in a scale effect, technique effect and composition effect.
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In the adoption subphase, pollution can be derived from (3.11) as:
Z = nLy (3.26)
Since both nL and y gradually increase during the adoption subphase, we see
immediately from (3.26) that the same holds for pollution. We argue that
this happens because changes in scale, composition and technique all tend
to increase pollution. First, the technique effect is positive, i.e. pollution
enhancing, since GPT 2 is polluting. Second, when a sector adopts the new
GPT, it not only starts to pollute but also reduces prices and produces more.
The gradual adoption of the new GPT (nL rises) changes the composition of
total output. This corresponds to intrasectoral changes from clean to dirty
firms. Finally, total production affects pollution. Defining total production
as the sum of sectoral production levels, we find the following expression for
the confidence adoption subphase [from (3.6) and Table 3.1]:
X ≡
∑
k
nkxk =y
[
1
λ
+
(
1−
1
λ
)
nL
]
(3.27)
Because nL and y gradually increase during the adoption subphase, we see
immediately from (3.27) that total production gradually rises, so that the
scale effect also contributes to rising pollution levels.
To describe the development of the innovation rate, we need to determine
how Lx changes over time [see (3.17)]. The appendix (Section 3.7.1) shows
that Lx increases (decreases) and innovation falls (rises) over time if η is
large (small). The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, the rate of
innovation tends to fall over time. This reflects the fact that the more sectors
have switched, the fewer opportunities are left for further adoption and the
sooner innovation has to be redirected to quality improvements, which yields
a lower rate of return. Forward-looking behaviour of investors ensures that
the rate of return is smoothed and research efforts are gradually reduced.
With lower research efforts, labour becomes available to expand the scale of
production. On the other hand, if production with the new GPT saves a
lot of labour, i.e. if η is small, the opposite happens and labour becomes
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available for research. With a small η, the process of adoption is relatively
fast and the scale of production as measured by Lx declines. Nevertheless,
pollution increases over time since fast adoption allows the technique and
composition effect to dominate the (pollution-saving) scale effect. The rise in
pollution and the decreasing innovation rate (for a sufficient high η) during
the confidence adoption subphase is illustrated in Figure 3.3 by the curve
segments from nL = 0 to nL = 1.
1
nT  1
nL 0 nL  1
nU  0
nU 1 1
nR  1
nF 0 nF  1
nE  0
nE 1
Pollution
Innovation
 
Pollution Innovation 
Confidence phase Cleaning-up phase 
Figure 3.3: Pollution and innovation in all phases
In the improvement subphase, pollution increases as well over time, al-
though at a decreasing pace. Since all sectors are using GPT 2 with a
fixed emission output ratio, changes in pollution can be explained entirely
by changes in total output (X) or labour in production (Lx). There are no
intrasectoral changes or technological effects. From (3.10) and (3.11) we find:
Z = X =
1
η
Lx (3.28)
The appendix (Section 3.7.1) shows that Lx rises over time. This implies a
gradual increase in pollution and a gradual fall in innovation. The underlying
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cause is a fall in the rate of return to innovation. As the proportion of
low-price firms increases, more labour is allocated to incumbents and less is
available per quality leader that replaces a cost-leader. As a result, profits for
entrants fall and innovation becomes less profitable. The paths of pollution
and of the innovation rate are again depicted in Figure 3.3 (curve segments
from nU = 0 to nU = 1).
The innovation intensity at the end of the confidence phase (when nL
approaches zero) can be solved by first substituting (3.22) and (3.24) into
(3.25) to eliminate n˙L/nL and y respectively, and then setting nL = y˙ = 0.
This yields:
ι =
λ− 1
λ
L
a
−
1
λ
ρ ≡ ιGH (3.29)
When only quality improvement is possible and the mass of cost leaders ap-
proaches zero, the model structure is the same as in Grossman and Helpman
(1991, chapter 4). Hence, the innovation rate in (3.29) equals the innovation
rate of their model (denoted by ιGH).
3.4.3 Innovation and Pollution in the Alarm Phase
The economy enters the alarm phase once it starts taxing pollution. Society
is aware of or alarmed about the polluting effects of using GPT 2. To mitigate
the adverse effects, firms are charged a pollution tax. Provided that all sectors
are at least hit once during the second period of the confidence phase, all
active firms at the beginning of the alarm phase are regulated quality leaders
(R-firms). To simplify matters, we assume that the alarm phase starts not
until labour-cost leaders have disappeared, i.e. nL = 0.
In addition, we rule out the case that it is profitable for firms to switch
back to the old traditional technology. This requires that the profits from
readopting GPT 1 fall short of those from further quality improvements still
using GPT 2. From (3.8), we see that this requires 1 − aL1w/(aL2w + τ) <
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1− 1/λ, or after substitution of (3.9):9
τ/w < λ− η (3.30)
Firms still make profits and research is still profitable. Innovators develop
new quality generations of the regulated products. Successful innovators be-
come new quality leaders and set prices pR = λ(ηw + τ). No other types of
innovation are undertaken, so that Lgk = 0 for k 6= R and LgR+Lx = L. The
value of a blueprint is determined by vR, and we have aw = vR if LgR > 0.
The dynamics of the alarm phase can be determined in analogy to the
dynamics of the improvement subphase of the confidence phase. Substituting
(3.4) into (3.23) to eliminate r, substituting (3.10) into (3.21) to eliminate
Lx, and taking into account nR= 1, nk= 0 for k 6= R, we find:
y˙
y
= y
1
a
(
λ− 1
λ
+
η
λ (η + τ/w)
)
−
(
L
a
+ ρ
)
(3.31)
If firms expect no shocks, i.e. they do not anticipate the arrival of a new GPT
or a change in taxation, equation (3.31) can only hold forever if y remains
constant over time.10 Hence, we can set (3.31) equal to zero to obtain the
following expression for the steady state expenditures per wage income:
y =
L+ aρ
1− θZ2/λ
(3.32)
where θZ2 = (τ/w)/(η + τ/w) is the share of pollution in total cost for GPT
2. In addition, from equations (3.10), (3.21) and (3.32) the steady state
innovation growth rate in the alarm phase, ιSSAlarm, is readily calculated as:
ιSSAlarm =
λ
λ− θZ2
[
L
a
(
λ− 1
λ
)
−
ρ
λ
+
θZ2
λ
ρ
]
(3.33)
9 If τ/w > λ − η, the alarm phase as described in the text does not arise and the
economy enters immediately a “reswitching phase” once the tax is imposed. This phase
is very similar to the cleaning-up phase analysed in the text (see section 3.4.4). The only
modification needed is setting γ equal to one. When GPT 3 arrives, a adoption phase
starts in which GPT 1 is replaced by GPT 3. The analysis of this phase is more complex
than the one in the text since with “reswitching” there are potentially three GPTs in the
market.
10Otherwise y would grow or shrink at an increasing rate, both of which is not feasible.
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or, equivalently as:
ιSSAlarm =
λ
λ− θZ2
[
ιGH +
θZ2
λ
ρ
]
(3.34)
Note that spending per wage income and the rate of innovation increase in the
pollution tax; for τ > 0 we have ιSSAlarm > ιGH and (L+aρ)/(1− (θZ2/λ)) >
L + aρ. The intuition behind this remarkable result for growth is that a
pollution tax increases the cost of production relative to that of R&D. Since
production with GPT 2 causes pollution, the introduction of a pollution tax
increases unit production costs [see equation (3.5)]. The costs of R&D, how-
ever, are not directly affected by the implementation of a pollution tax, since
R&D is a non-polluting activity. Thus, this policy intervention causes a
change in the relative prices of manufacturing and R&D and, therefore, a
reallocation of labour from manufacturing to the development of blueprints.
Besides this (positive) substitution effect, there is also a (negative) output
effect. The pollution tax increases unit production costs and thus reduces
firms’ profits. This mitigates the incentives to develop new blueprints, and
the innovation rate decreases. Yet, the substitution effect outweighs the out-
put effect.11 As a result, at the beginning of the alarm phase, the rate of
innovation jumps up and total emissions jump down compared to the values
at the end of the confidence phase, as shown in Figure 3.3 (curve segments
at nR = 1). But both variables remain constant during the alarm phase.
3.4.4 Innovation and Pollution in the Cleaning-up Phase
General equilibrium dynamics
From the point of view of GPTs, the cleaning-up phase is similar to the
confidence phase. A new unregulated technology is available for adoption,
but its diffusion takes time, since adoption is costly. Adoption takes place
11In addition, since our model assumes full employment and abstracts from adjustment
costs (i.e. costless and immediate switching of labour from manufacturing to R&D or vice
versa) the introduction of a pollution tax does not affect the labour market in this regard.
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only if the returns to the development of a blueprint for adopting GPT 3 are
large enough. To guarantee sufficient incentives to adopt GPT 3 we assume:
γ <
τ/w + η
λ
, (3.35)
which implies piR < piF (see Table 3.1). Regulated quality leaders stay active
as long as no rival in their sector has incurred the cost to adopt GPT 3.
Innovators that produce with the new GPT are first movers (F-Firms).
We can use expressions derived for the confidence phase to describe the
dynamics of the cleaning-up phase. For the adoption subphase, we need
to replace nL by nF in (3.17). Substituting (3.4) into (3.18) to eliminate
r, substituting (3.10) into (3.17) to eliminate Lx, and taking into account
cj/cj−1 = γ/(η + τ/w), nR + nF= 1 and nT = nL = nU = nE = 0, we find:
y˙
y
=
(
1−
γ
η + τ/w
)(
1
a
)
y − ρ (3.36)
n˙F =
L
a
− y
(
1
a
)
θL2
[(
γ
η
−
1
λ
)
nF +
1
λ
]
(3.37)
where θL2 = 1− θZ2 = η/(η + τ/w) is the labour cost share for GPT 2.
For the improvements subphase, we need to replace nL by nF in (3.22).
Substituting (3.4) into (3.23) to eliminate r, substituting (3.10) into (3.21) to
eliminate Lx, and taking into account nF + nE= 1, nT = nL = nU = nR = 0,
we get:
y˙
y
= (1− µFnF )
(
1
a
)
y −
(
L
a
+ ρ
)
(3.38)
n˙F
nF
=
(
1
λ
− µFnF
)(
1
a
)
y −
L
a
(3.39)
where µF = (1/λ)− γ/(η + τ/w).
The two dynamic systems in (3.36)-(3.39) can be depicted in a nF , y plane
similar to Figure 3.2. The equilibrium dynamics can again be characterised
by a rise in nF from 0 to 1, while y increases. After a finite time there is an
endogenous switch to the improvement subphase in which both nF and y fall
over time.
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Pollution and innovation
Pollution is obviously absent in the improvement subphase. Moreover, innova-
tion falls similar to innovation in the improvement subphase of the confidence
regime. Hence, we focus on what happens to pollution and innovation in the
adoption subphase. Pollution is given by [see (3.11)]:
Z = y
(
1− nF
λ(η + τ/w)
)
(3.40)
It turns out that pollution continuously falls over time (see Section 3.7.2 in
the appendix). More and more sectors switch to the clean technology (nF
increases), which reduces pollution. The upward pressure on pollution from
increases in spending y is dominated by intrasectoral shifts from dirty to clean
firms. The clean F-firms are for the most part responsible for rising y, since
they charge a lower price and produce more than regulated quality leaders. In
this case, the composition and technique effect outweigh the pollution-using
scale effect.
Labour allocated to production can be written from (3.10) as:
Lx = y
(
(λγ − η)nF + η
λ(η + τ/w)
)
(3.41)
Since y and nF increase over time, the amount of labour in production also
gradually increases if λγ ≥ η. Since the rate of innovation is negatively
related to Lx, as in (3.17), innovation falls over time. This seems to be the
most realistic case. It seems natural to assume that the superiority of GPT
3 over GPT 2 in terms of pollution (aZ3 = 0 < aZ2 = 1) comes at the cost of
a higher labour requirement, that is aL3 = γ > aL2 = η. Since λ > 1 we have
λγ > η.12
The progression of both pollution and the innovation rate during the
cleaning-up phase is shown in Figure 3.3 (curve segments form nF = 0 to
12 In case λγ < η innovation may first rise and then fall over time. In this case (3.41) is
isomorphic to (3.49) so that the analyses of the appendix (Section 3.7.1) can be repeated
and the pattern of innovation found there emerges.
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nF = 1 for the adoption subphase and from nE = 0 to nE = 1 for the im-
provement subphase). At the beginning of the adoption subphase pollution
jumps down and the innovations rate jumps up compared to the values during
the alarm phase. The reason for these jumps is a reallocation of labour from
manufacturing to R&D. Developing blueprints for adopting GPT 3 yields a
higher rate of return than developing blueprints for quality improvements.
3.5 Empirical Validation
In the model analysed above, the rise in pollution is primarily caused by the
availability of a new GPT, which entails lower labour costs but causes higher
pollution, and an increase in aggregate production. Likewise, the downturn
in pollution is based on two main mechanisms: first, the imposition of a pol-
lution tax due to the awakening of the public’s attention to environmental
degradation and, second, the intrasectoral adjustments towards cleaner pro-
duction technologies. These results fit fairly well with real-world observations.
As an example, consider the nitrogen oxide emissions in the last decades for
the USA, UK, Germany and Switzerland, as shown in Figure 3.4. It was not
until the eighties of the last century that the NOx emissions stopped increas-
ing, and then started to decline significantly. Similar emission patterns can
also be observed for other air pollutants, e.g. sulphur dioxide.
The rise in nitrogen oxide emissions was mainly caused by scale effects.
For example, increasing mobility and globalisation led to drastic growth in
road traffic in all four countries. Environmental degradation attracted broad
public attention in the late nineteen seventies. In 1979, the countries con-
sidered signed the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. In 1988
the convention was extended by a protocol concerning the control of nitrogen
oxides or their transboundary fluxes.13 The vertical lines labelled “LRTAP”
13Up until 1999, the convention was extended by eight protocols aiming at the reduction
of specific pollutants.
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in Figure 3.4 depict the signing of the Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution.
1970 1980 1990 2000
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
NOx cL Germany
LRTAP
1960 1975 1990 2003
50
100
150
200
NOx dL Switzerland
LRTAP
1960 1975 1990 2003
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
NOx aL USA
LRTAP
1980 1990 2000
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
NOx bL UK
LRTAP
Note: NOx emissions in Gg.
Source: USA: EPA (2000 and 2005); UK: DEFRA (2005),
Germany: DESTATIS (1966 - 2004), Switzerland: SAEFL (1995 and 2005).
Figure 3.4: NOx for the USA, UK, Germany and Switzerland
In the subsequent years the governments enacted a number of laws to
achieve the agreed emission reductions. The regulations were mainly geared
to the major sources of nitrogen oxide: road transport and combustion plants.
In the USA and particularly in California, catalytic converters became manda-
tory in the late nineteen seventies; Switzerland followed in 1987 and the Eu-
ropean Union in 1993. This regulation has led to a gradual displacement
of old motor vehicles by less exhaust-intensive vehicles with catalytic con-
verters. In addition, the exhaust gas regulations were and are still tightened
continuously. Moreover, Germany and Switzerland recently established a
performance-based heavy vehicles fee, inter alia in order to confine heavy ve-
hicle traffic. Concerning combustion plants, tightened emission restrictions
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led to the installation of so-called low nitrogen oxides burners, which can
reduce emissions by up to 30%. Summarising, the NOx emission reductions
can be traced back to the interaction of governmental regulation, intrasectoral
substitution processes and the adoption of new, cleaner technologies.
3.6 Conclusions
To analyse the relationship between economic growth, environmental degra-
dation and technology changes, we have set up a Schumpeterian endogenous
growth model with pollution. The model contributes to the literature by,
first, treating the direction of technological change as endogenous, i.e. inno-
vation opportunities and incentives determine whether technological change
is pollution-using or pollution saving. Second, the model stresses the impor-
tance of intrasectoral – rather than intersectoral – shifts as a leading cause
for the resulting pollution-income relation.
At first, a technological breakthrough in the form of a new general purpose
technology gives rise to the gradual adoption of this new technology by profit
maximising firms. As a side-effect, pollution rises. Once pollution taxes
are imposed to address the pollution externality, the pattern of technological
change and innovation is affected. Due to the emission taxation it becomes
profitable for firms to adopt a new, clean GPT. This results in a gradual
decrease of pollution associated with the use of the previous GPT.
We have shown that the gradual adoption of new general purpose tech-
nologies, which leads to intrasectoral shifts from clean to dirty firms or vice
versa, predicts a pattern of pollution over time that is consistent with the EKC
hypothesis. New technologies sometimes increase pollution, and decrease pol-
lution at other times, depending on the characteristics of the general purpose
technology that opens up opportunities for innovation and on the environmen-
tal policies that are in place. Our investigation of the relationship between
innovation and pollution shows that we cannot expect an unambiguous cor-
relation between changes in pollution and innovation, since both variables
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are endogenous and determined by several forces that act simultaneously.
When pollution is not taxed (during the confidence phase), pollution rises
while innovation falls over time; but during adoption of the clean technology
(cleaning-up phase), both pollution and innovation decline over time. Hence,
the relationship between environmental policy and economic growth varies
with the different stages of growth.
The model set up above does not necessarily predict an EKC for all pollu-
tants. In empirical research, the EKC is found only for specific pollutants, i.e.
for pollutants with local and immediate effects. In our model, the downward
sloping part of the EKC emerges only if the polluting GPT is eventually re-
placed by a cleaner GPT. The adoption of the cleaner GPT requires sufficient
incentives, i.e. a high pollution tax or low enough labour costs associated with
the clean GPT. Otherwise, no technology shift takes place and the pollution
tax only has the conventional static (level) effect. In this case, the economy
would remain in the alarm phase.
Our model provides a natural framework for the examination of the idea of
overlapping EKCs. Booth (1998) has argued quite strongly that one pollutant
can only be phased out because it is replaced by another pollutant. Put more
moderately, it could be that seemingly clean GPTs turn out to be polluting
in the end. If this is the case, additional GPTs have to be developed in a row
until finally, hopefully, one GPT really turns out to be clean. In the model,
the substitution of a pollutant for another would result in an overlapping of
the cleaning-up phase with a second confidence phase.
An obvious extension of the model would be the possible ability of indi-
viduals to expect the arrival of new GPTs. For example, we could assume
that the occurrence of new GPTs follows a Poisson process. It is conceivable
that, for certain pollutants, technical solutions in the future can be antici-
pated to a certain degree. In other cases, however, it seems reasonable to
assume that the arrival of a technological breakthrough is highly uncertain
and arrives, if ever, unexpectedly. In addition, the sequencing of the different
phases can be more complex than modelled in this approach. Arrival dates
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of profitable GPTs and/or the introduction of taxes can be assumed to oc-
cur at different points in time so that more types of producers are active in
the markets when a new phase begins. Finally, one could elaborate more on
optimal taxation. This requires the analysis of instruments to correct pol-
lution, to correct R&D, and to correct output levels in order to remove the
distortionary pricing effects. All these issues are left for future research.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Pollution and Innovation in the Confidence Phase
To find out the development of aggregate pollution and the rate of innovation
in the confidence phase, we transform the phase diagram from Figure 3.2 and
equations (3.19), (3.20), (3.24) and (3.25) into a phase diagram in the Lx, nL
plane.
Adoption subphase
Lx may either fall or rise during the adoption subphase, depending on whether
η is small or large respectively. From (3.10) we find the following expression
for Lx in the confidence adoption subphase:
Lx = y
(
1− (1− λη)nL
λ
)
(3.42)
We use (3.42) to replace y in (3.19) and (3.20) by Lx and find the following
dynamic system for the adoption subphase:
L˙x
Lx
=
1
a[1− (1− λη)nL]
(3.43)
· {[λ(1− η) + 1− λη]Lx − (1− λη)L− [1− (1− λη)nL]aρ}
n˙L =
1
a
(L− Lx) (3.44)
The L˙x = 0 locus is downward sloping as long as 1/λ > η which is the
case due to our assumption that µ ≡ 1/λ − η > 0 (to ensure that piL >
piT ). The initial jump in Lx is determined in the same way as that of y,
see main text: the endvalue of Lx is determined by its initial value in the
subsequent improvement subphase. However, we can also use the endvalue of
y to determine the end value of Lx by using the relation between these two
variables given by (3.42). Hence, we can infer some useful properties of the
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endvalue of Lx from the endvalue of y. From Figure 3.1 or (3.19) we see that
when nL = 1, y is bounded as follows:
y <
1
1− µ
(L+ aρ) (3.45)
Thus, from (3.42) we see that when nL = 1, Lx is bounded as follows:
Lx <
η
1− µ
(L+ aρ) (3.46)
From (3.43) we see that when nL = 1,we have
L˙x ≤ 0 if Lx ≤
µL+ ηaρ
µ+ 1− η
(3.47)
Now consider the following condition:
η
1− µ
(L+ aρ) ≤
µL+ ηaρ
µ+ 1− η
(3.48)
If condition (3.48) holds, Lx has to reach a value at the end of the adoption
phase that turns out to be so small [namely smaller than the expression at
the LHS of (3.48), see (3.46)] that it can only be reached by a declining Lx [as
is revealed by (3.47)]. Note that for sufficiently low values of η this condition
is satisfied. Figure 3.5 c) depicts this situation.
Let us now consider the opposite case in which η takes its maximal value,
that is η = 1/λ so that µ = 0. The dy = 0 locus and the dLx = 0 locus are
horizontal. Moreover, y and Lx have to reach the values L+aρ and (L+aρ)/λ
respectively at the end of the adoption subphase. Under our assumption that
ιGH > 0, see (3.29), this endpoint lies above the dLx = 0 locus, see (3.43), and
Lx has to increase over the entire adoption subphase. Figure 3.5 a) depicts
this situation.
For intermediate values of η we get the dynamics as depicted in Figure
3.5 b). The larger η, the more likely a rising pattern for Lx becomes. Note
that Lx may first fall and then rise (but never the other way around) in the
adoption subphase.
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Figure 3.5: Dynamics confidence phase in the nL, Lx plane
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Improvement subphase
We show that Lx unambiguously falls during the improvement subphase. For
this subphase, we find from (3.10):
Lx =
(
1
λ
− µnL
)
y (3.49)
We use (3.49) to replace y in (3.24) and (3.25) by Lx and find the following
dynamic system for the improvement subphase:
L˙x
Lx
=
1
a(1/λ− µnL)
(3.50)
· {[1− 2µnL]Lx − [1/λ− 2µnL]L− [1/λ− µnL]aρ}
n˙L
nL
= −
1
a
(L− Lx) (3.51)
The L˙x = 0 locus is downward sloping. Since the improvement subphase
starts at nL = 1 and has to converge to a constant value for Lx and nL = 0,
Lx has to start at a value above the dLx = 0 locus and will increase over
time. Figure 3.5 combines the two subphases.
The development of pollution in the improvement subphase directly fol-
lows from (3.28) and the notion that Lx rises over time. The development of
the rate of innovation is the mirror image of that of Lx, since ι = (L−Lx)/a.
3.7.2 Pollution in the Cleaning-up Phase
We transform the dynamic system in (3.36)-(3.37) into a dynamic system in
terms of Z and nR. Substituting (3.40) in these equations to eliminate y, and
replacing nF by 1− nR, we find:
Z˙
Z
=
(ξ + λγ/nR)Z − L− aρnR
anR
(3.52)
n˙R
nR
= −
L− [λγ/nR − (λγ − η)]Z
anR
(3.53)
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where ξ = η + (λ− 1)(τ/w + η) + [τ/w + η − λγ]− λγ. Note that ξ > −λγ
from our assumptions made above to ensure adoption of the clean GPT [the
term in square brackets is positive, see (3.35)].
We now have two situations, depending on whether ξ is positive or neg-
ative. First, if it is positive, the dZ = 0 locus slopes positive in the feasible
region (for 0 < nR < 1) and the saddlepath slopes downward so that pol-
lution unambiguously falls with the fall in nR. Figure 3.6 shows the phase
diagram for this case. Second, if ξ is negative, the dZ = 0 locus has a vertical
asymptote at nR = −λγ/ξ > 1 and slopes downward in the feasible range
(for 0 < nR < 1). However, the saddlepath slopes downward so that again
pollution unambiguously falls with the fall in nR. The corresponding phase
diagram would resemble the one shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Dynamics cleaning-up phase in the nR, Z plane
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Chapter 4
A Dynamic Model of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve:
Turning Point and Public
Policy∗
We set up a simple dynamic macroeconomic model with (i) polluting con-
sumption and a preference for a clean environment, (ii) increasing returns in
abatement giving rise to an EKC and (iii) sustained growth resulting from
a linear final-output technology. The model captures two sorts of market
failures caused by external effects associated with consumption and environ-
mental effort. This model is employed to investigate the determinants of
the turning point and the (relative) effectiveness of different public policy
measures aimed at a reduction of the environmental burden. Moreover, the
model offers a potential explanation of an N-shaped pollution-income rela-
tion. Finally, it is shown that the model is compatible with most empirical
regularities on economic growth and the environment.
∗Forthcoming in Environmental & Resource Economics. This chapter represents joint
work together with Thomas M. Steger (ETH Zurich).
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4.1 Introduction
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis states that there is an
inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental degradation and the
level of income. Starting with Grossman and Krueger (1993) this pattern
has been intensively debated in empirical terms; recent reviews are provided
by Dasgupta et al. (2002) and Stern (2004). The EKC has also captured
considerable attention from policymakers and theorists. This is due to the
fact that the EKC hypothesis implies that pollution diminishes once a critical
threshold level of income is reached. As a consequence, there is the hope that
– loosely speaking – the environmental problem sooner or later peters out as
the economy grows.
There are two major strands within the theoretical EKC literature. In the
first class of models an EKC arises from shifts in the use of production tech-
nologies, which differ in their pollution intensity (Stokey, 1998; Chapter 3 of
this study). The second class focuses on the characteristics of the abatement
technology (John and Pecchenino, 1994; Selden and Song, 1995; Andreoni
and Levinson, 2001; Chimeli and Braden, 2002; Brock and Taylor, 2004).
The Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model has attracted a significant at-
tention. Using a static setup, they show that an EKC can be explained with
increasing returns to scale (IRS) in the abatement technology. Moreover, An-
dreoni and Levinson (2001) claim that by focusing on the degree of returns
to scale in abatement, a large part of the literature dealing with very differ-
ent mechanisms (e.g. a shift in technology or a shift in institutions) can be
summarised.
The level of income at which pollution peaks (labelled “the turning point”)
and the associated level of pollution are of fundamental interest from the
perspective of public policy. A sound understanding of the pollution-income
relation (PIR) could provide important information for public policies aimed
at a reduction of the environmental burden. The empirical EKC literature has
accordingly devoted much effort to the determination of this critical threshold.
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The results show, however, a large dispersion across different studies. For
instance, the reported turning points for sulphur dioxide range from $2,900
to $908,200 and for nitrogen oxides from $5,500 to $30,800 (in 1985 PPP$;
Lieb, 2003). Given these diverse empirical results, it is clearly desirable to
better understand the determinants of the turning point from a theoretical
perspective.
In this paper, we set up a simple dynamic EKC model, which has the
following characteristics: Pollution is a by-product of consumption activities,
it is modelled as flow pollution and it creates disutility. Households can
spend resources on abatement to reduce net pollution. Following Andreoni
and Levinson (2001) we assume that there are IRS in abatement giving rise to
an EKC. There are two market distortions due to external effects associated
with consumption and abatement activities. Permanent growth results from
an accumulable stock of capital and a linear final-output technology.
The paper at hand focuses on two issues: First, we employ the simple
dynamic EKC model to better understand the determinants of the turning
point. The factors which are of major interest in this type of models are
the preference for a clean environment, the degree of IRS in abatement and
the magnitude of external effects. Second, we investigate the effectiveness of
public policy measures aimed at a reduction of the environmental burden. In
this context, it is important to have a model with multiple market failures
so that the question of the relative effectiveness of different environmental
policy measures can be answered.
As noted above, pollution is modelled as flow pollution. The reason lies in
the fact that an EKC is more likely to arise for flow pollutants than for stock
pollutants. This is best illustrated by Lieb (2004, p. 484) who reports that
“almost all studies agree that there is an EKC for sulphur dioxide (SO2), sus-
pended particulate matter (SPM), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), carbon monoxide
(CO), and for some (but not all) sorts of river pollution (PR)... Although
all these pollutants are stock pollutants, they all have short life-times and can
therefore be considered as flow pollutants from a long-run point of view.”
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Turning to the related literature, there are a number of theoretical papers
on the EKC which consider the determinants of the turning point; some of
these papers also investigate the role of public policies. Brock and Taylor
(2004) use an augmented Solow model to demonstrate that an EKC arises
along the transition to the steady state. Although there is polluting produc-
tion in this model, there is no market failure. Lieb (2004) uses an overlapping
generations model with a stock pollution and a flow pollution. He focuses on
the different pollution paths of the stock and the flow pollution. The model
captures several external effects associated with production and abatement.
However, only the problem of a myopic government is analysed implying that
the intragenerational externalities are internalised, while the intergenerational
externalities are not. Moreover, the effectiveness of public policy measures
is not considered since the unregulated market economy is not investigated.
Chimeli and Braden (2002) employ a simple endogenous growth model with
environmental quality. The authors show that environmental quality follows a
V-shaped pattern, thereby explaining an EKC for a stock pollution. There is
single external effect associated with polluting production. Hence, the conse-
quences of multiple external effects cannot be studied. Finally, Anderson and
Cavendish (2001) employ a dynamic simulation model to investigate the con-
sequences of public policy measures on the turning point. This computable
equilibrium model has the advantage of being able to directly include differ-
ent aspects of the real world which are important in this context. However,
general equilibrium feedback effects are excluded and optimal taxes cannot
be derived.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 4.2, the
basic Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model is sketched. In Section 4.3, a sim-
ple dynamic EKC model is set up in general form. The decentralised and
the centralised solution are investigated and the optimal tax scheme is deter-
mined. In Section 4.4, a parameterised version of the model is employed to
investigate the determinants of the turning point and the relative effective-
ness of different public policies. In Section 4.5, it is shown that an N-shaped
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PIR can potentially be explained from the interaction of public policy and
the intrinsic properties of the model. Section 4.6 demonstrates concisely that
the model is compatible with most sets of stylised facts on economic growth
and the environment. Finally, Section 4.7 summarises the main results and
concludes.
4.2 The Andreoni and Levinson EKC Model
In an important paper, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) set up a simple static
model to derive sufficient conditions for an EKC. The Andreoni and Levin-
son model is sketched below to provide a reference point for the following
discussion.
Utility of the representative agent depends positively on consumption C
and negatively on pollution P . The general utility function may be expressed
as:
U = U(C, P ). (4.1)
Pollution is a function of consumption and environmental effort E according
to:
P = C − B(C,E). (4.2)
Pollution increases one-to-one with consumption (gross pollution) as repre-
sented by the first term on the RHS. On the other hand, pollution decreases
due to abatement as represented by the second term of the RHS. B(C,E)
is the abatement technology, which is increasing in both arguments. Both
“inputs” are essential for abatement, i.e. B(0, E) = B(C, 0) = 0. The final
basic equation is a standard budget constraint given by M = C + E, where
M denotes the available resources (income).
Andreoni and Levinson (2001, p. 277) show that there are two conditions
which together guarantee the existence of an EKC. The first condition –
related to preferences – states that “the marginal willingness to pay to clean up
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the last speck of pollution does not go to zero as income approaches infinity”.
This is a rather weak condition; it is easily satisfied since pollution abatement
can be regarded as a normal good.1 The second condition – related to the
abatement technology – states that there must be IRS in abatement.
Using the following parameterisation U(C, P ) = C − zP with z = 1 and
B(C,E) = CαEβ , Andreoni and Levinson (2001) show that an EKC results
provided that α + β > 1. This can be immediately recognised by inspecting
the pollution function in terms of M :
P (M) =
α
α+ β
M −
(
α
α + β
)α(
β
α + β
)β
Mα+β . (4.3)
The preceding equation results from P = C − CαEβ, C∗ = α
α+β
M and
E∗ = β
α+β
M , where C∗ and E∗ are the optimal level of consumption and
environmental effort. Equation (4.3) implies that P (M) is concave inM pro-
vided that α + β > 1. Hence, IRS in abatement (defined by α + β > 1)
represent a necessary condition for the existence of an EKC.
4.3 A General Dynamic EKC Model
In this section, we set up a simple dynamic EKC model, which will be em-
ployed in the course of this paper. Pollution results as a by-product of con-
sumption activities and is modelled as flow pollution. Households can reduce
pollution by spending resources on abatement. The abatement technology is
characterised by IRS. As Andreoni and Levinson (2001) have shown, this as-
sumption leads to an EKC. There is a homogeneous final-output good which
is produced under constant returns to scale using (physical and human) cap-
ital as the sole input factor. Households earn income by renting capital to
firms. Output and factor markets are perfectly competitive. We consider
two types of externalities and hence the decentralised solution diverges from
1Lieb (2002) shows that the normality of environmental quality is a necessary condition
for the existence of an EKC.
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the centralised solution. At first, the market economy is considered and sub-
sequently the centralised solution is investigated. Finally, the optimal tax
scheme is determined.2
4.3.1 The Decentralised Economy
There is a large number of identical households ordered on the interval [0, 1].
The representative household derives utility from consumption C and disu-
tility from net pollution P . The instantaneous utility function is U(C, P )
with UC > 0, UCC < 0, UP < 0 and UPP < 0.
3 The flow of pollution (per
period of time) is given by the difference between gross pollution G(C, C¯) and
abatement B(C,E, E¯):
P (C, C¯, E, E¯) = G(C, C¯)− B(C,E, E¯), (4.4)
where E is environmental effort and a “bar” above a variable denotes its
economywide average. The above-stated pollution function shows that pollu-
tion is modelled to result from consumption.4 Direct examples for polluting
consumption activities would be the use of automobiles and central heating.
Turning to environmental effort, we can interpret the model in the sense that
both households as well as firms conduct abatement. It is plausible and con-
venient to let the incidence of abatement costs fall on households. To clarify
this aspect, consider a real-world example: Abatement in the case of driving
automobiles comprises the installation of catalytic converters and strainers.
Although the major part of this abatement activity (development and instal-
lation) is conducted by firms, households face the decision for, and bear the
costs of this environmental effort.
2There are other general growth models with pollution and external effects (e.g. Smul-
ders and Gradus, 1996).
3We do not restrict the cross derivatives at this stage.
4More frequently, pollution is modelled as a by-product of production (e.g. Xepapadeas,
2004). There are, however, other theoretical studies, beside Andreoni and Levinson (2001),
which assume that consumption generates pollution (e.g. John and Pecchenino, 1994).
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There are two kinds of externalities, which both build on the assumption
that there is no strategic interaction between households – in terms of mak-
ing allowance for interdependence between own and others’ actions. First,
the representative household takes the polluting effects of consumption only
partly into account. It does not consider that the other households are also
negatively affected by its consumption. In other words, there is a (negative)
pollution externality associated with consumption. Second, environmental ef-
fort aimed at reducing (net) pollution also affects the society as a whole, i.e.
there is a (positive) externality resulting from environmental effort. Again,
the representative household neglects that its environmental effort has a pos-
itive impact on the other households, as well. As an example, consider again
the use of automobiles. It is the household who bears the financial burden,
but it is society that primarily benefits from the implementation of catalytic
converters and filters. External effects are associated with the economy-wide
averages of consumption C¯ and environmental effort E¯, which are considered
exogenous from the perspective of the typical household.
As noted above, households earn capital income only. Let r denote the
rental price of capital and K the stock of capital owned by households. Then
the household’s income is simply rK. The household’s gross expenditures
(including taxes) are given by (1+τC)C+(1+τE)E, where τC and τE represent
taxes (or subsidies) on consumption and environmental effort.5 Overall tax
revenues T are redistributed in a lump-sum manner according to a balanced-
budget rule, i.e. T = τCC + τEE. Households are assumed to maximise the
present value of an infinite utility stream. The associated dynamic problem
may be expressed as follows (time index suppressed):
max
{C,E}
∫ ∞
0
U(C, P )e−ρt dt (4.5)
s.t. P (C, C¯, E, E¯) = G(C, C¯)− B(C,E, E¯) (4.6)
K˙ = rK − (1 + τC)C − (1 + τE)E + T (4.7)
K(0) = K0, (4.8)
5Optimal tax rates are determined below.
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where ρ denotes the time preference rate, t the time index, K˙ the rate of
change of K per period of time and K0 is the initial stock of capital, respec-
tively. Notice that equation (4.7) shows the flow budget constraint of the
typical household.
As mentioned above, the focus here is on flow pollution. Because a pure
flow pollution (i.e. there is no pollution stock) cannot become negative, the
technical restriction P ≥ 0 must be taken into account (see also Lieb, 2004,
p. 488). Moreover, since we are interested in an inverted U-shaped PIR,
attention is restricted to interior solutions. The dynamic problem above can
be easily extended to allow for border solutions with P = 0.
The (current-value) Hamiltonian for the above-stated problem reads as
follows:
H = U [C, P (C, C¯, E, E¯)] + λ[rK − (1 + τC)C − (1 + τE)E + T ], (4.9)
where λ denotes the shadow price of capital. The necessary first-order con-
ditions are given by:6
UC + UPPC
1 + τC
= λ (4.10)
UPPE
1 + τE
= λ (4.11)
λ˙ = −λ(r − ρ), (4.12)
where Ux and Px denote the partial derivatives of U and P with respect to x ∈
{C,E}, respectively. For ease of interpretation, assume for the moment that
τC = τE = 0. Equation (4.10) then shows that along the optimal growth path
the (private) marginal utility of consumption must equal the shadow price of
capital λ. The marginal utility of consumption comprises two components: (i)
the direct utility from consumption UC and (ii) the disutility from pollution
UPPC . Moreover, it should be remembered that PC captures a gross pollution
6In addition, the transversality condition limt→∞ e
−ρtλK = 0 must hold. Moreover,
we assume that the necessary conditions are also sufficient for a maximum of the utility
functional.
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effect GC and an abatement effect BC . Similarly, equation (4.11) indicates
that marginal utility from environmental effort UPPE must equal the shadow
price of capital. Equation (4.12) shows that if the growth condition holds
(i.e. r − ρ > 0), the shadow price of capital vanishes at the rate r − ρ.
Turning to the firm side of the economy, there is a large number of final-
output firms. The representative final-output firm produces a homogeneous
good using capital as the sole input factor.7 The constant returns to scale
technology is Y = AK, where Y is final output, K the stock of capital and A
a constant technology parameter. Capital depreciates at constant rate δ ≥ 0.
From the solution to the firm’s static optimisation problem one gets:
r = A− δ.
4.3.2 The Centralised Economy
The social planner maximises the welfare of the representative individual.
This requires, of course, that the external effects are taken into account. The
social planner’s problem may be expressed as follows:
max
{C,C¯,E,E¯}
∫ ∞
0
U(C, P )e−ρt dt (4.13)
s.t. P (C, C¯, E, E¯) = G(C, C¯)−B(C,E, E¯) (4.14)
K˙ = F (K)− δK − C − E (4.15)
K(0) = K0. (4.16)
The (current-value) Hamiltonian reads as follows:
H = U [C, P (C, C¯, E, E¯)] + λ[F (K)− δK − C −E] (4.17)
and the necessary first-order conditions are given by:8
7As noted above, capital should be interpreted broadly to comprise human as well as
physical capital.
8Once again, the transversality condition limt→∞ e
−ρtλK = 0 must hold and we assume
that the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
A GENERAL DYNAMIC EKC MODEL 101
UC + UP (PC + PC¯) = λ (4.18)
UP (PE + PE¯) = λ (4.19)
λ˙ = −λ(FK − δ − ρ). (4.20)
Comparing the first-order conditions (4.18) and (4.19) to the first-order condi-
tions (4.10) and (4.11) shows the differences between the centralised solution
and the decentralised solution. When deciding on the optimal levels of con-
sumption C and environmental effort E the social planner, in contrast to the
private agent, takes the external consequences associated with average con-
sumption C¯ and average environmental effort E¯ into account. Specifically, the
social planner considers also the effects of average consumption on gross pol-
lution (UPPC¯ = UPGC¯) as well as the consequences of average environmental
effort on abatement (UPPE¯ = −UPBE¯).
4.3.3 Optimal Tax Scheme
Optimal taxes τ ∗C and τ
∗
E result from the comparison between the first-order
conditions of the social planner’s solution [(4.18) and (4.19)] and the first-
order conditions of the decentralised solution [(4.10) and (4.11)]. It can be
readily shown that an optimal tax scheme is given by:
τ ∗C = −
UPPC¯
UC + UP (PC + PC¯)
> 0 (4.21)
τ ∗E = −
PE¯
PE + PE¯
< 0. (4.22)
Let us start with the interpretation of τ ∗E , which is straightforward. Equation
(4.22) shows that the optimal subsidy on environmental effort equals the ratio
of the external marginal effect of environmental effort on pollution PE¯ < 0
and the overall (i.e. private and external) marginal effect of environmental
effort on pollution PE + PE¯ < 0. Similarly, the optimal consumption tax τ
∗
C
[equation (4.21)] is the ratio of the external marginal consumption effect on
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utility UPPC¯ < 0 and the overall marginal effect of consumption on utility
given by UC + UP (PC + PC¯) > 0.
9
Consider finally the consequences of a tax on consumption τC > 0 on the
decisions of the representative household. A consumption tax τC > 0 reduces
the LHS of equation (4.10). Holding the shadow price of capital constant,
equation (4.10) then requires that the marginal utility of consumption must
increase. This can be accomplished by reducing the level of consumption. An
analogous interpretation (with τE < 0) applies to equation (4.11).
4.4 A Specific Dynamic EKC Model
In this section, a parameterised version of the model is employed to investigate
the determinants of the turning point and the effectiveness of public policy. At
first, we consider the centralised solution with z = 1. Subsequently, we turn
to the more relevant case of an unregulated/imperfectly regulated economy
with z < 1.
4.4.1 Parameterisation
For further investigations we parameterise instantaneous utility U(C, P ), gross
pollution G(C, C¯) and abatement B(C,E, E¯). The following functional forms
are assumed:
U(C, P ) = log(C − zP ) with z > 0, C ≥ zP (4.23)
G(C, C¯) = CφC¯ω with 0 < φ, ω,< 1 (4.24)
B(C,E, E¯) = CαEβE¯υ with 0 < α, β, υ < 1, (4.25)
where z reflects the desire for a clean environment. A lower value of z means
that a given amount of pollution causes less disutility and individuals will
accordingly spend more on consumption and less on environmental effort.
Turning to the gross pollution function (4.24), Cφ represents the internal
9Notice that UC + UP (PC + PC¯) = λ > 0.
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effect of consumption on gross pollution and C¯ω is the corresponding external
effect. We assume throughout the paper that ω+φ = 1, which implies a linear
gross pollution function.10 Similarly, Eβ is the private and E¯υ the external
effect of environmental effort in abatement.11
A short explanation of the instantaneous utility function (4.23) is indi-
cated. Since φ+ω = 1 and taking into account C = C¯ and E = E¯, pollution
is given by P = C − CαEβ+υ. Moreover, assuming z = 1 the utility function
becomes U [C, P (C,E)] = log(CαEβ+υ). This formulation has the advantage
that C and E enter utility additively separable, which enables an analytical
solution for the social planner’s problem. Two issues should be noticed in
this respect: First, the preceding utility function requires C− zP ≥ 0, other-
wise utility would not be defined. For z ≤ 1 this restriction is automatically
satisfied since C is gross pollution and P is net pollution (gross pollution
minus abatement). Second, the utility function implies UCP =
1
(C−zP )2
> 0.
This property appears counterintuitive at first glance. However, this is due
to the fact that a rise in P has the same effect as a reduction in C and hence
marginal utility of consumption increases with pollution P .12
4.4.2 Analytical Results
The PIR is derived analytically and determinants of the turning point are
discussed. Here we focus on the centralised solution and assume that z = 1.
This allows us to derive analytical results. The decentralised solution with
z < 1 is investigated in a second step by simulating the transition process
(Section 4.4.3).
10In addition, this restriction enables us to solve the differential equation system resulting
from the centralised solution analytically.
11The appendix on page 120 shows that the parameterised Hamiltonian functions are
concave, i.e. the necessary conditions are also sufficient for a maximum of the utility
functional.
12According to Michel and Rotillon (1995) UCP > 0 can be interpreted as a compensation
effect; consumption desire rises with pollution.
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The time path of pollution P (t) and the PIR P (Y )
From the first-order conditions [(4.18) to (4.20)] and the parameterised func-
tions [(4.23) to (4.25)], one obtains the following solutions for K and λ:
K = K0e
(A−δ−ρ)t (4.26)
λ =
α + β + υ
K0ρ
e−(A−δ−ρ)t. (4.27)
Using equations (4.18), (4.19) and (4.27) and noting equations (4.23) to
(4.25), one can formulate an analytical expression for the time path of pollu-
tion:
P (t) =
K0e
(A−δ−ρ)tαρ
α+ β + υ
−
[(
K0e
(A−δ−ρ)tαρ
α + β + υ
)α
·
(
K0e
(A−δ−ρ)t(β + υ)ρ
α + β + υ
)β+υ]
. (4.28)
Furthermore, the PIR may be expressed as follows:
P (Y ) = cY − (cY )α(hY )β+υ, (4.29)
where c := C
Y
is the consumption rate and h := E
Y
the “environmental effort
rate”. To determine c and h, we consider the growth rate of capital Kˆ := K˙
K
using equations (4.15), (4.25) and (4.26):
Kˆ = A− δ − ρ = A− δ −
C
K
−
E
K
. (4.30)
Together with the parameterised versions of (4.18) and (4.19) this immedi-
ately yields the balanced growth values of the consumption rate c and of the
environmental effort rate h to read as follows:
c =
αρ
A(α + β + υ)
and h =
(β + υ)ρ
A(α + β + υ)
. (4.31)
The PIR is illustrated in Figure 4.1 (a) and the time path of pollution
in Figure 4.1 (b). These figures are based on the baseline set of parame-
ters, which is set out in Section 4.4.3 below. As in Andreoni and Levinson
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Figure 4.1: P (Y ) and P (t) with IRS in abatement (α + β + υ > 1)
(2001), IRS in abatement is a necessary condition for a hump-shaped PIR.13
Figure 4.1 (a) shows that pollution first rises with income, then declines and
eventually becomes zero. This EKC represents a balanced growth phenom-
enon.14 Although pollution does not grow at a constant rate (as is required
by the definition of a balanced growth path), the illustrated pollution path
represents a balanced growth phenomenon since pollution results from two
endogenous variables (consumption and environmental effort), which both
grow at constant rates. The required time span until pollution reaches its
peak and becomes zero is quite long. The whole “EKC story” takes nearly
250 years as is displayed in Figure 4.1 (b).
The EKC pattern displayed in Figure 4.1 (a) is in line with empirical
evidence as reported by Grossman and Krueger (1995) according to which
the PIR is asymmetric with an upper tail that declines relatively gradually.
The turning point
As has been noted above, the level of income at which pollution peaks and the
associated level of pollution is of outstanding interest from the perspective of
13In a more general version of the Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model Plassmann and
Khanna (2004, p. 16) show that “for non-constant returns to scale in gross pollution, a
sufficient condition for pollution to decline is rather that the returns to scale in abatement
exceed the returns to scale in gross pollution.”
14Employing a neoclassical growth model, it can be shown that the EKC can also result
from transitional dynamics.
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public policy. We employ the model set up above to investigate the factors
which determine this turning point. Unfortunately, closed-form solutions can
only be obtained for the centralised economy with z = 1. Under these re-
strictions we can investigate the impact of basic technology and preference
parameters on the turning point analytically. This represents an interesting
limiting case which is relevant in the sense that the qualitative results largely
hold true also for the decentralised economy with z < 1. In Section 4.4.3
we turn to the empirically more plausible case of an imperfectly regulated
economy with z < 1.
First, consider the point in time at which pollution reaches its maximum.
From the analytical expression for the time path of pollution [equation (4.28)],
one can determine this time threshold (denoted as t∗) to read as follows:
t∗ = −
log[Kα+β+υ−10 α
α−1(β + υ)β+υ(α + β + υ)2−α−β−υρα+β+υ−1]
(α + β + υ − 1)(A− δ − ρ)
. (4.32)
It should be noticed that the desire for a clean environment z, and the
parameters reflecting the internal and external effects of consumption on gross
pollution (φ and ω respectively) do not appear on the RHS, which is due to the
restrictions imposed (i.e. z = 1 and φ+ω = 1). Below we will investigate the
impact of these parameters numerically. Inserting the preceding expression
for the time threshold t∗ into the time path of income [Y (t) = AK(t)] and
using equation (4.26) yields the turning point (denoted as Y ∗):15
Y ∗ =
Aα
1−α
α+β+υ−1 (β + υ)−
β+υ
α+β+υ−1 (α + β + υ)1−
1
α+β+υ−1
ρ
. (4.33)
This critical income level is determined by the marginal product of capital
A, the rate of time preference ρ, the elasticity of consumption in abatement
α as well as the elasticities of environmental effort in abatement β and υ. It
is independent of the depreciation rate δ and the initial capital stock K0.
15This is basically the solution for the turning point one would obtain from the static
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model.
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Table 4.1: Comparative static results for Y ∗
∂Y ∗
∂x
for x ∈ {A, ρ, α, β}
A Y ∗ 1
A
> 0
ρ Y ∗ −1
ρ
< 0
α Y ∗ (ζ−1)(−α+β+υ)+αζ(log[ζ]+(β+υ)(log[β+υ]−log[α])
αζ(ζ−1)2
?
β Y ∗ 2+ζ(log[ζ]−2)+ζ(α−1)(log[α]−log[β+υ])
ζ(ζ−1)2
?
From the preceding solution for the turning point (Y ∗) we obtain the
comparative static results shown in Table 4.1.16 The first row shows that Y ∗
increases with the marginal product of capital A. For ease of interpretation,
let us assume that α = β + υ such that C = E .17 In this case, the level of
pollution depends only on consumption. Since an increase in A reduces the
consumption rate [equation (4.31)], the required level of income for pollution
to reach its maximum increases. The second row indicates that Y ∗ falls as ρ,
i.e. the time preference, rises. An analogous reasoning is applicable here. The
rate of consumption rises with ρ [equation (4.31)] and hence the required level
of income for pollution to reach its maximum falls. The signs of the partial
derivatives of Y ∗ with respect to the abatement technology parameters α and
β are indetermined.18 In most instances, the derivatives with respect to α and
β are negative. An increase in the degree of IRS in abatement leads, ceteris
paribus, to a higher abatement output for each level of income and hence to a
lower turning point. However, a positive sign can not be excluded in general;
for instance, under the restrictions α = β + υ and z = 1 the derivative with
respect to α is positive.19
16To simplify notation, we define ζ = α+ β + υ.
17A similar reasoning would apply to the case α 6= β + υ.
18Since we are considering the centralised solution with z = 1, ∂Y
∗
∂υ
= ∂Y
∗
∂β
.
19In this case, the relevant range of consumption is 0 < C < 1. Within this range an
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4.4.3 Numerical Analysis
The preceding analysis focused on the centralised solution with z = 1 implying
that consumption and pollution have the same weight in the utility function.
We now investigate the importance of external effects, the effectiveness of
public policies and the implications of different environmental preferences. To
accomplish this task, the transition process of the model under study must
be simulated. We apply the backward integration procedure (e.g. Brunner
and Strulik, 2002) to solve for the time paths of the endogenous variables.
Calibration
Table 4.2 shows the baseline set of parameters which underlies the numerical
investigations. The time preference rate ρ and the depreciation rate δ are
similar to the parameter values used in previous exercises (e.g. Ortigueira and
Santos, 1997; Eicher and Turnovsky, 2001). Given these values the marginal
product of capital A is chosen such that the implied net rate of return on
capital (A − δ) and the growth rate of per capita income (A − δ − ρ) are
in line with empirically plausible numbers (6% and 2%). The parameter
ω determines the strength of the external pollution effect of consumption,
while υ captures the external effect of environmental effort in abatement.
We choose ω and υ such that the relative external effect of consumption in
(gross) pollution ( ω
φ+ω
) and the relative external effect of environmental effort
in abatement ( υ
β+υ
) are both 10%, implying fairly moderate external effects.
As noted above, we assume that the gross pollution function is linear (i.e.
φ+ ω = 1).20
Turning to the abatement technology parameters (α, β and υ), there are
increase in α lowers, ceteris paribus, the abatement output. As a result, the maximum level
of pollution occurs at a higher consumption level. With α = β+υ the rate of consumption
is independent of α and hence a higher consumption-level implies a higher turning point
Y ∗.
20The alternatives of a concave or convex gross pollution function G(C) appear clearly
less plausible.
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Table 4.2: Baseline set of parameters
Final output technology A = 0.12 ; δ = 0.06
Preferences ρ = 0.04
Abatement technology α = 0.6 ; β = 0.45 ; υ = 0.05
Gross pollution φ = 0.9 ; ω = 0.1
two points to be noticed: First, we assume that there are IRS in abatement,
i.e. α + β + υ > 1. As in Andreoni and Levinson (2001), IRS in abatement
are necessary for an EKC. This is in line with Xepapadeas (1994), where IRS
in the pollution abatement sector (due to knowledge spillovers) is a necessary
condition for unbounded growth without excess pollution (similar results are
given in Michel, 1993). Another way to justify IRS in abatement is due to
technological progress in the abatement technology (Anderson and Cavendish,
2001). There is also empirical evidence for the existence of IRS in pollution
abatement. For instance, Andreoni and Levinson (2001, p. 281) argue that
“at the level of US states, average pollution abatement costs per dollar of GSP
[gross state product] decline with industry size, across states and industries,
and over time.” Moreover, Maradan and Vassiliev (2005) report that the
marginal opportunity costs of carbon dioxide abatement, measured as forgone
production of output, are negatively associated with income. Second, the
abatement technology parameters β and υ crucially determine the ratio of
abatement expenditures and income. This ratio ranges from about 3% for
z = 0.5 to 15% for z = 1. These values are in line with the empirical figures
reported by Brock and Taylor (2004, p. 6).
The turning point
The dependence of the turning point Y ∗ on the different model parameters
is investigated numerically. On this occasion, we consider three different
values for the desire for a clean environment z. In addition, the unregulated
economy (Table 4.3) is distinguished from an imperfectly regulated economy
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(Table 4.4).21 We focus on these two cases since we believe that the real world
is best represented by an unregulated or imperfectly regulated economy. The
basic assumption here is that politicians know the optimal taxes but due to
imperfections in the political process do not fully implement this optimal tax
scheme. The numbers reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the elasticities
of Y ∗ with respect to different model parameters, i.e. ∆Y
∗/Y ∗
∆x/x
with x ∈
{ω, υ, A, ρ, α, β, z}.22
Table 4.3: Elasticities of Y ∗ with respect to model parameters
unregulated economy (Θ = 0)
ω
(φ+ ω = 1)
υ A ρ α β z
Y ∗
z = 1
0.67 -0.79 0.97 -0.90 -4.41 -5.74 -4.70
Y ∗
z = 0.75
0.46 -1.45 0.98 -0.90 -7.48 -7.40 -4.42
Y ∗
z = 0.5
0.28 -2.22 0.99 -0.91 -9.06 -8.61 -4.19
Three points should be noticed: First, the case of z = 1 is qualitatively
identical to the cases of z < 1. By lowering the desire for a clean environment
z, the results change only gradually. Furthermore, the respective elasticities
show the same sign for the unregulated economy (Table 4.3) and for the
imperfectly regulated economy (Table 4.4). Second, the analytical results
from Table 4.1 are confirmed and the ambiguous effects of the abatement
21The tax rates imposed are specified as τC = ΘCτ
∗
C and τE = ΘEτ
∗
E , where τ
∗
C > 0
and τ∗E < 0 are optimal taxes (defined in Section 4.3.3); ΘC ≥ 0 and ΘE ≥ 0 indicate
the extent of tax implementation. A policy programme which diminishes both market
distortions simultaneously is described by Θ = ΘC = ΘE .
22The elasticities are based on an 10% increase of the parameter under consideration.
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technology parameters α and β are determined, at least numerically. Third,
compared to the case investigated above (centralised solution with z = 1) the
impact of additional model parameters (i.e. ω and υ) can now be assessed.
The first column of Table 4.3 shows the elasticity of Y ∗ with respect to
ω, i.e. the strength of the external pollution effect of consumption in gross
pollution. At the outset, it should be noticed that the restriction for the
gross pollution function to be linear (φ+ω = 1) remains valid, i.e. increasing
ω requires a reduction of φ. The positive impact of ω on the turning point
Y ∗ can be explained as follows: Since φ + ω is held constant, the level of
consumption resulting from the centralised solution remains constant. In-
creasing the external pollution effect of consumption ω leads to a larger gap
between the centralised and the decentralised allocation. This implies that
decentralised consumption rises, which, holding other things constant, causes
a higher level of pollution at each level of income. Graphically speaking, the
EKC is expanded outwards and the turning point increases. Moreover, this
column also shows that the impact of ω on Y ∗ increases with the desire for
a clean environment z. A higher value of z (i.e. greener preferences) leads
to a larger gap between the centralised and the decentralised solution, as can
be seen by inspecting the first-order condition (4.18). This implies that the
strength of the mechanism described above is reinforced. Finally, the effect
of ω on Y ∗ is smaller for the imperfectly regulated economy (Table 4.4).
The second column of Table 4.3 gives the impact of a variation in the ex-
ternal effect of environmental effort in abatement, υ, on the turning point Y ∗,
which is negative. An increase in υ has two separate effects: First, environ-
mental effort falls. To understand this effect, consider the case of a variation
in υ assuming that β + υ = constant. This implies that environmental ef-
fort E resulting from the centralised solution remains constant. Since the
magnitude of the distortion increases, the gap between the centralised and
the decentralised solution gets larger. Hence, E must decrease implying that
pollution rises at each level of income and that the turning point increases
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Table 4.4: Elasticities of Y ∗ with respect to model parameters
imperfectly regulated economy (Θ = 0.5)
ω
(φ+ ω = 1)
υ A ρ α β z
Y ∗
z = 1
0.30 -0.75 0.99 -0.90 -2.71 -4.87 -4.98
Y ∗
z = 0.75
0.21 -1.46 1.00 -0.91 -6.92 -7.00 -4.60
Y ∗
z = 0.5
0.14 -2.27 1.00 -0.91 -8.90 -8.43 -4.29
as well. Second, by holding β fixed (which is assumed in Table 4.3 and 4.4),
an increase in υ leads to a higher degree of IRS, which means that pollution
at each level of income falls. This implies that the turning point decreases.
The second effect dominates the first and hence the sign of this elasticity is
negative.23
The third column (A) and the fourth column (ρ) are in line with the
analytical results obtained from the special case investigated in Section 4.2.
The fifth column (α) and sixth (β) column contain negative values. Increasing
either α or β increases the degree of IRS in abatement, which has a strong
negative impact on the turning point.24 Finally, the last column (z) shows
that an increase in the desire for a clean environment z has a substantially
negative impact on the turning point Y ∗. This observation is in line with
Figure 4.2 below.
23The results are nearly identical for the unregulated and the imperfectly regulated
economy. This is due to the fact that the IRS argument does not depend on the degree of
regulation.
24As for the analytical solution the impact of δ is zero.
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The effectiveness of public policies
The effectiveness of public policies aimed at a reduction of the environmental
burden is investigated. On this occasion, we distinguish between the case
of highly environmentally sensitive preferences (z = 1) and the case of less
environmentally sensitive preferences (z = 0.5).
The baseline set of parameters implies fairly moderate external effects,
i.e. the relative external effect of consumption in gross pollution ( ω
φ+ω
) and
the relative external effect of environmental effort in abatement ( υ
β+υ
) are
both 10%. Nevertheless, the impact of the associated market failures on
the PIR is substantial, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. The PIR labelled “social”
shows the EKC resulting from the centralised solution, while the PIR labelled
“market” shows the EKC resulting from the unregulated market economy
(ignore the curves marked by ΘC = 1 and ΘE = 1 for the moment). Moreover,
Figure 4.2 (a) is based on z = 1, while Figure 4.2 (b) assumes z = 0.5. In
both cases, the turning point Y ∗ and the maximum amount of pollution
P ∗ = P (Y ∗) are highly sensitive with respect to external effects, i.e. the
market economy shows considerably higher values for Y ∗ and P ∗ compared
to the centralised solution. This implies that public policy should be highly
effective with respect to a reduction of the environmental burden.
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Figure 4.2: Centralised EKC versus decentralised EKC
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By imposing appropriate taxes on consumption and subsidies on envi-
ronmental effort the government can correct the market failures. The taxes
imposed are specified as τC = ΘCτ
∗
C and τE = ΘEτ
∗
E , where τ
∗
C > 0 and
τ ∗E < 0 are optimal taxes (determined in Section 4.3.3) and ΘC ≥ 0 and
ΘE ≥ 0 indicate the extent of tax implementation.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the effectiveness of the policy instruments under con-
sideration. The curves labelled as ΘC = 1 implies that the external effect of
polluting consumption is completely internalised, whereas the external effect
of environmental effort is not. The curves labelled as ΘE = 1 shows the re-
verse situation, i.e. the external effect of environmental effort is completely
internalised and the external effect of consumption on gross pollution is not.
We now turn to the relative effectiveness of public policy measures. Figure
4.2 (a) shows that the consumption tax is more effective than a subsidy on
environmental effort provided that preferences are extremely environmentally
sensitive (z = 1). This can be recognised by the fact that the curve ΘC = 1
lies strictly below the curve ΘE = 1 implying both a lower turning point
Y ∗ and smaller maximum amount of pollution P ∗. In contrast, provided that
preferences are less environmentally sensitive (z = 0.5) the reverse holds true.
A subsidy on environmental effort is more effective than a tax on polluting
consumption.
The reason for this observation is as follows: The optimal taxes shown
in equations (4.21) and (4.22), which are Pigouvian taxes, indicate the im-
portance of the respective market failure. The optimal environmental effort
subsidy is independent of the desire for a clean environment z. It simply
corresponds to the share of the external marginal effect of environmental
effort to the overall marginal effect of E on pollution. In contrast, the opti-
mal consumption tax depends on z. This can be immediately recognised by
inspecting the parameterised versions of τ ∗C and τ
∗
E :
τ ∗C =
zωCφ+ω
C − z(φ+ ω)Cφ+ω + zαCαEβ+υ
(4.34)
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τ ∗E = −
υ
β + υ
. (4.35)
Holding consumption C and environmental effort E fixed we see that the
optimal consumption tax τ ∗C increases with the desire for a clean environment
z. For z approaching zero, the representative individual does not care about
pollution and hence polluting consumption does not represent a problem.
The greener the preferences become (the larger z), the more important is
this market failure and the higher the consumption tax should be.25 For
large values of z we find that |τ ∗C | > |τ
∗
E|, which means that the market
distortion resulting from polluting consumption is of a higher magnitude than
the market distortion associated with environmental effort. Consequently, a
consumption tax is more effective than a subsidy on environmental effort. In
contrast, provided that z is small enough the reverse holds true, i.e. |τ ∗C | <
|τ ∗E|. In this case, a subsidy on environmental effort is more effective than a
consumption tax.
4.5 N-shaped Pollution-Income Relation
There are a number of empirical studies which argue that the PIR is not in-
verted U-shaped but instead is N-shaped, at least for some pollutants (Gross-
man and Krueger, 1995, Section IV; Lieb, 2003). This is important because,
in this case, pollution eventually increases with income.
The model under study provides a potential explanation for this phenom-
enon. Imagine the economy develops at first along the upward sloping branch
of the EKC resulting from the market economy as shown in Figure 4.3. At
some point in time, policy instruments are implemented to internalise external
effects and pollution accordingly diminishes. In the model, the economy
25This argument is based on holding consumption C and environmental effort E fixed,
which is problematic because optimal C and E depend, of course, on z. We checked
numerically that |τ∗C | > |τ
∗
E | for z = 1 and |τ
∗
C | < |τ
∗
E | for z = 0.5 indeed holds at each
point in time for the simulations underlying Figure 4.2.
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jumps to the centralised EKC; of course, in reality this process is distributed
over time. Provided that the economy is still below the critical threshold Y ∗
of the centralised solution, pollution starts to increase again. As a result,
one would observe an N-shaped PIR resulting from the interplay of public
policy and the intrinsic properties of the model. It should be noticed that
this explanation implies in fact an M-shaped PIR. As soon as the peak of
pollution (on the centralised EKC) is reached, pollution starts to decline
again.
Y
PHY L
Figure 4.3: M-shaped pollution-income relation
The mechanism sketched above provides one potential explanation for an
N-shaped PIR. We do not consider this to be a general explanation. However,
future empirical research aimed at explaining this pattern should take this
possibility into account. This kind of reasoning implies that the first down-
ward movement is policy induced, i.e. it should succeed the implementation
of environmental regulations aimed at a reduction of pollution. The subse-
quent increase in pollution is then simply due to the fact that growth might
be accompanied by a rise in pollution. Moreover, an N-shaped pattern can
result provided that there are less than IRS in abatement. Finally, one should
notice that Giles and Mosk (2003) find indeed an M-shaped EKC pattern by
using long-run data on methane emissions for New Zealand.
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4.6 Other Empirical Regularities
A dynamic EKC model should not only be able to reproduce an inverted
U-shaped PIR. In addition, it should be compatible with the remaining em-
pirical regularities on economic growth and the environment. These have
been reported by Brock and Taylor (2004) based on US data for the period
1950 to 2001: First, the emission intensities (P/Y in our notation) for most
pollutants are declining over time. Second, despite the fact that emission in-
tensities decline, the emission levels (P in our notation) continue to increase
for a certain period of time. Third, abatement costs relative to GDP (E/Y
in our notation) are roughly constant.
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Figure 4.4: Pollution levels, pollution intensity and abatement expenditures
The EKC model set up above is compatible with these empirical regular-
ities. Figure 4.4 (a) shows that the model is in line with the first and the
second stylised fact.26 The emission intensity (P/Y ) is indeed declining over
time and the pollution level (P ) continues to increase for a certain period of
time although pollution intensity is falling. Figure 4.4 (b) indicates that the
third regularity is also satisfied, i.e. abatement expenditures relative to GDP
(E/Y ) are indeed constant over time.
In addition, the simple dynamic EKC model (being a standard AK growth
model with pollution) is compatible with most of the stylised facts on eco-
26Figure 4.4 is based on the centralised solution with z = 1 and the baseline set of
parameters.
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nomic growth, known as the Kaldor (1961) facts: (i) the growth rate of per
capita output is constant, (ii) the capital-output ratio is constant and (iii)
the real rate of return on capital is constant as well.27
4.7 Summary and Conclusions
We have set up a simple dynamic EKC model with multiple market failures
resulting from external effects associated with polluting consumption and en-
vironmental effort. The model has been used to investigate the determinants
of the level of income at which pollution starts to decline (turning point) as
well as the relative effectiveness of public policy measures aimed at a reduc-
tion of the environmental burden. The main results can be summarised as
follows:
(1) The turning point is most strongly affected by the degree of IRS in
abatement and the preference for a clean environment. In addition, the mag-
nitude of external effects associated with polluting consumption and environ-
mental effort also has a substantial impact. This aspect points directly to the
importance of public policy measures.
(2) Provided that households have a strong preference for a clean envi-
ronment a consumption tax (i.e. avoiding the problem of pollution) is more
effective than a subsidy on environmental effort (i.e. correcting the prob-
lem of pollution). In contrast, if households are less environmental sensitive,
then a subsidy on environmental effort is more effective in comparison to a
consumption tax.
(3) It has been shown that an N-shaped PIR, observable for some specific
pollutants, can potentially be explained from the interaction of public policy
measures and the intrinsic properties of the model. Although we do not
consider this explanation to be valid in general, we think that this kind of
reasoning should be taken into account in future empirical research aimed at
explaining this pattern.
27The model is silent on the constancy of the capital and labour income shares.
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(4) In addition to the empirical EKC hypothesis, the dynamic EKC model
under study is compatible with the remaining empirical regularities associated
with economic growth and the environment. Moreover, the model is also
compatible with most of the stylised facts on economic growth due to Kaldor
(1961).
Finally, the paper points to a number of interesting questions for future
research. For instance, an obvious flaw of the Andreoni and Levinson (2001)
model, which becomes especially obvious in a dynamic context, lies in the
fact that pollution sooner or later becomes negative as the economy grows
provided that there are IRS in abatement. Finding a plausible mechanism
which is able to avoid this problematic implication would represent a valuable
contribution to the theoretical EKC discussion.
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4.8 Appendix
This appendix is compiled using Mathematica. Hence, most formulas are
in the input- and output style of Mathematica. In addition, the variable
definitions on pp. XI - XIII do not fully apply.
4.8.1 Concavity Test of the Hamiltonian Functions
Provided that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the control and the state
variable (Mangasarian sufficiency conditions) or that the maximised Hamil-
tonian is concave in the state variable (Arrow sufficiency condition), the neces-
sary conditions are also sufficient. Let us focus on the Mangasarian condition.
Conditions for concavity
A twice continuously differentiable function f(x) = f(x1, ..., xn) is concave on
an open, convex set S in Rn if and only if for all x in S and for all principal
minors ∆r(x) of the Hessian matrix of f at x, (−1)
r∆r(x) ≥ 0 for r = 1, ..., n
[Sydsæter et al., 2000 p. 82]. In other words: A function f(x) is concave
if its Hessian matrix H is negative semidefinite. H is negative semidefinite
if its principal minors alternate in sign, beginning with negative. The last
principal minor, namely the determinant of H itself, may be zero. (H is
negative definite if the principal minors alternate in sign and none may be
zero [Kamien and Schwartz, 1991 p. 301].)
Example: A general Hamiltonian function
Consider a general Hamiltonian function H(·) with two control variables (c
and e), one state variable (k) and one co-state variable (λ): H [c, e, k, λ]. The
Hessian matrix H is then given by:
H =


Hcc Hce Hck
Hec Hee Hek
Hkc Hke Hkk


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For concavity of the Hamiltonian H the following three conditions must be
satisfied:
(1) Hcc ≤ 0
(2) HccHee −HceHec ≥ 0
(3) detH ≤ 0
Concavity of the Hamiltonian for the centralised solution
Inserting the parameterised instantaneous utility, gross pollution and abate-
ment functions [equations (4.23) to (4.25) of the main text] into the Hamil-
tonian function for the centralised solution [equation (4.17) of the main text]
yields:
H = u[c,p] + λ(f [k]− δk− c− e);
u[c ,p ] = log[c− zp];
p = c− cαeβ+η;
f [k] = Ak;
H
(−c− e + Ak− kδ)λ+ Log
[
c−
(
c− cαeβ+η
)
z
]
The Hessian matrix H is given by:
H ={{D[H,{c,2}],D[H, c, e],D[H, c,k]},
{D[H, e, c],D[H,{e,2}],D[H, e,k]},
{D[H,k, c],D[H,k, e],D[H,{k,2}]}}
{{
c−2+αeβ+ηz(−1 + α)α
c− (c− cαeβ+η) z
−
(
1− z
(
1− c−1+αeβ+ηα
))2
(c− (c− cαeβ+η) z)
2 ,
c−1+αe−1+β+ηzα(β + η)
c− (c− cαeβ+η) z
−
cαe−1+β+ηz
(
1− z
(
1− c−1+αeβ+ηα
))
(β + η)
(c− (c− cαeβ+η) z)
2 , 0
}
,
{
c−1+αe−1+β+ηzα(β + η)
c− (c− cαeβ+η) z
−
cαe−1+β+ηz
(
1− z
(
1− c−1+αeβ+ηα
))
(β + η)
(c− (c− cαeβ+η) z)
2 ,
cαe−2+β+ηz(−1 + β + η)(β + η)
c− (c− cαeβ+η) z
−
c2αe−2+2β+2ηz2(β + η)2
(c− (c− cαeβ+η) z)
2 , 0
}
, {0, 0, 0}
}
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Condition (3) (see above) is easily satisfied, since all cross derivatives with
respect to k are zero.
Simplify[Det[H] ≤ 0]
True
Condition (1) is satisfied too. Consider Hcc
Minors[H,1][[1,1]]
c−2+αeβ+ηz(−1 + α)α
c− (c− cαeβ+η) z
−
(
1− z
(
1− c−1+αeβ+ηα
))2
(c− (c− cαeβ+η) z)
2
This expression is unambiguously negative. Given our assumption P ≥ 0
and the parameter restrictions, the numerator of the first term is negative,
whereas the denominator is positive. Thus the first term is negative. Both the
numerator and the denominator of the second term are positive. Subtracting
the second term from the first, yields a negative expression.
It remains to investigate condition (2), i.e. HccHee −HceHec ≥ 0. As we
have shown Hcc is negative. Hee is negative as long as β + η < 1. Otherwise,
Hee could be positive as well. HceHec is certainly positive, since Hce = Hec
(Young’s theorem). Thus, the sign of the second principal minor depends on
(i) the sign of β + η and (ii) the absolute values of HccHee and HceHec. For
condition (2) to be satisfied |HccHee| ≥ |HceHec| and β + η < 1 must hold.
Hee = D[H,{e,2}]
cαe−2+β+ηz(−1 + β + η)(β + η)
c− (c− cαeβ+η) z
−
c2αe−2+2β+2ηz2(β + η)2
(c− (c− cαeβ+η) z)
2
Unfortunately, |HccHee| ≥ |HceHec| can not be answered analytically. Thus,
we check condition (2) numerically. Specifically, we determine the sign of the
second principal minor using the baseline set of parameters (Table 4.2 of the
main text) for the different values of z used in Section 4.4.3 of the main text,
i.e. z = 1, z = 0.75 and z = 0.5.
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The baseline set of parameters is given by:
α =
6
10
;β =
45
100
;η =
5
100
;φ =
9
10
;ω =
1
10
;ρ =
4
100
; δ =
6
100
;A =
12
100
;
1. Case: z = 1
z = 1;
Simplify[Minors[H,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
True
2. Case: z = 0.75
z = 0.75;
Simplify[Minors[H,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
True
3. Case: z = 0.5
z = 0.5;
Simplify[Minors[H,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
True
All three conditions for concavity of H are satisfied. Therefore, the Hamil-
tonian for the centralised solution is indeed concave (at least for the baseline
set of parameters).
Simplified Hamiltonian z = 1
For the special case z = 1, the Hamiltonian (for the centralised solution)
simplifies and the question of concavity can be answered in general.
Clear[α, β, η, φ, ω, ρ, δ,A]
z = 1;
H¯ = H
(−c− e + Ak− kδ)λ+ log
[
cαeβ+η
]
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The Hessian matrix H¯is now given by:
H¯ = {{D[H¯,{c,2}],D[H¯, c, e],D[H¯, c,k]},{D[H¯, e, c],D[H¯,{e,2}],
D[H¯, e,k]},{D[H¯,k, c],D[H¯,k, e],D[H¯,{k,2}]}};
H1 = H¯//MatrixForm

− α
c2
0 0
0 −β+η
e2
0
0 0 0


The same three conditions as above must be satisfied.
Condition (1):
Minors[H¯,1][[1,1]]
Simplify[Minors[H¯,1][[1,1]] ≤ 0,
{c > 0, e > 0,0 < α < 1,0 < β < 1,0 < η < 1}]
−
α
c2
True
Condition (2):
Minors[H¯,2][[1,1]]
Simplify[Minors[H¯,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,
{c > 0, e > 0,0 < α < 1,0 < β < 1,0 < η < 1}]
α(β + η)
c2e2
True
Condition (3):
Det[H¯]
Simplify[Det[H¯] ≤ 0]
0
True
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Concavity of the Hamiltonian for the decentralised solution
Inserting the parameterised instantaneous utility, gross pollution and abate-
ment functions [equations (4.23) to (4.25) of the main text] into the Hamil-
tonian function for the centralised solution [equation (4.9) of the main text]
yields (cc = c¯ and ee = e¯):
Clear[H,u,p,λ, r,k, τc, τe, f , z,α, β, η, φ, ω, ρ, δ,A, c, e, ee, cc]
H = u[c,p] + λ(rk− (1+ τc)c− (1+ τe)e+T);
u[c ,p ] = log[c− zp];
p = cφccω − cαeβeeη;
f [k] = Ak;
H
λ(kr + T− c(1 + τc)− e(1 + τe)) + log[c− (c
φccω − cαeβeeη)z]
The Hessian matrix H is given by:
H ={{D[H,{c,2}],D[H, c, e],D[H, c,k]},
{D[H, e, c],D[H,{e,2}],D[H, e,k]},
{D[H,k, c],D[H,k, e],D[H,{k,2}]}}
{{
−
z
(
−c−2+αeβeeη(−1 + α)α+ c−2+φccω(−1 + φ)φ
)
c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z
−
(
1− z
(
−c−1+αeβeeηα+ c−1+φccωφ
))2
(c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z)
2 ,
c−1+αe−1+βeeηzαβ
c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z
−
cαe−1+βeeηzβ
(
1− z
(
−c−1+αeβeeηα+ c−1+φccωφ
))
(c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z)
2 , 0
}
,
{
c−1+αe−1+βeeηzαβ
c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z
−
cαe−1+βeeηzβ
(
1− z
(
−c−1+αeβeeηα+ c−1+φccωφ
))
(c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z)
2 ,
cαe−2+βeeηz(−1 + β)β
c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z
−
c2αe−2+2βee2ηz2β2
(c− (cφccω − cαeβeeη) z)
2 , 0
}
, {0, 0, 0}
}
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Again, conditions (1) to (3) must be satisfied (see above). Condition (3) is
again satisfied, since all cross derivatives with respect to k are zero.
Simplify[Det[H] ≤ 0]
True
The sign of the first and second principal minor of H [conditions (1) and (2)]
can not be determined analytically. Thus we check conditions (1) and (2)
numerically. Specifically, we determine the sign of the first and the second
principal minor of H using the baseline set of parameters (Table 4.2 of the
main text) for the different values of z used in Section 4.4.3 of the main text,
i.e. z = 1, z = 0.75 andz = 0.5. The taxes have no influence on the concavity
of the Hamiltonian (τc, τe do not appear in the Hessian matrix). Since we
have a large number of identical households ordered on the interval [0,1], we
can set c¯ = c and e¯ = e (here: cc = c, ee = e) after having determined the
derivatives.
The baseline set of parameters is given by:
α =
6
10
;β =
45
100
;η =
5
100
;φ =
9
10
;ω =
1
10
;ρ =
4
100
; δ =
6
100
;
A =
12
100
; cc = c; ee = e;
1. Case: z=1
z = 1;
Simplify[Minors[H, 1][[1, 1]] ≤ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
Simplify[Minors[H, 2][[1, 1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
True
True
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2. Case: z=0.75
z = 0.75;
Simplify[Minors[H,1][[1,1]] ≤ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
Simplify[Minors[H,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
True
True
3. Case: z=0.5
z = 0.5;
Simplify[Minors[H,1][[1,1]] ≤ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
Simplify[Minors[H,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
True
True
Thus, all three conditions for concavity of H are satisfied. Therefore, the
Hamiltonian for the decentralised solution is indeed concave (at least for the
baseline set of parameters).
Perturbations of the baseline set of parameters
We checked concavity of the Hamiltonian for perturbations of the baseline set
of parameters. For instance, consider the following two examples for z = 0.75.
In the first example we increased α by 10 per cent. In the second we increased
all parameters by 10 per cent (with the exception of φ and ω in order to retain
a linear gross pollution function).
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1. Example:
α =
66
100
;β =
45
100
;η =
5
100
;φ =
9
10
;ω =
1
10
;ρ =
4
100
; δ =
6
100
;
A =
12
100
; cc = c; ee = e; z = 0.75;
Simplify[Minors[H,1][[1,1]] ≤ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
Simplify[Minors[H,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
Simplify[Det[H] ≤ 0]
True
True
True
2. Example:
α =
66
100
;β =
495
1000
;η =
55
1000
;φ =
9
10
;ω =
1
10
;ρ =
44
1000
; δ =
66
1000
;
A =
132
1000
; cc = c; ee = e; z = 0.75;
Simplify[Minors[H,1][[1,1]] ≤ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
Simplify[Minors[H,2][[1,1]] ≥ 0,{c > 0, e > 0}]
Simplify[Det[H] ≤ 0]
True
True
True
Chapter 5
A New Approach to Pollution
Modelling in Models of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve∗
Models of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, particularly those with an ex-
plicit abatement technology, often involve that pollution becomes negative in
the long run. This, of course, is a highly implausible prediction. The paper at
hand examines the problem of negative pollution by, first, critically discussing
two approaches adopted in existing EKC models and, second, by proposing
a new approach. Motivated by the debatable assumption of perpetually in-
creasing returns to scale in abatement, the idea of fading increasing returns
to scale is introduced. This procedure does not only constitute a solution to
the theoretical problem of negative pollution, but also does well regarding the
empirical plausibility of the abatement technology.
∗Published in: Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.
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5.1 Introduction
Knowledge about the relationship between environmental pollution and in-
come is decisive for reliable predictions of long-term development of individual
welfare. If the pollution-income relation is characterised by the eventual de-
coupling of pollution from economic growth, then sustained growth without
excess pollution could be feasible. If, on the other hand, economic growth
invariably comes with increasing environmental degradation, the growth po-
tential could be limited, as propagated by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al.,
1972).
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is one of the most-used con-
cepts to analyse the pollution-income relation. EKC models largely dominate
both the empirical and theoretical literature on economic growth and pollu-
tion. The theoretical literature on EKCs can be separated into two major
strands. The first class of models stresses shifts in the production technolo-
gies, which differ in their pollution intensity, as the main cause for the hump-
shaped pollution-income relation. Prominent examples of this strand are
the contribution of Stokey (1998) and the model of Chapter 3. In the sec-
ond class, the inverted U-shaped pollution-income relation results from the
explicitly modelled abatement of (gross) pollution. That is, besides consump-
tion and investments in accumulable (human or physical) capital, there is an
additional economic activity, namely environmental effort. The characteris-
tics of the abatement technology are crucial for the occurrence of an EKC.
Examples for this strand of EKC models are John and Pecchenino (1994),
Selden and Song (1995), Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Brock and Taylor
(2004) and the model analysed in Chapter 4.1
The focus of this paper lies on EKC models of the second class and, in
1De Groot (1999) stresses structural changes within an economy as the main cause for
an EKC. However, the underlying mechanism is largely restricted to developing countries
and does not apply in the same way to mature economies. As a result, this mechanism has
not attracted considerable attention in the EKC literature.
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particular, on models where net pollution is defined as the difference between
gross pollution and abatement. The main characteristic necessary to generate
an EKC is a form of increasing returns to scale (IRS) in the abatement tech-
nology (see Andreoni and Levinson, 2001). But assuming IRS in abatement
only leads to reasonable implications in the short and medium run. In the
long run, this specific model set-up often results in unrealistic implications.
Pollution both as a stock and as a flow variable can become negative as soon
as the whole stock of pollution – if there is any at all – has been abated and
the actual output of the “abatement sector”, i.e. abated pollution, is greater
than the amount of pollution generated by the polluting activities. This, of
course, is an incorrect prediction. In order to diminish environmental degra-
dation, there must be a positive amount of pollution in the first place – at
least from a logical point of view. As a result, negative net pollution flows
can only be justified as long as there is a positive pollution stock. It should
be noted that the problem of negative pollution arises with or without the
incorporation of a pollution stock. In the former case, the problem is less se-
vere since temporarily negative pollution flows can be justified and typically
arises at a later date.
The potential occurrence of negative pollution is, however, not only a
technical problem, which could be solved by appropriate constraints, but has
severe consequences. Specifically, even the reliability of the predictions for
the short and medium run are challenged. If a model implies implausible or
incorrect predictions for the long run, the model specification does appar-
ently not reflect real economic relations or the facts observed by the natural
sciences.
Up to now, the problem of negative pollution has not been adequately
addressed in the theoretical EKC literature. Therefore, the hitherto existing
predictions might not be optimal or reliable. The present paper tries to close
this gap. In a first step, it critically discusses two approaches to avoiding neg-
ative pollution, which are adopted in existing EKC models. These are, first,
the restriction to interior solutions, i.e. only that period of time or devel-
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opment phase is considered where pollution is positive. Second, the original
modelling with net pollution as the difference between gross pollution and
abatement is converted into a specification in line with pollution intensities.
Since intensities are non-negative by definition, pollution will be non-negative
as well. In a second step, a new approach for modelling pollution in EKC
models with abatement is introduced. It is argued that the assumption of
perpetual increasing returns to scale in abatement is debatable. In conse-
quence, the main mechanism of the proposed approach lies in a continuous
restraint of the degree of the IRS in the abatement sector. With an appropri-
ate functional specification of the model, pollution stocks and flows remain
strictly positive.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The first step, i.e.
the discussion of the existing approaches to avoid negative pollution, is dealt
with in Sections 5.2 (restriction to interior solutions) and 5.3 (conversion of
the pollution function with explicit gross pollution and abatement functions
into a specification with a pollution intensity). The subsequent two sections
address the second step. In Section 5.4, the evidence on economies of scale
in abatement is discussed. Section 5.5 deals with the new approach of fading
increasing returns to scale in abatement. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Interior Solutions and Non-Negativity
Constraint
In most theoretical EKC models, the hump-shaped pollution-income relation
occurs at early stages of economic development. That is, pollution rises right
from the start, until eventually a decoupling of environmental degradation
from economic growth occurs. The problem of negative pollution – as a flow
or as a stock variable – emerges relatively late in the development process,
after abatement has succeeded in reducing pollution to zero. On account of
this chronology, some models ignore the possibility of negative pollution and
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make do with the proof of an inverted U-shaped pollution-income relation or
turn the attention to interior solutions only (e.g. Selden and Song, 1995).
By disregarding the eventuality of negative pollution and the associated un-
realistic implications, these procedures are not fully satisfying despite their
simplicity and manageability.
The first approach to avoiding negative pollution is a purely technical
solution. Specifically, the model under consideration is augmented by a non-
negativity constraint for pollution. As an illustration, consider the following
net pollution function known from literature:2
P (C,E) = Λ[C − B(C,E)], (5.1)
where P is net pollution, C consumption, E environmental effort, Λ a pollu-
tion intensity parameter reflecting the actual state of the technological knowl-
edge and B(·) is the abatement technology. Gross pollution, reflected by the
first term in brackets, is a linear function of the polluting economic activ-
ity, namely consumption.3 Andreoni and Levinson (2001) show that with a
linear gross pollution function, increasing returns to scale in abatement is a
necessary condition for an EKC pattern. The non-negativity constraint for
pollution then requires:
P (C,E) ≥ 0. (5.2)
Provided that both C and E grow over time and that abatement is charac-
terised by IRS, net pollution [equation (5.1)] would eventually become neg-
ative. Hence, equation (5.2) becomes binding sooner or later. In order to
satisfy the non-negativity constraint, consumption and environmental effort
can no longer be chosen independently. In fact, for P = 0 environmental
effort is no longer an independent choice variable but rather a function of
consumption.
2To simplify notation, the time index is suppressed.
3More frequently, pollution is modelled as a by-product of production (e.g. Xepapadeas,
2004). However, the assumption that only part of the production is polluting is warrantable
as well (John and Pecchenino, 1994).
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The consideration of a non-negativity constraint for pollution does not
constitute a satisfying solution for the problem of negative pollution. The
prevention of negative pollution is of a solely technical nature and not due to
a more realistic abatement function. Thus, the reservations about pollution
functions implying negative pollution in the long run still apply. Moreover,
both consumption and environmental effort are discontinuous at the point
in time where the non-negativity constraint becomes binding. The empirical
plausibility of such discontinuities is questionable.
5.3 From Abatement to Pollution Intensities
Since the potential occurrence of negative pollution can be traced back inter
alia to the modelling of net pollution as the difference between gross pollution
and abatement, the second approach to avoiding negative pollution starts at
this point. Specifically, the idea is to convert the original specification with
explicit gross pollution and abatement functions into a specification, where
net pollution is given by the product of the polluting economic activity and
a measurement for environmental effort (see e.g. the Green Solow Model of
Brock and Taylor, 2004). One could argue that this procedure, i.e. the pool-
ing of the gross pollution and abatement functions, corresponds to a specifi-
cation characterised by pollution intensities. In other words, the mechanism
employed by the other prevailing class of theoretical EKC models (see Section
5.1) is adopted.
For an illustration of this procedure, consider the same net pollution func-
tion as in Section 5.2 [equation (5.1)]. Assuming – as Brock and Taylor (2004)
– thatB(·) is linearly homogeneous and defining h = E
C
, the pollution function
can be rewritten as:
P (C,E) = ΛC[1−B(1, h)], (5.3)
respectively as:
P = ΛCb(h) where b(h) = [1−B (1, h)] , (5.4)
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where b(h) can be regarded as an abatement function in intensive form de-
pending on the ratio of (polluting) consumption and environmental effort.
However, rewriting equation (5.1) with a pollution intensity term is not a
remedy for negative pollution. The success of this approach lies rather in the
adequate choice of the functional form of the abatement function in intensive
form. For plausibility reasons, environmental effort should have a positive
but decreasing marginal effect on pollution reduction, i.e. the following con-
ditions should hold: b(0) = 1, b′(h) < 0 and b′′(h) > 0. To prevent pollution
from becoming negative, b(h) must additionally satisfy
lim
h→∞
b(h) ≥ 0. (5.5)
Otherwise, the non-negativity of pollution is not guaranteed. Provided that
C > E and, hence, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 the following functional form could be em-
ployed:
b(h) = (1− h) with  > 1 (5.6)
This function has the desired attributes and satisfies the condition for non-
negative pollution.4 Even if the same amount were be spent for abatement as
for consumption, pollution would simply be equal to zero but never become
negative. However, if h were constant or bounded from above with an up-
per bound smaller than unity, there would have to be technological progress
targeted at more environmentally friendly production technologies (thereby
reducing the intensity parameter Λ) in order to get a pollution-income relation
in line with the EKC.
At first glance, the procedure outlined in this section seems to be a so-
lution to avoid negative pollution. At closer inspection, however, it becomes
clear that its success depends on the accurate specification of the abatement
function in intensive form [b(h)]. In addition, technological progress could
possibly be necessary for an EKC-type pollution-income relation.
4Equation (5.6) is adopted from Brock and Taylor (2004). In their model, production
and not only consumption is polluting. Hence, h is defined as the fraction of overall
economic activity dedicated to abatement and 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 is fulfilled by definition.
136 A NEW APPROACH TO POLLUTION MODELLING IN EKC MODELS
5.4 Evidence on Returns in Abatement
As pointed out in Section 5.1, many EKC models are based on a form of scale
economies, which can be due to direct modelling or due to fixed costs.5 By
explicitly modelling an abatement technology, Andreoni and Levinson (2001)
demonstrate that IRS in abatement are crucial for the occurrence of an EKC
pattern. This applies provided that the gross pollution function is linear. In a
more general version of the Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model, Plassmann
and Khanna (2004, p. 16) show that “for non-constant returns to scale in
gross pollution, a sufficient condition for pollution to decline is rather that the
returns to scale in abatement exceed the returns to scale in gross pollution.”
Formally, assume that the abatement function B(C,E) is homogeneous of
degree d and the gross pollution function G(C) is homogeneous of degree νd.
Then, a sufficient condition of an EKC pattern is ν < 1.6
However, if pollution is considered in terms of emissions – as opposed to
in terms of ambient concentration or in terms of damage – the assumption
of a linear gross pollution function is most appropriate. In this paper, the
focus lies on pollution as a flow variable and, hence, pollution should be best
regarded in terms of emissions. Thus, the leading cause for the occurrence of
negative pollution is the assumption of IRS in abatement. On this occasion,
the question of the plausibility of increasing returns to scale in abatement
arises. Is the pervasive existence of IRS indeed an appropriate assumption?
Or is abatement rather characterised by fading increasing returns to scale?
On the one hand, Andreoni and Levinson (2001, pp. 278 - 281) report empiri-
5Fixed costs are conceivable for example in pollution abatement. As a result, poorer
countries use dirtier production technologies, as in Stokey (1998), or there is a zero-
abatement phase at the beginning, as in Selden and Song (1995). Another example for
fixed costs is given by appointment costs of institutions which stick up for the environ-
ment, e.g. an environmental protection agency (Jones and Manuelli, 2001). Hence, richer
countries are more likely to have powerful environmental institutions.
6A technical proof is given by Plassman and Khanna (2004, pp. 6 - 15). The pollution
function (5.1) with IRS in abatement is compatible with this notation if ν = 1/d and d > 1.
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cal evidence of IRS in abatement. For example, at the plant level, the costs of
controlling emissions of large coal-fired boilers decline substantially with the
boiler size. At the level of US states, the authors show that “average pollution
abatement costs per dollar of GSP [gross state product] decline with industry
size, across states and industries, and over time.” Moreover, Maradan and
Vassiliev (2005) report that the marginal opportunity costs of carbon dioxide
abatement, measured as forgone production of output, are negatively associ-
ated with income. All these empirical findings can be interpreted as evidence
for the existence of IRS in abatement.
On the other hand, there are also legitimate arguments for fading IRS in
abatement. First, it is not clear from the outset that doubling both pollution
and environmental effort results throughout in more than doubled abated
pollution. In contrast, it seems plausible that abating pollution becomes rel-
atively more resource intensive as the last speck of pollution is or must be
tackled. Second, abatement activities may be characterised by learning by
doing, so that experience in pollution abatement will indeed increase the effec-
tiveness of environmental effort. However, learning curves typically show that
the potential gains due to experience decrease with the cumulative activity.
Moreover, the potential cost reductions associated with learning are usually
higher for infant technologies than for mature technologies (Bramoulle´ and
Olson, 2005). There are no broad empirical estimates of learning curves for
pollution abatement so far. The early study of Bellas (1998) can be regarded
as an exception. He finds a decreasing cost trend of flue gas desulphurisation
units over their lifetimes. Despite the fact that this result can be regarded
as evidence for the existence of learning-by-doing effects, no conclusions re-
garding decreasing learning effects can be drawn by means of this study. Yet,
McDonald and Schrattenholzer (2001) compile estimated learning rates for
various energy technologies from 26 field studies, and conclude that later
data imply lower learning rates, especially for gas turbines and gas turbine
combined-cycle power plants.
In sum, there is evidence for the existence of increasing returns to scale
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in abatement. In addition, it seems more plausible that an abatement tech-
nology can indeed exhibit IRS at some stages but not throughout. In other
words, with rising environmental effort, the increasing returns to scale in
abatement level off.
5.5 New Approach: Fading IRS in Abatement
5.5.1 The General Mechanism
On the basis of the arguments above, a further mechanism to avoid neg-
ative pollution becomes obvious: continuous restraint of the degree of the
increasing returns to scale. In other words, at the beginning the abatement
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. But with rising abatement
activities the IRS get weaker and weaker and approach constant returns to
scale (CRS) in the limit. This general mechanism is illustrated in Figure
5.1. The gross pollution function is linear in the polluting activity, while the
abatement technology exhibits IRS at the beginning but eventually becomes
a linear function too. If the restraint of the degree of IRS is adequately
specified, an EKC-conform pollution-income relation would still result, but
pollution would never become negative. Pollution would rather approach a
non-negative constant.
This procedure does not only constitute a accurate solution to the theoret-
ical problem of negative pollution, but also does well regarding the empirical
plausibility of the abatement technology. Moreover, its smooth decline of
pollution is more plausible than a steep decline and an abrupt change from
positive pollution levels to zero pollution, as would result with the incorpora-
tion of a non-negativity constraint for pollution. However, it should be noted
that this approach is only applicable to EKC models with explicitly modelled
increasing returns to scale in the abatement technology.
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Figure 5.1: Fading IRS in abatement
5.5.2 A Specific Example
To further illustrated this approach, the fading-IRS mechanism is now ap-
plied to a dynamic EKC model with a net pollution function in line with
equation (5.1). However, the abatement technology is slightly modified. Ba-
sically, B(C,E) exhibits IRS but the degree of the IRS steadily declines with
increasing environmental effort E. In the limit, B(C,E) is approximately
characterised by CRS. The following net pollution function fulfills this prop-
erty:
P = C − CαE
1−α+ 1
1+E2 (5.7)
The decreasing degree of IRS is due to the second term in the exponent of
E, i.e. 1
1+E2
, which approaches zero as E becomes large. Of the various
arguments for fading IRS in abatement (outlined in Section 5.4 above), the
declining learning effects fit best with this particular specification, since it is
E and not e.g. P which causes the continuous restraint of the degree of IRS
in equation (5.7).
Assuming for illustration purposes that α = 0.5, consumption and envi-
ronmental effort will be approximately equal in the long run. As a result, net
pollution approaches zero. It should be noted that the condition α = 0.5 for
net pollution to be zero with CRS is not a singularity of this specification,
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but is also valid for the seminal Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model. With
CRS and α > 0.5, net pollution is monotonically increasing, whereas with
CRS and α < 0.5, net pollution is monotonically decreasing and, thus, would
eventually become negative.
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Figure 5.2: Pollution-income relation with fading IRS in abatement
A numerical example with the above net pollution function is provided in
Figure 5.2. The illustration is based on an optimisation of the utility function∫∞
0
[log(C − zP )]e−ρt dt subject to a standard capital accumulation equation
K˙ = AK − δK −C −E, where z reflects the desire for a clean environment,
ρ denotes time preference, P is net pollution according to equation (5.7), K
is capital, A a constant technology parameter and δ the capital depreciation
rate.7
For the relevant range of income the pollution-income relation plotted
in Figure 5.2 has all “desired” characteristics: hump-shaped, asymmetric
with an upper tail that declines relatively gradually and – most importantly
– non-negative net pollution in the long run.8 Thus, with an appropriate
7The following set of parameters is employed: A = 0.12, δ = 0.06, ρ = 0.04, α = 0.5
and z = 1. The case z = 1 represents an interesting limiting case which is relevant in the
sense that the qualitative results largely hold true also for z < 1. For a detailed parameter
calibration and the consequences of z < 1 see Chapter 4, pp. 108 - 112.
8According to empirical evidence reported by Grossman and Krueger (1995) the
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specification of the net pollution function, the approach with fading IRS in
abatement constitutes a promising way of modelling pollution in EKC models
with explicit abatement technologies. Unlike e.g. the purely technical solution
with a non-negativity constraint (Section 5.2), the approach outlined in this
section is able to reflect the real economic relations and the facts observed by
the natural sciences.
For example, consider the actual SO2 emissions for Switzerland for the
years 1950 - 2003 reported in Figure 5.3. Since 1980, the SO2 emissions have
been steadily decreasing. However, the rate of decline is not constant. After
1990 the reductions slowed down. Such an emission path is compatible with
the argument of fading increasing returns to scale, but not with constant IRS
in abatement. With constant IRS in abatement, the emission path would
rather continue like the dashed line in Figure 5.3.
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Source: 1950 - 1989: Swiss Agency for the Environment, Forests and Landscape (1995);
1990 - 2003: Swiss Agency for the Environment, Forests and Landscape (2005).
Figure 5.3: SO2 emissions for Switzerland, 1950 - 2003.
pollution-income relation should be skewed to the right.
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5.6 Summary and Conclusions
Theoretical EKC models with an explicit abatement technology and net pol-
lution as the difference between gross pollution and abatement, often involve
that both pollution as a stock variable and pollution as a flow variable can
potentially become negative.
In the theoretical literature on the EKC the aspect of negative pollution
is usually not adequately addressed. The paper at hand has tried to close
this gap. In a first step, two different solution approaches adopted in existing
EKC models were discussed. First, the restriction to interior solutions and
the consideration of an additional non-negativity constraint for pollution were
investigated. It was argued that this procedure is not fully satisfying since
it is of a solely technical nature and not due to a more realistic abatement
function. Second, an approach employed by Brock and Taylor (2004) was
discussed. By converting the original pollution function with net pollution
as difference between gross pollution and abatement into a pollution function
in line with emission intensities, these authors proposed a smart solution to
the problem of negative pollution. However, this approach does not consti-
tute a general solution but its success depends rather on the choice of the
“right” functional form for the abatement technology, and in some circum-
stances additional technological progress is necessary for an hump-shaped
pollution-income relation. In a second step, a new approach to avoid neg-
ative pollution was introduced. Motivated by the debatable assumption of
perpetual increasing returns to scale in abatement, the mechanism of fading
IRS was proposed. By a continuous restraint of the IRS until the abatement
technology exhibits CRS in the limit, the pollution-income relation can po-
tentially be characterised by non-negative pollution levels in the long run.
Even though this new approach is promising, it is not a panacea for the prob-
lem of negative pollution. The general applicability is not given since this
mechanism can only be employed in EKC models with explicitly modelled
IRS in abatement. Furthermore, more research on an appropriate functional
specification generating the needed restraint of the degree of IRS is required.
Chapter 6
The Environmental Kuznets
Curve – Evidence from Time
Series Data for Germany
In recent years, extensive literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve
leading to optimistic policy conclusions has attracted great attention. How-
ever, the underlying cross-section estimations are not very reliable. Accord-
ingly, this contribution uses time series data for a single country with reliable
data quality: Germany. The results of the traditional reduced-form speci-
fication do not support the EKC hypothesis. However, with a specification
in the tradition of error correction models, which are more appropriate in
the presence of non-stationary time series, it is found that the typical EKC
pattern can be confirmed.
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6.1 Introduction
Recently, a series of empirical studies about the so-called Environmental
Kuznets Curve (hereafter EKC) has been published.1 The EKC hypothesis
postulates that environmental pollution follows an inverted U-shaped curve
relative to income. Put differently, environmental quality first decreases with
rising income but, after a certain income level has been reached, it begins to
recover again. However, the reported empirical results and conclusions are
ambiguous. Some authors find evidence for an EKC for different air and water
pollutants and other measurements of environmental degradation (e.g. Gross-
man and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; Cole et al., 1997). Others,
on the other hand, report either monotonically increasing or decreasing rela-
tionships between pollution and per capita income, or even find no such rela-
tionship (e.g. Torras and Boyce, 1998 and partly Shafik, 1994). Nevertheless,
the validity of the EKC hypothesis is crucial for possible policy implications.
If the hypothesis does not apply, one could argue that “to save the environ-
ment and even economic activity from itself, economic growth must cease
and the world must make a transition to a steady state economy”(Panayotou
2000, page 1). If, however, the hypothesis applies, the conclusion might be
quite different: “But the strong correlation between incomes and the extent
to which environmental protection measures are adopted demonstrates that,
in the long run, the surest way to improve your environment is to become
rich” (Beckerman, 1992, page 491).
Most empirical studies on the EKC hypothesis use cross-country or panel
data for their empirical estimations. But the fiercely criticised use of cross-
country data suggests that only single-country studies could shed light on the
validity of the EKC hypothesis (e.g. Roberts and Grimes, 1997). The follow-
ing arguments support this view. An EKC found by cross-country estima-
tions could simply reflect the juxtaposition of a positive relationship between
1The EKC is named after Simon Kuznets (1955), who found a hump-shaped relationship
between income and the inequality of income.
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pollution and income in developing countries with a negative one in devel-
oped countries, and not a single relationship that applies to both categories
of countries. Such an EKC would be a statistical artefact (Vincent, 1997).
This argument partly applies also to panel data estimations. Owing to the
short length of available time series on pollution, the panel data sets typi-
cally contain little or no overlap between observations from developing and
developed countries. Low-income observations come from developing coun-
tries; high-income observations, on the other hand, from developed countries
(Vincent 1997). On account of this fact, the somewhat uncommon conclusion
is drawn that for EKC studies time series estimations are to be preferred even
to panel data estimations.2 In principle, the disregard for this juxtaposition
is a special case of parameter heterogeneity, which is a frequent problem in
the cross-section growth context. It is questionable whether the homogeneity
assumption that all estimated coefficients are country-invariant is appropriate
for a broad spectrum of countries, reaching from poor developing countries to
rich and highly industrialised nations. Possibilities for avoiding the parameter
heterogeneity problem are the use of specifications, which allow for varying
coefficients, or – as in this paper – data limitation to one single country.3
More arguments for the use of time series data are provided by List and
Gallet (1999). These authors find very different income turning points across
the US states for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide. In other words, the US
states do not follow a uniform pollution path. Since US states are commonly
and correctly assumed to be more homogenous than most samples of coun-
tries, this study backs up the advantage of time series estimations over cross-
country studies. If the results of cross-section estimations are generalised,
incorrect inferences about the further development of pollutant emissions or
2This animadversion does, of course, not apply to panel data studies with a broad and
overlapping data set. In this case, panel data estimations are indeed to be preferred to
time series estimations with only one country.
3For a brief treatise on parameter heterogeneity in the growth context, see Temple
(1999).
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concentrations could be drawn and, therefore, misleading policies proposed.
Similar conclusions are reported by Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2005) when
comparing time series with panel estimations for carbon dioxide. Estimat-
ing the income-emission relation for OECD countries, they find that pooling
countries in one panel can bias the estimates and, therefore, the results may
not be reliable. Again, the cause of this distortion is the juxtaposition of
different income-emission relationships within the pooled countries.
So far, there are only a few studies with time series data for a single
country and, as in the case of cross-country studies, the results are mixed.
Carson et al. (1997), using US state data between 1988 and 1994, find a
negative relationship between seven types of air pollutant emissions and in-
come. Since, for the period under consideration, the per capita income levels
of the United States are clearly above the EKC turning points usually cal-
culated by cross-country studies, these results are consistent with the EKC
hypothesis. No support for the EKC supposition, however, is given by Vin-
cent (1997). This author reports that the emission profiles that are actually
observed in Malaysia do not coincide with those that are predicted by cross-
country studies for a country with a per capita GDP like Malaysia. Mostly,
the concentration path of pollutants is incorrectly predicted and the changes
in pollutant emissions are vastly overstated by cross-country estimations. Ap-
plying a somewhat more sophisticated model specification, de Bruyn et al.
(1998) find that economic growth has a negative effect on environmental qual-
ity, but, despite the increase in emissions due to economic growth, emissions
are likely to decline over time, given sufficient technological progress or struc-
tural change. On this account, the authors reason that “the presumption
that economic growth results in improvements in environmental quality is
unsupported by evidence [. . . ]”. Unruh and Moomaw (1998) and Moomaw
and Unruh (1997) find evidence that the carbon dioxide emission trajectories
of sixteen OECD countries follow an inverted U-shaped curve; however, not
with respect to income, but with respect to time. The change from an in-
creasing to a decreasing relationship occurred in all countries around 1973 –
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the time of the first world-wide oil price shock. Unruh and Moomaw (1998,
page 227) conclude that “emissions trajectories would be expected to follow
a regular, incremental path until subjected to a shock that leads to the es-
tablishment of a new trajectory or attractor.”4 Perman and Stern (2003)
use cointegration analysis to test the EKC hypothesis for sulphur emissions.
These authors show that the general applicability of of the EKC hypothesis
is not granted. The estimation results highly depend on the supposed model
specification and on the data set. A historical perspective about the carbon
dioxide emissions in Sweden from 1870 – 1997 (Lindmark, 2002) shows that
emission fluctuations can be explained mostly by technological and structural
change, by economic growth and by changing prices. Recent and more com-
prehensive surveys of the empirical EKC literature are provided by Copeland
and Taylor (2004), Dasgupta et al. (2002) and Stern (2004), among others.5
This paper, using time series data for Germany, aims at investigating the
relationship between several pollutants and income within a single, developed
country. In particular, the following questions are scrutinised. Are the doubts
on the suitability of cross-country studies legitimate, i.e. are the results of
time series estimations in line with those of cross-country studies? Is the
widely used traditional reduced-form equation appropriate for time series es-
timations? To answer these questions, first the traditional form model with
only one independent variable, namely gross domestic product (GDP), is es-
timated. The estimation results of this simple specification, which was first
introduced by Grossman and Krueger (1993), give rise to the supposition
that the development of environmental pressure is more complex and that
the different stages of environmental degradation cannot be explained by per
4However, since the included countries were selected on the basis that their pollution-
income relations show evidence of a structural break around 1973, the estimation results
are not very representative and, therefore, the conclusion should not be generalised.
5Compared to empirical EKC studies, theoretical EKC models are quite rare. Recent
contributions are Brock and Taylor (2004), Kelly (2003), Chimeli and Braden (2002), Lieb
(2002), Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Bulte and van Soest (2001) or the models presented
in Chapters 3 and 4.
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capita income alone. Therefore, other variables must have at least as much
influence on the environment as income. Different possibilities, such as the
incorporation of trade variables or gross value added by the industry sector,
which are commonly proposed by theory, are evaluated.
Second, this paper contributes to the EKC literature by applying a model
specification that can be regarded as a modified error correction model. The
advantages of this specification are the distinction between two different in-
fluence channels and the more favourable estimation characteristics in the
presence of serial correlation and non-stationarity. Although these results
yield better results with regard to the estimation statistics and some evi-
dence for a hump-shaped emission pattern is found, the empirical validity of
the EKC hypothesis is not conclusively confirmed.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, the
theoretical framework is set forth. Some explanatory notes to the data are
provided in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, the empirical results are presented
and discussed. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Framework
The non-linear relationship between the indicators of environmental pollution
and per capita income is usually specified in a reduced form such as:
Pt = σ0 + σ1Yt + σ2Y
2
t + σ3Y
3
t + σ4Vt + εt (6.1)
where P stands for the pollution indicator, Y for income and V for other
variables that are supposed to influence pollution; t denotes a time index and
ε is the normally distributed error term. An EKC results from σ1 > 0, σ2 < 0,
and σ3 = 0. The income level at which environmental degradation begins to
decline is called income turning point (ITP). The ITP of an EKC is obtained
by setting the first derivation (with respect to income) of equation (6.1) equal
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to zero and solved for income; this yields −σ1/2σ2.
6 With σ1 > 0, σ2 < 0
and σ3 > 0 an N-shaped pattern is obtained, i.e. there is a second turning
point, after which the environmental degradation rises again with increasing
income. However, investigating the relationship between carbon dioxide and
GDP for a subset of OECD countries, Moomaw and Unruh (1997) conclude
that an N-shaped curve is more the result of polynomial curve fitting than a
reflection of any underlying structural relation. In addition, if an N-shaped
pattern is obtained, the second turning point usually occurs at relatively high
per capita income levels reached only by very few countries; thus, these results
should be viewed with caution. Furthermore, the incorporation of a cubic in-
come term can cause econometric problems due to the multicollinearity of the
income variables (linear, quadratic and cubed). Thus, both estimations with
and without a cubed income term seem appropriate. An either monotonically
increasing or decreasing relationship between income and environmental qual-
ity is achieved if only σ1 is significant (negative or positive sign, respectively),
whereas the other coefficients of the income variables, i.e. σ2 and σ3, remain
insignificant.
While the incorporation of per capita income as an independent variable in
single country studies seems undisputed, the choice of the other explanatory
variables is not clear, since – contrary to cross-country studies – differences
that are country-specific but consistent over time do not matter in time se-
ries. For example, it is unnecessary to control for population density, for oil
exporting or former communist countries, for literacy rate or political rights.
All these variables do not change, or at least not relevantly, over the time
period under consideration.
As will be shown in Section 6.4 below, per capita income fails to sat-
isfactorily explain the environmental degradation with regard to economic
6Under the assumption σ3 = 0. This term should be small relative to mean per capita
income, in order for the EKC to turn down at achievable income levels. Moreover, de-
pendent on the scaling of y, |σ1| > |σ2| in order to get a rising curve segment at the
beginning.
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development. Therefore, the traditional reduced-form equation must be ex-
tended. Income can either be included directly in the model as a variable
that summarises all effects associated with income, or it can be disaggregated
into different channels through which income affects pollution (Grossman,
1995). First, there is a scale effect. Ceteris paribus, more economic activity
leads to increased environmental damage, since increasing output requires
more natural resources as inputs and causes more emissions and waste as a
by-product. Second, structural changes in the economy lead ceteris paribus
to altered environmental pressure. During industrialisation (transformation
from agricultural to industrial production), environmental degradation tends
to increase, whereas during the deindustrialisation phase (from industry to
services), the reverse occurs. This argument is based on the legitimate as-
sumption that industrial production is normally more polluting than both
the agricultural and the service sectors (Arrow et al., 1995; Suri and Chap-
man, 1998). This second channel is usually called the composition effect.
Third, due to more research and development expenditure, economic growth
is usually accompanied by technological progress.7 Therefore, a replacement
of obsolete machineries and technologies with more environmentally friendly
ones can be observed. This is labelled the technique effect. Since in this paper
pollution data are in the form of aggregate emissions and not concentrations,
there is no obvious way to separate scale and technique effects (Cole 2003).8
Therefore, only the composition effect is specified separately [see equation
(6.2) below].
Besides these income-related variables, which do not differ from cross-
country studies, other variables influencing pollution come to the fore in
7The positive correlation between income and R&D expenditure can be traced back to
the uncontested assumption that the demand for environmental quality rises with income.
8With concentrations as pollution data, GDP per square kilometre can be used as a
proxy for scale and and per capita GDP to appraise technique effects (e.g. Panayotou,
1997). The approximation of environment-related technology levels with a time trend is
not satisfactory, albeit this is sometimes done in empirical studies.
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studies with time series data. The displacement effect (also referred to as
pollution haven hypothesis) relates to the possibility that developed coun-
tries may shift pollution-intensive production to developing countries with
laxer environmental regulations and import those products. By doing so, de-
veloped countries cut back their domestic emissions without having to alter
their consumption habits. But overall, there is no world-wide emission re-
duction or, in other words, only an illusion of sustainability is created (Rees,
1994). The factor endowment hypothesis, however, counteracts the pollution
haven hypothesis. It suggests that dirty production, which is usually capital
intensive, is located where capital is more abundant, i.e. in developed coun-
tries. Antweiler et al. (2001) investigate the consequences of free trade on the
environment and find empirical evidence that capital abundance is more im-
portant than lax environmental policy. However, Suri and Chapman (1998)
incorporate the amount of imported manufactured goods as an additional
explanatory variable and find that this leads to significantly higher income
turning points than estimations without trade variables. The existence and
importance of the displacement effect is also supported by a meta-analysis
of twenty-five EKC studies by Cavlovic et al. (2000). If one controls for the
countries’ trade relations, higher EKC turning points are obtained.
Finally, the reunification of the former East German states with the West
German states calls for a dummy variable, if one would also like to use more
recent data. From 1992 onwards, the statistical data about pollutant emis-
sions is only published for the reunified Germany and not separately for the
two former German republics.
Taking into account the extensions discussed above, the traditional EKC
specification [equation (6.1)] becomes:
Pt = σ0 + σ1Yt + σ2Y
2
t + σ3Y
3
t + σ4St + σ5It + σ6Dt + εt (6.2)
where Y stands for income and now indicates the net income effect (scale and
technique effect), S is the industry share of GDP and represents the compo-
sition effect, I is the sum of imports and exports of goods from pollution-
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intensive production relative to GDP and D is the reunification dummy.
If one uses time series data, two econometric problems – namely the as-
sumption of no serial correlation and of stationarity – must not be neglected.9
In time series studies, the assumption that errors corresponding to different
observations are uncorrelated often fails to prove true. In general, this leads
to inefficiency of ordinary least squares. The generalised least squares proce-
dure (GLS) controls for serial correlation and is, therefore, widely applied in
time series studies. Besides the favourable characteristics with regard to au-
tocorrelation, the GLS method also produces best linear unbiased estimators
if the assumption of homoscedasticity, i.e. equal variances of the error term,
is not fulfilled. Therefore, all estimations of equation (6.2) are based on GLS.
Time series are often non-stationary.10 A regression involving non-stationary
time series only leads to sensible results if the series are cointegrated, whereas
otherwise such a regression is subject to the spurious regression problem.
Cointegration is given if both time series are non-stationary and a linear
combination that is itself stationary exists between them. In other words,
the non-stationary components of these variables neutralise each other. In
our case, none of the considered pollutants is a stationary variable, nor are
they cointegrated with GDP in the usual sense.11 However, since we are not
looking at a linear relationship between income and emissions, but rather
at an inverted U-shaped or an N-shaped one, income squared and cubed
should be added as additional variables while testing for cointegration. If
the resulting residuals are stationary, the two time series can be viewed as
quasi-cointegrated in the sense that the non-stationary components of the
considered time series neutralise each other and, therefore, the estimation
results are not spurious. By regressing each pollutant on GDP (with a linear,
9Unless otherwise stated, correlation stands for correlation of first order.
10Unless otherwise stated, non-stationary and non-stationarity stands for unit root non-
stationary and unit root non-stationarity, respectively.
11If they were cointegrated in the usual sense, the relation between the two variables
would be linear and, therefore, there would be no income turning point. The results of the
Dickey Fuller tests for unit root are reported in Table 6.4 in the appendix on page 166.
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quadratic and partly a cubed term) and controlling for autocorrelation, the
obtained residuals are indeed mostly stationary.12 In the following, an esti-
mation procedure is considered which deals with serial correlation and the
non-stationarity of the time series in an appropriate way.
All estimation specifications considered so far do not distinguish between
a long-term income-emission relationship and short-term disturbances from
the long-term equilibrium path. A model specification that differentiates be-
tween these two effects is the so-called error correction model (ECM), which
was popularised by Davidson et al. (1978) in estimating a consumption func-
tion for the UK. In the ECM specifications, the relationship between the
endogenous variable and the explanatory variable is modelled as follows. The
changes in the dependent variable are influenced by changes in the exogenous
variable (channel one) and the deviation of the dependent variable from its
long-term value in the previous period (channel two). For our purposes, the
specification of the ECM equation must be modified, since first the hypo-
thesised long-term relationship is not linear, but follows a hump-shaped or
an N-shaped pattern, and second we have more than one exogenous variable
(see also Perman and Stern, 2003). Regarding the first channel, we have to
include the changes of the squared and cubed income terms as well as of
the industry share of GDP and of the trade openness variable. The second
channel has to be enlarged analogously. This yields:
∆Pt = ψ0 + ψ1∆Yt + ψ2∆Y
2
t + ψ3∆Y
3
t + ψ4∆St + ψ5∆It
+ ψ6
(
P ht−1 − ϕ0 − ϕ1Yt−1 − ϕ2Y
2
t−1 − ϕ3Y
3
t−1 − ϕ4St−1
− ϕ5It−1 − ϕ6D
h
t−1 ) + ψ7∆Dt + εt (6.3)
where ∆ denotes a variable’s first difference. The whole term in parenthe-
sis,
(
Pt−1 − ϕ0 − ϕ1Yt−1 − ϕ2Y
2
t−1 − ϕ3Y
3
t−1 − ϕ4St−1 − ϕ5It−1 − ϕ6Dt−1
)
, i.e.
the deviation from the long-term relation, is called error correction term and
coincides with the one-period lagged residuals of the above-mentioned tradi-
tional EKC equation [equation (6.2)].
12The detailed results are reported in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 in the appendix on page 167.
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To potentially obtain a hump-shaped pattern between environmental degra-
dation and income or an EKC, respectively, the coefficient of the error cor-
rection term, ψ6, must be negative. This can be interpreted in the following
way. If, in the previous period, the actual emissions were greater than the
optimal long-term emissions, the error correction term becomes positive and,
together with its negative coefficient, operates towards a smaller or even neg-
ative emission growth rate. If, however, the actual emissions were less than
the optimal emissions, the error correction term becomes negative and, to-
gether with the negative sign of its coefficient, the reverse effect occurs. This
does not mean that individuals intend to reduce environmental quality un-
necessarily, but that due to socially optimal activities they put up with an
increasing emission growth rate. For example, it may be optimal to invest in
infrastructure equipment even though this causes higher emissions. In this
case, income rises with investments, but emissions temporarily fall below the
long-term equilibrium because pollution does not start immediately when the
infrastructure is built up. An analogous reasoning applies for an N-shaped
pattern. The coefficients of ∆Y and ∆Y 3, i.e. ψ1 and ψ3, are expected to
be positive, whereas the coefficient of ∆Y 2, i.e. ψ2, should be negative. As
above, a higher industry sector share of GDP should lead to higher emis-
sions. Thus, ψ4 is expected to be positive. ψ5 again determines the relative
strength of the pollution haven hypothesis relative to the counteracting factor
endowment hypothesis.
6.3 Data
6.3.1 Data Source
In this study, per capita emission data are used as indicator for environmental
degradation. Ekins (1997) argues that environmental damage is more likely to
be related to aggregate emissions than urban concentrations.13 The following
13For a brief treatise on the choice of environmental data, i.e. the advantages and
disadvantages of emission and concentration data, see Lieb (2003).
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eight pollutants are considered: sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx,
as usually measured by nitrogen dioxide NO2), carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon
monoxide (CO), ammonia (NH3), methane (CH4), particulate matter (PM)
and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC). All pollutants are
measured in kilograms. Per capita GDP is measured in Euros at 1991 prices,
while the imports and exports of goods from pollution-intensive production
are set in relation to GDP.14 Gross value added by sector is gauged by percent
of total value added. The time period covers the years 1966 – 1999. All data,
i.e. emissions data, GDP, population data, gross value added by sectors, as
well as import and export data, are taken from the Statistical Yearbooks
for the Federal Republic of Germany (1966 – 2002). Because of availability
limitations, all data from 1966 to 1991 represent only the former West Ger-
many, whereas the data from 1992 onwards incorporate all sixteen German
La¨nder.15 Since empirical work with time series data requires observations
over a longer period, one has to accept this data break. To restrict the sample
to West Germany and/or up to 1991 is no real alternative, and observations
for the years before 1966 are not available.
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
If one looks at the time profile of the emissions, several points stand out
(see Figure 6.1). Without exception, all pollutant emissions declined in the
last few years; however, the rate of the decrease is not equal among the
pollutants or over time. In addition, there is no common turnaround for
the eight pollutants. In particular, there is no turnaround in the year of
reunification. On this account, a potential EKC would not be the result of
the incorporation of former East Germany from 1992 on. In the case of CO2
14The following product categories are taken into account: raw materials (apart from
foodstuffs), mineral fuels, lubricants, chemicals, manufactured goods, machine and vehicle
construction, and various finished products.
15Notice that, due to data availability, the value of the dummy variable does not change
in the year of German reunification, but only in 1992.
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Figure 6.1: Time profiles of the pollutants
and SO2, one observes a great leap in the first year of reunification. These
emission paths can possibly be explained by the fact that the heavily polluting
power stations of former East Germany stayed in operation for some years,
whereas the replacement of vehicles, which were largely responsible for carbon
monoxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, was carried out more quickly.
6.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
In a first step, different estimations of equation (6.2) were carried out for
all eight pollutants, i.e. with and without the cubed income term and the
additional explanatory variables, respectively. Because of serial correlation,
generalised least squares (Cochrane-Orcutt procedure) is required as the es-
timation technique. Nevertheless, in most estimations the problem of serial
correlation cannot be solved by GLS, meaning that the equations are mis-
specified and an interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not possible.
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Problems arise for SO2, CO2, PM, CH4, NMVOC and mostly for CO. In ad-
dition, including a cubed income term causes a sign reversal for the income
variables in some cases. These coefficients, however, are not significant with
the exception of particulate matter. The reason for the sign reversal can be
traced back to the very high correlation between the three income variables.
Thus, in the following, only the successful examples of these estimations, i.e.
the estimations for NOx and NH3, are reported and discussed. The results
are shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively.16
For the traditional reduced-form model with only GDP as explanatory
variable and without a cubed income term [column (1)], positive linear and
negative quadratic income coefficients are obtained. This results in a hump-
shaped emissions profile, but only in the case of NOx are the coefficients
significant. The calculated turning point of the NOx-EKC occurs at a per
capita income of e 15,164 (in 1991 prices). This level of per capita income
was reached around 1977 and corresponds to roughly USD 14,750 (in 1985
prices).17 Allowing for a cubed income term [column (5)] results, on the one
hand, in the loss of significance for NOx but, on the other hand, the coefficients
of NH3 are now significant. With the positive coefficient of the cubed income
term, the emission profile of ammonia is N-shaped. Therefore, two ITPs are
obtained: the first occurs around e 17,500 (USD 17,000), which is somewhat
higher than in the case of NOx; the second emerges around e 23,700, i.e.
it lies slightly outside the sample range.18 The estimated pollution-income
relations for NOx and NH3 are depicted in Figure 6.2. On the basis of these
estimation results, the question on the appropriateness of a cubed income
term cannot be conclusively answered. In the case of NH3, the incorporation
16The estimation results of the other six pollutants are reported in Tables 6.7 – 6.12 in
the appendix on pages 168 to 173.
17The amounts are first converted into USD using the annual mean exchange rate of
1991 (source: http://www.oanda.com) and then deflated using the implicit price deflator
for GDP (source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce).
18The income turning point of NH3 is not calculated in column (1), since the income
coefficients are not significant.
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Table 6.1: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of NOx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -20.74 -24.54 11.05 -13.91 80.09 69.84 43.76 69.59
(0.76) (0.88) (0.39) (0.47) (1.07) (1.56) (1.02) (1.49)
(0.46) (0.39) (0.70) (0.64) (0.29) (0.13) (0.32) (0.15)
Y 9.1e-3*** 9.9e-3*** 8.5e-3*** 9.1e-3** -1.1e-2 -9.2e-3 -8.0e-3 -9.2e-3
(3.20) (2.90) (3.00) (2.55) (0.82) (1.15) (1.01) (1.12)
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.42) (0.26) (0.32) (0.27)
Y 2 -3.0e-7*** -3.2e-7*** -2.8e-7*** -3.0e-7*** 9.3e-7 1.0e-6** 9.4e-7* 1.0e-6**
(4.00) (3.41) (3.71) (3.03) (1.22) (2.13) (1.96) (2.06)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.23) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Y 3 -2.4e-11 -3.0e-11*** -2.8e-11*** -3.0e-11***
(1.67) (3.15) (2.93) (3.03)
(0.11) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
S -0.08 -0.07 -0.36** -0.36*
(0.34) (0.27) (2.24) (1.74)
(0.73) (0.79) (0.03) (0.09)
I -11.57 -11.50 11.89 0.23
(1.21) (1.18) (1.52) (0.02)
(0.24) (0.25) (0.14) (0.98)
D -10.03*** -10.20*** -11.11*** -11.23*** -10.07*** -11.02*** -8.79*** -10.99***
(9.31) (8.53) (7.98) (7.34) (9.41) (9.86) (6.16) (6.15)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
adj. R2 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.97 0.97 0.97
DW 1.93 1.90 1.83 1.82 1.99 1.69 1.74 1.69
N. of obs. 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
ρ 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.38 0.32 0.38
ITP 1a 15,164 15,321 15,182 15,371
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
a in e at ’91 prices
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results in a change from an inverted U-shaped to an N-shaped pattern, while
in the case of NOx a sign reversal and a loss of significance are observed,
presumably due to multicollinearity.19
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
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NOx
NH3
Note: NOx and NH3 emissions in kg; Y (GDP) in 1991 Euros.
Figure 6.2: Estimated pollution-income relation for NOx and NH3
In comparison with cross-country studies, the turning point of nitrogen
oxide matches that of other estimations; in Selden and Song (1994), the curve
turns down at about USD 11,000, in Cole et al. (1997) between 14,700 and
USD 17,600 and, finally, Grossman (1995) reports a turning point of USD
18,453. Although Carson et al. (1997) report a monotonically decreasing
relationship between NOx emissions and GDP for the US, this result is not
inconsistent with the EKC pattern found here, since they use only data from
1988 to 1994. In this period, the NOx emissions in Germany decreased as
well. This follows directly from the calculated income turning point, which
was reached not later than 1977. Comparisons of the ITPs for ammonia with
other estimations are not possible, since to my knowledge ammonia is not
considered in any other EKC study.
When incorporating gross value added of the industry sector [(columns (2)
and (6)] the estimation results of NOx do not change notably; the industry
share shows no significant influence. However, the income coefficients are
19A sign reversal and partly a loss of significance is also found for CO2, PM, CH4 and
NMVOC.
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Table 6.2: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of NH3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const 6.31 -8.61*** -8.66*** -8.52*** -138.8*** -130.6*** -72.8*** -94.0***
(0.81) (2.95) (3.40) (3.72) (5.01) (3.52) (3.87) (3.99)
(0.43) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Y 5.8e-4 2.6e-3*** 2.0e-3*** 2.1e-3*** 2.3e-2*** 2.1e-2*** 1.2e-2*** 1.5e-2***
(0.75) (8.62) (7.25) (8.11) (5.16) (3.71) (4.10) (4.22)
(0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Y 2 -2.3e-8 -7.7e-8*** -6.2e-8*** -6.7e-8*** -1.1e-6*** -1.1e-6*** -6.1e-7*** -7.8e-7***
(1.18) (9.17) (8.35) (9.17) (4.92) (3.51) (3.83) (3.98)
(0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Y 3 1.9e-11*** 1.8e-11*** 9.5e-12*** 1.3e-11***
(4.64) (3.26) (3.44) (3.66)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
S -0.10** -0.03 -9.7e-3 0.04
(4.55) (1.09) (0.32) (1.37)
(0.00) (0.29) (0.75) (0.19)
I 4.56*** 3.81*** 3.14*** 3.68***
(6.00) (3.60) (4.24) (4.36)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D -0.35** -0.67*** 0.14 0.01 -0.37*** -0.40*** -0.04 0.11
(2.74) (4.75) (1.00) (0.06) (3.24) (2.86) (0.32) (0.68)
(0.01) (0.00) (0.33) (0.96) (0.00) (0.01) (0.75) (0.51)
adj. R2 0.73 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98
DW 2.29 2.03 1.70 1.84 2.09 2.18 2.24 2.07
N. of obs. 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
ρ 0.80 -0.00 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.32 0.18 0.20
ITP 1a 16,947 16,319 16,357 18,093 17,575 16,969 17,124
ITP 2a 22,409 23,187 25,353 23,882
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
a in e at ’91 prices
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stable in size and the ITP is only slightly higher than before. In the case
of ammonia, now both the estimation with and without cubed income are
significant, with a slightly lower ITP in the latter case. Still, the GDP share
of the industry sector does not have the predicted positive sign. This result
is difficult to explain, since the assumption that the industry sector is more
polluting than the agriculture and service sectors is plausible and not at all
controversial in literature.
The estimation results of columns (3) and (7) reveal ambiguous infor-
mation about the relative strength of the displacement effect and the factor
endowment hypothesis. For NOx no significant result is obtained. This could
be interpreted in the sense that the two effects offset each other. For ammo-
nia, however, a positive sign results. This means that with increasing trade
openness emissions also rise. Therefore, the factor abundance hypothesis is
supported. The calculated income turning points match those of the previ-
ous specifications. The estimations with both the GDP share of the industry
sector as well as the trade openness do not give many new insights [columns
(4) and (8)]. The main reason may be that the two variables are highly cor-
related (about 0.9). Apart from that, the same remarks as for the previous
estimations apply here.
These estimations clearly show that the existence of an EKC for a sin-
gle country cannot be supported on the basis of the traditional reduced-form
specification. This result contradicts the majority of cross-country or panel
data EKC studies. However, as outlined in Section 6.2 above, the reduced-
form specification is not appropriate for a time series analysis without restric-
tions. More sophisticated specifications are to be preferred.
The results of equation (6.3), which follows the error correction model
tradition, are set forth in Table 6.3. For each pollutant only its best fitted
estimation is shown, since the different specifications yield similar results.20
Concerning the incorporation of additional explanatory variables, Table 6.3
20The complete estimation results, i.e. all eight different estimations for each pollutant,
are reported in Tables 6.13 – 6.20 in the appendix on pages 174 to 181.
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Table 6.3: Endogenous variable: first difference of pollutant emissions
SO2 NOx CO2 PM CO NH3 CH4 NMVOC
const -2.87** -0.48 -101.6 -0.10 -5.30*** 0.09** -1.76** -0.71
(2.28) (1.23) (1.46) (0.42) (2.89) (2.78) (2.81) (1.13)
(0.03) (0.23) (0.16) (0.68) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27)
∆Y 8.0e-3 5.9e-3* 2.8e-1 3.7e-3* 2.1e-3 1.8e-2*** 7.3e-4 2.0e-3
(1.19) (1.88) (0.57) (1.98) (0.04) (6.93) (0.11) (0.30)
(0.24) (0.07) (0.57) (0.06) (0.97) (0.00) (0.91) (0.77)
∆Y 2 -2.4e-7 -1.8e-7* -4.6e-6 -1.1e-7* -1.3e-7 -9.5e-7*** -1.4e-8 -1.4e-7
(1.21) (1.97) (0.32) (1.89) (0.04) (6.55) (0.08) (0.34)
(0.24) (0.06) (0.75) (0.07) (0.97) (0.00) (0.94) (0.74)
∆Y 3 1.7e-12 1.6e-11*** 2.4e-12
(0.02) (6.10) (0.29)
(0.98) (0.00) (0.78)
∆S -0.19 -11.48 2.12** 0.12*** 0.17
(0.33) (0.36) (2.09) (4.08) (0.73)
(0.74) (0.73) (0.05) (0.00) (0.48)
∆I -9.43 2.66***
(0.29) (4.22)
(0.77) (0.00)
ECT b -0.36** -0.18** -0.63** -0.18*** -0.36*** -0.58*** -0.59*** -0.52***
(2.36) (2.16) (2.55) (4.80) (3.45) (4.08) (4.11) (4.41)
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆D 28.86*** -9.28*** -113.5 1.30** 4.41 0.01 -17.12*** 0.26
(13.39) (8.45) (0.89) (2.63) (0.97) (0.07) (22.51) (0.67)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.01) (0.34) (0.95) (0.00) (0.51)
adj. R2 0.87 0.77 0.33 0.57 0.49 0.92 0.97 0.42
DW 1.95 2.03 1.46 1.64 2.04 2.08 1.88 1.92
N. of obs. 32 32 28 32 32 23 23 32
ρ 0.56 0.19 0.48 0.23 0.29 -0.40 0.68 0.87
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT: particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y3, S and I.
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shows that a cubed income term as well as a trade openness variable do
not greatly improve the estimation’s explanatory power. The industry sector
share of GDP, on the other hand, improves the results in most cases.
Analysing the estimation results in detail, several things strike the ob-
server’s eye. First, the coefficients of the first differences of the income vari-
ables are mostly not significant. Only in the cases of NOx, PM and NH3
significant influences can be observed. However, the signs of the income vari-
ables are as expected. As before, the incorporation of a cubed income term
sometimes leads to a sign reversal in the income variables. Again, this must
be attributed to the multicollinearity of the income variables. Second, and
contrary to the estimations of the traditional reduced-form model, here the
significant coefficients for the industry sector share of GDP have the expected
positive sign (with the exception of NOx). This means that the more impor-
tant the industry sector is, the higher are the emissions. Third, the absence
and/or the non-significance of the trade openness variable confirms the re-
sults of the reduced-form estimations. Either foreign trade does not have
an influence on emissions, or the factor abundance hypothesis and the pollu-
tion haven hypothesis offset each other.21 Fourth and most importantly, the
coefficients of the error correction term, i.e. ECT , are all significant and –
as expected – negative. Thus, these results can be interpreted in the sense
that changes in income only have an influence through the second channel.
Deviations from the long-term relationship, which is specified to be either
hump-shaped or N-shaped, are corrected in the next period. Therefore, even
if there is no direct influence through the first channel, the significant results
of the second channel suggest an EKC pattern for these pollutants.22
21Exceptions are ammonia and nitrogen oxide: the positive coefficient of ammonia sup-
ports the factor endowment hypothesis, while the negative coefficient of nitrogen oxide (not
shown in Table 6.3) endorses the pollution haven hypothesis.
22The hump-shaped pattern is traced back to the non-linear specification of the two
influence channels in equation (6.3).
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However, there is one reason why this interpretation is debatable. If envi-
ronmental degradation indeed follows a hump-shaped curve, this result should
already have been found in equation (6.2). But there, the EKC hypothesis
could only be verified for NOx and NH3. On the other hand, one can argue
that if the distinction between the two different channels, i.e. income changes
and deviations from the optimal long-term relation, is important, specifica-
tions where this differentiation is not made could lead to distorted results
and that, therefore, estimation specification with different channels should
be preferred.
6.5 Summary and Conclusions
Using time series data for Germany instead of cross-country or panel data and
testing different specifications to gain new insights into the EKC hypothesis
for different pollutants, the estimation results remain ambiguous. First, the
traditional reduced-form model and some extensions with additional explana-
tory variables – namely the trade relations and the industry sector share of
GDP – are estimated. For nitrogen oxide and mostly for ammonia, an EKC or
N-shaped pattern is found, with income turning points around e 15,200 and
17,500, respectively. Thus, for these two pollutants, the results of most cross-
country studies can be confirmed. However and more importantly, the other
six pollutants do not show clear results. Either the t-statistics are unsatisfac-
tory, or the Durbin-Watson tests give rise to a rejection of these simple model
specifications. Astonishingly, this is valid not only with respect to a possible
EKC pattern, i.e. a positive linear income term together with a negative
quadratic one, but also with respect to monotonically increasing or decreas-
ing development paths of the considered harmful chemical emissions. These
results indicate clearly that cross-country studies provide unreliable estima-
tions. Second, and because of the variables’ non-stationarity and motivated
by error correction models, equations are estimated that distinguish between
two different influence channels. But contrary to the well-known error cor-
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 165
rection models (e.g. for a consumption function), the long-term relationship
is specified as a non-linear, i.e. hump-shaped function. The estimations show
that the deviations from the long-term optimal value have a significant in-
fluence on pollutant emissions. Changes in income or the sectoral and/or
foreign trade structure, however, do not have a prominent impact. Neverthe-
less, the results of the modified error correction model with the underlying
non-linear long-term relation give some evidence for the existence of EKCs
within a single country.
Summarising all presented estimations, one has to admit that the question
of whether EKCs really exist for a single country is not conclusively answered.
The estimations of the traditional reduced-form specification do no show a
clear and consistent pattern. In addition, the estimation results are not very
robust regarding the incorporation of additional explanatory variables. On
the other hand, the modified error correction specification is more supportive
of the EKC hypothesis. As a result, general policy recommendations with
regard to the environment should only cautiously rely on the EKC approach.
In conclusion, two points must be addressed. First, the quality and, for
the most part, quantity of the available data is limited. It would be helpful
for empirical researchers if they could access a more widespread data pool.
Second, it is likely that imported explanatory variables are still omitted in
the model specifications. Future research and especially theoretical work on
the EKC hypothesis for a single country may lead to more adequate model
specifications. Further empirical studies should maybe adhere less to the tra-
ditional reduced-form model, but rather enlarge the well-known specifications
with additional structural variables or use completely different approaches,
e.g. non-linear estimation equations.23
23Meaning non-linear in parameters.
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6.6 Appendix
6.6.1 Tests for Unit Root and Quasi-Cointegration
In Table 6.4 the Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root of GDP and the eight con-
sidered pollutants are reported. As one can see, for all time series (with the
exception of particulate matter) the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be
rejected at the usual significance levels. Therefore, only the time series for
particulate matter is a stationary one.
Table 6.4: Dickey-Fuller test for unit root
N. of obs. Test Statistics 5% Critical Value* Approx. p-value**
GDP 33 -0.901 -2.978 0.7876
SO2 33 -0.272 -2.978 0.9294
NOx 33 0.671 -2.978 0.9892
CO2 29 0.496 -2.989 0.9848
PM 33 -6.545 -2.978 0.000
CO 33 1.976 -2.978 0.9986
NH3 24 0.450 -3.000 0.9833
CH4 24 0.700 -3.000 0.9898
NMVOC 33 3.182 -2.978 1.000
* The critical values are linearly interpolated from the table of values
that appears in Fuller (1976).
** The MacKinnon approximate p-values use the regression surface
published in MacKinnon (1994).
In Tables 6.5 and 6.6 the results of the tests for quasi-cointegration (as
described in the main text) are reported. More precisely, each pollutant
is regressed on GDP, GDP squared, GDP cubed (Table 6.6 only) and the
dummy variable for reunification using GLS (Cochrane-Orcutt procedure) as
estimation technique. The resulting residuals of these regressions are then
tested for unit root. If the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected,
the residuals can be considered as stationary. Analogous to a standard test
for cointegration (see e.g. Pindyck/Rubinfeld 1998, page 513ff), stationary
residuals are the critical condition for quasi-cointegration between the two
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considered time series. Here, as one can see, the following pollutants are
cointegrated with GDP, at least at the ten percent significance level: (i) with
a linear and quadratic GDP term: NOx, CO2, PM, CO, and NH3; (ii) with
a linear, quadratic and cubed GDP term: NOx, CO2, PM, NH3 and nearly
NMVOC.
Table 6.5: Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (quasi-cointegration test I)
N. of obs. Test Statistics 5% Critical Value* Approx. p-value**
SO2 33 -2.377 -2.978 0.1484
NOx 33 -2.650 -2.978 0.0830
CO2 29 -2.872 -2.989 0.0487
PM 33 -9.949 -2.978 0.0000
CO 33 -2.835 -2.978 0.0535
NH3 24 -3.651 -3.000 0.0049
CH4 24 0.712 -3.000 0.9901
NMVOC 33 -2.135 -2.978 0.2306
* The critical values are linearly interpolated from the table of values
that appears in Fuller (1976).
** The MacKinnon approximate p-values use the regression surface
published in MacKinnon (1994).
Table 6.6: Dickey-Fuller test for unit root (quasi-cointegration test II)
N. of obs. Test Statistics 5% Critical Value* Approx. p-value**
SO2 33 -2.219 -2.978 0.1993
NOx 33 -3.262 -2.978 0.0167
CO2 29 -2.963 -2.989 0.0385
PM 33 -9.640 -2.978 0.0000
CO 33 0.409 -2.978 0.9818
NH3 24 -10.912 -3.000 0.0000
CH4 24 0.511 -3.000 0.9852
NMVOC 33 -2.565 -2.978 0.1004
* The critical values are linearly interpolated from the table of values
that appears in Fuller (1976).
** The MacKinnon approximate p-values use the regression surface
published in MacKinnon (1994).
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6.6.2 Additional Econometric Results
In the Tables 6.7 to 6.12 the estimation results of equation (6.2) for the pol-
lutants SO2, CO2, PM, CO, CH4 and NMVOC are reported. As stated in the
main text, these estimation results should be interpreted with caution, since
the Durbin-Watson statistics do not satisfy the usual significance criterions
and the coefficients of the estimated variables are often not significant.
Table 6.7: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of SO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -28.61 -59.25 -51.81 -54.10 -138.0 -132.2 -106.7 -103.0
(0.56) (1.02) (1.10) (0.90) (0.67) (0.65) (0.55) (0.49)
(0.58) (0.31) (0.28) (0.38) (0.51) (0.52) (0.59) (0.63)
Y 1.5e-2*** 1.1e-2 1.8e-2*** 1.1e-2 3.5e-2 2.4e-2 2.8e-2 2.0e-2
(2.64) (1.65) (3.32) (1.60) (0.96) (0.66) (0.81) (0.55)
(0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.12) (0.35) (0.51) (0.42) (0.59)
Y 2 -6.5e-7*** -4.7e-7*** -6.8e-7*** -4.6e-7** -1.8e-6 -1.3e-6 -1.3e-6 -1.0e-6
(3.96) (2.46) (4.54) (2.30) (0.85) (0.59) (0.63) (0.46)
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.40) (0.56) (0.54) (0.65)
Y 3 2.3e-11 1.5e-11 1.2e-11 1.0e-11
(0.55) (0.37) (0.29) (0.25)
(0.59) (0.71) (0.77) (0.80)
S 1.24** 1.06* 1.21** 1.05*
(2.22) (1.77) (2.13) (1.72)
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10)
I -43.62* -27.52 -42.50 -26.72
(1.76) (1.06) (1.67) (1.00)
(0.09) (0.30) (0.11) (0.33)
D 26.04*** 28.35*** 21.82*** 25.35*** 25.88*** 28.24*** 21.84*** 25.39***
(8.25) (8.99) (5.55) (5.96) (8.08) (8.78) (5.47) (5.87)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
adj. R2 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.82
DW 1.20 1.29 1.25 1.25 1.19 1.28 1.24 1.25
N. of obs. 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
ρ 0.70 0.76 0.67 0.78 0.71 0.76 0.68 0.79
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
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Table 6.8: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of CO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const 6.2e3* 4.4e3 6.0e3 4.4e3 3.4e4* 2.1e4 3.1e4* 2.1e4
(1.72) (1.41) (1.71) (1.37) (2.01) (1.11) (1.79) (1.09)
(0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.19) (0.06) (0.28) (0.09) (0.29)
Y 0.70* 0.60* 0.73* 0.61* -3.93 -2.11 -3.53 -2.11
(1.77) (1.96) (1.89) (1.80) (1.38) (0.69) (1.20) (0.68)
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.18) (0.49) (0.24) (0.51)
Y 2 -2.1e-5* -1.7e-5* -2.2e-5** -1.7e-5* 2.3e-4 1.3e-4 2.1e-4 1.3e-4
(2.01) (1.98) (2.10) (1.86) (1.47) (0.80) (1.31) (0.78)
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.16) (0.43) (0.20) (0.45)
Y 3 -4.6e-9 -2.8e-9 -4.3e-9 -2.8e-9
(1.59) (0.90) (1.44) (0.88)
(0.13) (0.38) (0.16) (0.39)
S 49.50* 48.67 41.43 40.46
(1.91) (1.64) (1.48) (1.25)
(0.07) (0.12) (0.15) (0.22)
I -844.96 -73.78 -851.8 -85.86
(0.69) (0.06) (0.71) (0.06)
(0.50) (0.96) (0.48) (0.95)
D -275.60* -145.56 -354.27* -155.23 -234.6 -143.6 -324.1 -155.3
(1.87) (0.94) (1.84) (0.68) (1.59) (0.92) (1.66) (0.66)
(0.07) (0.36) (0.08) (0.50) (0.13) (0.37) (0.11) (0.51)
adj. R2 0.54 0.70 0.58 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.72
DW 1.33 1.49 1.34 1.48 1.42 1.49 1.42 1.49
N. of obs. 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
ρ 0.68 0.55 0.64 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
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Table 6.9: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of PM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -11.72 -4.80 -13.24 -5.92 86.30** 84.36** 87.68** 88.77**
(0.91) (0.39) (1.00) (0.47) (2.73) (2.58) (2.73) (2.70)
(0.37) (0.70) (0.33) (0.64) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Y 2.7e-3* 1.3e-3 2.8e-3* 1.4e-3 -1.7e-2*** -1.6e-2*** -1.7e-2*** -1.8e-2***
(1.99) (0.89) (2.00) (0.91) (2.99) (2.79) (3.09) (3.04)
(0.06) (0.38) (0.06) (0.37) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Y 2 -9.1e-8** -5.2e-8 -9.4e-8** -5.5e-8 1.1e-6*** 1.1e-6*** 1.1e-6*** 1.2e-6***
(2.49) (1.26) (2.48) (1.28) (3.28) (3.09) (3.39) (3.37)
(0.02) (0.22) (0.02) (0.21) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Y 3 -2.3e-11*** -2.2e-11*** -2.4e-11*** -2.4e-11***
(3.52) (3.35) (3.63) (3.62)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
S 0.16 0.16 0.03 -0.02
(1.47) (1.39) (0.25) (0.13)
(0.15) (0.18) (0.81) (0.90)
I 1.79 1.47 3.85 3.99
(0.39) (0.31) (0.91) (0.92)
(0.70) (0.76) (0.37) (0.37)
D 1.02* 1.30** 1.20* 1.44* 1.18** 1.21** 1.59** 1.59**
(1.93) (2.27) (1.74) (1.87) (2.51) (2.32) (2.58) (2.37)
(0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
adj. R2 0.36 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.37
DW 1.44 1.45 1.42 1.45 1.63 1.63 1.62 1.61
Number of obs. 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
ρ 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.91
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
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Table 6.10: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of CO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const 237.89 119.85 200.80* 120.79 -6.9e3*** -490.5 -583.5* -418.5
(1.69) (1.21) (1.89) (1.26) (3.82) (1.56) (1.71) (1.36)
(0.10) (0.24) (0.07) (0.22) (0.00) (0.13) (0.10) (0.19)
Y 9.5e-3 -1.2e-2 1.4e-2 -8.3e-3 1.4e-1** 9.9e-2* 1.5e-1** 9.0e-2
(0.61) (1.07) (1.17) (0.73) (2.28) (1.77) (2.51) (1.64)
(0.55) (0.30) (0.25) (0.47) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.11)
Y 2 -7.5e-7* 7.6e-8 -7.3e-7** 1.7e-8 -7.3e-6* -6.4e-6* -8.9e-6** -5.7e-6*
(1.74) (0.23) (2.19) (0.05) (1.96) (1.97) (2.45) (1.80)
(0.09) (0.82) (0.04) (0.96) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08)
Y 3 1.3e-10 1.2e-10* 1.6e-10** 1.1e-10*
(1.68) (1.99) (2.22) (1.80)
(0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
S 5.57*** 5.00*** 5.28*** 4.79***
(6.02) (5.32) (6.02) (5.31)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I -162.10*** -78.17* -170.2*** -68.50*
(3.09) (1.92) (3.45) (1.73)
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.10)
D -5.53 5.69 -20.72** -2.88 1.40 4.79 -22.74*** -2.68
(0.77) (1.10) (0.28) (0.43) (0.26) (0.97) (2.83) (0.41)
(0.45) (0.28) (0.02) (0.67) (0.80) (0.34) (0.01) (0.68)
adj. R2 0.82 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.26 0.93 0.95 0.93
DW 1.11 1.33 1.64 1.41 1.43 1.41 1.70 1.49
N. of obs. 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
ρ 0.77 0.78 0.70 0.79 0.99 0.77 0.59 0.77
ITP 1a 13,386
ITP 2a 24,491
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
a in e at ’91 prices
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Table 6.11: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of CH4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -1.5e3*** 42.29 -1.6e3*** 43.27 -1.2e3** 379.7 -1.3e3** 379.7
(3.28) (0.40) (3.45) (0.39) (2.57) (0.86) (2.73) (0.83)
(0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.70) (0.02) (0.40) (0.01) (0.42)
Y 9.7e-3** 2.6e-3 9.3e-3** 2.5e-3 -1.7e-2 -5.1e-2 -2.0e-2 -5.1e-2
(2.27) (0.21) (2.18) (0.20) (0.45) (0.76) (0.53) (0.73)
(0.03) (0.83) (0.04) (0.85) (0.66) (0.46) (0.60) (0.47)
Y 2 -2.6e-7** -1.4e-7 -2.5e-7** -1.4e-7 1.2e-6 2.7e-6 1.4e-6 2.7e-6
(2.19) (0.45) (2.11) (0.42) (0.59) (0.80) (0.67) (0.77)
(0.04) (0.66) (0.05) (0.68) (0.56) (0.44) (0.51) (0.45)
Y 3 -2.7e-11 -5.0e-11 -3.0e-11 -5.0e-11
(0.71) (0.87) (0.79) (0.84)
(0.48) (0.39) (0.44) (0.41)
S 1.04** 1.04** 1.08** 1.08**
(2.33) (2.26) (2.47) (2.38)
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
I 13.08 -0.40 13.71 -0.15
(1.07) (0.03) (1.11) (0.01)
(0.30) (0.98) (0.28) (0.99)
D -18.89*** -19.14*** -17.48*** -19.18*** -18.89*** -19.23*** -17.42*** -19.25***
(14.60) (11.48) (9.52) (8.67) (14.42) (11.38) (9.38) (8.33)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
adj. R2 0.91 0.96 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.91 0.96
DW 1.16 1.50 1.16 1.50 1.21 1.49 1.22 1.49
N. of obs. 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
ρ 0.99 0.77 0.99 0.77 0.99 0.71 0.99 0.71
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
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Table 6.12: Endogenous variable: per capita emissions of NMVOC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const 2.76 17.29 0.61 14.26 57.33 60.33 54.44 56.93
(0.13) (0.79) (0.03) (0.63) (0.99) (1.11) (0.91) (1.02)
(0.90) (0.44) (0.98) (0.53) (0.33) (0.28) (0.37) (0.32)
Y 6.5e-3*** 3.1e-3 6.6e-3*** 3.3e-3 -3.9e-3 -5.1e-3 -3.5e-3 -4.9e-3
(2.95) (1.19) (2.94) (1.23) (0.38) (0.53) (0.34) (0.49)
(0.01) (0.25) (0.01) (0.23) (0.71) (0.60) (0.74) (0.63)
Y 2 -2.4e-7*** -1.5e-7** -2.5e-8*** -1.5e-7** 3.9e-7 3.6e-7 3.7e-7 3.5e-7
(4.22) (2.08) (4.15) (2.12) (0.65) (0.63) (0.60) (0.60)
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04) (0.52) (0.53) (0.55) (0.56)
Y 3 -1.3e-11 -1.0e-11 -1.2e-11 -9.9e-12
(1.07) (0.90) (1.02) (0.87)
(0.30) (0.38) (0.32) (0.39)
S 0.41** 0.41** 0.39* 0.39*
(2.05) (2.05) (2.00) (2.01)
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
I 3.50 4.35 3.10 4.23
(0.46) (0.60) (0.41) (0.58)
(0.65) (0.55) (0.69) (0.57)
D -2.60*** -1.88** -2.28** -1.46 -2.65*** -1.91** -2.37** -1.50
(3.10) (2.17) (2.06) (1.30) (3.14) (2.18) (2.14) (1.31)
(0.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.21) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.20)
adj. R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.75
DW 1.47 1.33 1.45 1.35 1.57 1.43 1.55 1.44
N. of obs. 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
ρ 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.91 0.87 0.90
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
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In the Tables 6.13 to 6.20 the complete estimation results of equation (6.3)
for all pollutants are reported.
Table 6.13: Endogenous variable: first difference of SO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -2.40** -2.87** -2.19* -2.62* -2.39** -2.85** -2.19** -2.61*
(2.24) (2.28) (1.91) (1.89) (2.26) (2.26) (1.89) (1.86)
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08)
∆Y 8.6e-3 8.0e-3 8.1e-3 6.0e-3 2.3e-2 8.7e-3 2.3e-2 8.7e-3
(1.36) (1.19) (1.24) (0.86) (0.67) (0.25) (0.65) (0.24)
(0.19) (0.24) (0.23) (0.40) (0.51) (0.81) (0.52) (0.81)
∆Y 2 -2.7e-7 -2.4e-7 -2.5e-7 -1.8e-7 -1.2e-6 -2.6e-7 -1.2e-6 -3.3e-7
(1.37) (1.21) (1.23) (0.86) (0.54) (0.12) (0.54) (0.15)
(0.18) (0.24) (0.23) (0.40) (0.59) (0.91) (0.59) (0.88)
∆Y 3 1.7e-11 -1.7e-14 1.8e-11 2.9e-12
(0.40) (0.00) (0.43) (0.07)
(0.69) (1.00) (0.67) (0.95)
∆S -0.19 -0.06 -0.22 -0.07
(0.33) (0.10) (0.37) (0.11)
(0.74) (0.93) (0.72) (0.91)
∆I -26.43 -22.98 -26.58 -22.37
(1.27) (1.16) (1.26) (1.10)
(0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.28)
ECT b -0.27 -0.36** -0.33* -0.39** -0.27 -0.36** -0.34* -0.38**
(1.68) (2.36) (1.80) (2.33) (1.63) (2.29) (1.81) (2.27)
(0.10) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
∆D 28.74*** 28.86*** 26.70*** 27.12*** 28.83*** 28.85*** 26.78*** 27.16***
(12.81) (13.39) (9.90) (10.46) (12.53) (13.03) (9.76) (10.21)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
adj. R2 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.86
DW 1.94 1.95 1.90 1.91 1.95 1.95 1.89 1.91
N. of obs. 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
ρ 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.59
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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Table 6.14: Endogenous variable: first difference of NOx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -0.48 -1.02* -0.93* -1.26 -0.40 -0.40 0.12 -0.12
(1.23) (1.96) (1.75) (0.82) (1.06) (0.83) (0.31) (0.24)
(0.23) (0.06) (0.09) (0.42) (0.30) (0.41) (0.76) (0.81)
∆Y 5.9e-3* 6.1e-3* 2.2e-3 5.8e-3* -2.5e-2 -6.1e-3 -3.6e-3 -6.6e-3
(1.88) (1.86) (0.70) (1.83) (1.36) (0.44) (0.27) (0.50)
(0.07) (0.07) (0.49) (0.08) (0.19) (0.66) (0.79) (0.62)
∆Y 2 -1.8e-7* -1.7e-7* -6.0e-8 -1.6e-7 1.7e-6 8.0e-7 6.0e-7 8.2e-7
(1.97) (1.80) (0.64) (1.66) (1.57) (0.94) (0.73) (0.99)
(0.06) (0.08) (0.53) (0.11) (0.13) (0.36) (0.47) (0.33)
∆Y 3 -3.7e-11* -2.4e-11 -1.9e11 -2.4e-11
(1.77) (1.39) (1.18) (1.46)
(0.09) (0.18) (0.25) (0.16)
∆S -0.41 -0.33 -0.47* -0.37
(1.46) (1.48) (1.74) (1.41)
(0.16) (0.15) (0.10) (0.71)
∆I -18.21** -17.41** -11.46 -15.30*
(2.09) (2.34) (1.40) (1.82)
(0.05) (0.03) (0.18) (0.08)
ECT b -0.18** -0.26** -0.23** -0.72*** -0.32** -0.71*** -0.78*** -0.79***
(2.16) (2.35) (2.65) (3.29) (2.50) (3.08) (3.75) (3.50)
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
∆D -9.28*** -9.29*** -10.51*** -10.42*** -9.46*** -9.70*** -10.39*** -10.96***
(8.45) (8.97) (8.61) (10.58) (8.80) (9.88) (8.85) (9.41)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
adj. R2 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.85 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.82
DW 2.03 2.10 2.17 2.17 2.04 1.92 2.02 1.96
N. of obs. 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
ρ 0.19 0.42 0.49 0.88 0.21 0.32 0.37 0.36
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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Table 6.15: Endogenous variable: first difference of CO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -67.39 -101.6 -67.76 -101.9 -76.83 -108.2 -75.06 -110.1
(1.04) (1.46) (1.04) (1.37) (1.32) (1.48) (1.20) (1.40)
(0.31) (0.16) (0.31) (0.19) (0.20) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18)
∆Y 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.28 -2.17 -2.19 -2.04 -2.22
(0.36) (0.57) (0.33) (0.55) (0.57) (0.55) (0.52) (0.54)
(0.72) (0.57) (0.75) (0.59) (0.58) (0.59) (0.61) (0.59)
∆Y 2 -2.7e-6 -4.6e-6 -2.1e-6 -4.5e-6 1.3e-4 1.4e-4 1.2e-4 1.4e-4
(0.18) (0.32) (0.14) (0.31) (0.59) (0.60) (0.54) (0.59)
(0.86) (0.75) (0.89) (0.76) (0.56) (0.56) (0.59) (0.56)
∆Y 3 -2.5e-9 -2.6e-9 -2.3e-9 -2.7e-9
(0.60) (0.62) (0.55) (0.61)
(0.55) (0.54) (0.59) (0.55)
∆S -11.48 -11.85 -15.35 -16.35
(0.36) (0.35) (0.45) (0.45)
(0.73) (0.73) (0.66) (0.66)
∆I -337.8 -9.69 -346.8 58.14
(0.30) (0.01) (0.30) (0.05)
(0.77) (0.99) (0.77) (0.96)
ECT b -0.46* -0.63** -0.51* -0.62** -0.52* -0.60** -0.55* -0.60**
(1.90) (2.55) (1.96) (2.45) (1.97) (2.33) (1.97) (2.23)
(0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
∆D -155.7 -113.5 -173.0 -115.2 -126.6 -115.9 -157.3 -112.9
(1.20) (0.89) (1.12) (0.75) (0.94) (0.88) (0.99) (0.72)
(0.24) (0.38) (0.27) (0.46) (0.36) (0.39) (0.33) (0.48)
adj. R2 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.26
DW 1.47 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.52 1.51 1.50 1.50
N. of obs. 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
ρ 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.47
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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Table 6.16: Endogenous variable: first difference of PM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -0.10 -0.18 -0.13 -0.25 -0.15 -0.23 -0.16 -0.27
(0.42) (0.70) (0.54) (0.92) (0.55) (0.73) (0.56) (0.79)
(0.68) (0.49) (0.59) (0.37) (0.58) (0.47) (0.58) (0.44)
∆Y 3.7e-3* 3.6e-3* 3.7e-3* 3.8e-3* -1.7e-2** -1.6e-2* -1.8e-2** -1.8e-2**
(1.98) (1.91) (1.94) (1.98) (2.19) (2.05) (2.37) (2.42)
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
∆Y 2 -1.1e-7* -9.9e-8* -1.1e-7* -1.1e-7* 1.1e-6** 1.1e-6** 1.1e-6** 1.2e-11**
(1.89) (1.84) (1.86) (1.91) (2.46) (2.35) (2.66) (2.75)
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
∆Y 3 -2.3e-11** -2.2e-11** -2.4e-11*** -2.5e-11***
(2.73) (2.61) (2.90) (3.00)
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
∆S 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10
(0.12) (0.14) (0.43) (0.73)
(0.91) (0.89) (0.67) (0.47)
∆I 4.71 4.82 4.84 5.47
(1.09) (1.13) (1.13) (1.24)
(0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.23)
ECT b -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.17*** -0.23*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.08***
(4.80) (4.92) (4.71) (4.88) (2.87) (2.87) (2.84) (2.82)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆D 1.30** 1.33*** 1.73** 1.74*** 1.29** 1.25** 1.74** 1.75**
(2.63) (2.76) (2.70) (2.86) (2.58) (2.47) (2.72) (2.71)
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
adj. R2 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.58
DW 1.64 1.73 1.64 1.75 1.81 1.83 1.81 1.84
N. of obs. 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
ρ 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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Table 6.17: Endogenous variable: first difference of CO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -6.34*** -5.31*** -5.78*** -5.43*** -7.94 -5.07*** -5.13*** -5.30***
(3.63) (3.02) (3.34) (2.93) (0.05) (2.92) (2.95) (2.89)
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.96) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆Y 2.2e-2* 4.2e-3 1.4e-2 1.4e-3 1.3e-1** 1.9e-2 7.1e-2 2.1e-3
(1.97) (0.38) (1.29) (0.12) (2.36) (0.33) (1.23) (0.04)
(0.06) (0.71) (0.21) (0.91) (0.03) (0.75) (0.23) (0.97)
∆Y 2 -6.2e-7* -1.6e-7 -4.2e-7 -7.3e-8 -7.0e-6* -1.0e-6 -3.8e-6 -1.3e-7
(1.80) (0.51) (1.29) (0.23) (2.01) (0.30) (1.08) (0.04)
(0.08) (0.61) (0.21) (0.82) (0.06) (0.77) (0.29) (0.97)
∆Y 3 1.2e-10* 1.7e-11 6.5e-11 1.7e-12
(1.73) (0.26) (0.94) (0.02)
(0.10) (0.80) (0.36) (0.98)
∆S 2.19** 2.19** 2.18** 2.12**
(2.18) (2.15) (2.18) (2.09)
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
∆I -24.13 -10.37 -35.53 -9.43
(0.68) (0.32) (1.02) (0.29)
(0.50) (0.76) (0.32) (0.77)
ECT b -0.16 -0.25*** -0.36*** -0.27*** 1.7e-4 -0.33*** -0.47*** -0.36***
(1.61) (3.37) (2.84) (3.60) (0.01) (3.21) (3.25) (3.45)
(0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆D 4.70 4.90 2.92 4.00 3.67 5.29 2.13 4.41
(1.11) (1.33) (0.60) (0.86) (0.77) (1.17) (0.45) (0.97)
(0.28) (0.19) (0.56) (0.40) (0.45) (0.16) (0.66) (0.34)
adj. R2 0.15 0.45 0.25 0.47 0.29 0.47 0.29 0.49
DW 2.18 2.05 2.08 2.06 2.02 2.04 2.05 2.04
N. of obs. 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
ρ 0.43 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.14 0.30 0.47 0.29
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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Table 6.18: Endogenous variable: first difference of NH3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const 8.5e-6 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.12** -0.01 0.09**
(0.00) (1.04) (0.19) (1.48) (0.74) (2.74) (0.27) (2.78)
(1.00) (0.31) (0.85) (0.16) (0.47) (0.01) (0.79) (0.01)
∆Y 8.0e-4 1.0e-3 2.2e-3*** 2.0e-3*** 1.6e-2*** 2.2e-2*** 9.7e-3* 1.8e-2***
(1.34) (1.30) (4.79) (4.16) (3.95) (5.53) (1.77) (6.93)
(0.20) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
∆Y 2 -2.7e-8 -3.5e-8 -6.5e-8 -6.1e-8*** -8.2e-7 -1.2e-6 -4.7e-7 -9.5e-7***
(1.73) (1.72) (5.34) (4.92) (3.71) (5.28) (1.60) (6.55)
(0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00)
∆Y 3 1.3e-11*** 1.9e-11*** 7.1e-12 1.6e-11***
(3.41) (4.97) (1.38) (6.10)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00)
∆S 0.03 0.05* 0.11** 0.12***
(0.83) (1.75) (2.75) (4.08)
(0.42) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00)
∆I 3.65*** 2.86*** 2.49*** 2.66***
(3.52) (3.22) (3.01) (4.22)
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ECT b -0.19** -0.85*** -0.77*** -0.95*** -0.44*** -0.41*** -1.22*** -0.58***
(2.50) (4.57) (2.95) (4.08) (3.17) (3.35) (4.90) (4.08)
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆D -0.46*** -0.26** -0.02 -0.02 -0.45*** -0.30*** -0.05 0.01
(3.80) (2.59) (0.16) (0.19) (4.18) (2.90) (0.43) (0.07)
(0.00) (0.02) (0.88) (0.85) (0.00) (0.01) (0.67) (0.95)
adj. R2 0.69 0.62 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.83 0.72 0.92
DW 2.03 2.28 1.95 1.77 2.04 1.98 1.87 2.08
N. of obs. 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
ρ -0.34 0.55 -0.04 0.12 -0.36 -0.35 0.26 -0.40
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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Table 6.19: Endogenous variable: first difference of CH4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -71.19 -1.76** -70.94 -1.76** 38.61 -1.81*** -20.40 -1.80**
(0.93) (2.81) (1.01) (2.71) (0.33) (2.96) (0.22) (2.83)
(0.37) (0.01) (0.33) (0.02) (0.75) (0.01) (0.83) (0.01)
∆Y 7.0e-4 7.3e-4 1.7e-3 6.0e-4 -8.7e-2 -4.5e-2 -7.0e-2 -4.5e-2
(0.08) (0.11) (0.20) (0.09) (1.06) (0.73) (0.73) (0.71)
(0.94) (0.91) (0.85) (0.93) (0.30) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
∆Y 2 -1.9e-19 -1.4e-8 -3.3e-8 -1.1e-8 4.6e-6 5.4e-6 3.8e-6 5.4e-6
(0.01) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (1.05) (0.74) (0.73) (0.72)
(0.99) (0.94) (0.89) (0.95) (0.31) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48)
∆Y 3 -8.7e-11 -4.3e-11 -6.6e-11 -4.3e-11
(1.04) (0.76) (0.72) (0.73)
(0.31) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48)
∆S 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.20
(0.73) (0.70) (0.83) (0.80)
(0.48) (0.50) (0.42) (0.43)
∆I 8.68 -0.44 6.84 -0.80
(0.84) (0.06) (0.68) (0.10)
(0.42) (0.96) (0.51) (0.92)
ECT b 0.05 -0.59*** 0.04 -0.59*** -0.03 -0.58*** 0.01 -0.58***
(0.90) (4.11) (0.99) (3.89) (0.35) (3.89) (0.20) (3.68)
(0.38) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00)
∆D -17.68*** -17.12*** -17.07*** -17.15*** -17.16*** -17.13*** -16.83*** -17.18***
(16.34) (22.51) (12.35) (18.23) (16.57) (21.64) (12.75) (17.49)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
adj. R2 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97
DW 1.70 1.88 1.73 1.88 1.80 1.83 1.79 1.83
N. of obs. 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
ρ 0.52 0.68 0.46 0.68 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.65
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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Table 6.20: Endogenous variable: first difference of NMVOC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
const -0.83 -1.46** -0.77 -1.34** -0.71 -1.22* -0.66 -1.11*
(1.29) (2.23) (1.11) (2.10) (1.13) (1.96) (0.99) (1.79)
(0.21) (0.04) (0.28) (0.05) (0.27) (0.06) (0.33) (0.09)
∆Y -8.8e-5 -1.9e-3 9.5e-5 -1.8e-3 2.0e-3 2.9e-3 2.1e-3 2.8e-3
(0.07) (1.39) (0.07) (1.26) (0.30) (0.41) (0.31) (0.38)
(0.95) (0.18) (0.95) (0.22) (0.77) (0.69) (0.76) (0.71)
∆Y 2 -1.6e-8 3.5e-8 -2.1e-8 3.1e-8 -1.4e-7 -2.7e-7 -1.4e-7 -2.5e-7
(0.38) (0.84) (0.49) (0.72) (0.34) (0.60) (0.34) (0.56)
(0.71) (0.41) (0.63) (0.48) (0.74) (0.55) (0.74) (0.58)
∆Y 3 2.4-12 5.9e-12 2.3e-12 5.5e-12
(0.29) (0.67) (0.27) (0.61)
(0.78) (0.51) (0.79) (0.55)
∆S 0.19* 0.20* 0.22** 0.23**
(1.88) (1.88) (2.07) (2.10)
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
∆I -0.04 -0.24 -0.78 -1.00
(0.01) (0.07) (0.23) (0.28)
(0.99) (0.95) (0.82) (0.78)
ECT b -0.50*** -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.46*** -0.52*** -0.46*** -0.54*** -0.48***
(4.63) (4.20) (4.46) (4.13) (4.41) (3.94) (4.27) (3.89)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆D 0.25 0.37 0.25 0.35 0.26 0.40 0.20 0.33
(0.65) (0.94) (0.53) (0.74) (0.67) (1.01) (0.43) (0.68)
(0.52) (0.36) (0.60) (0.47) (0.51) (0.32) (0.67) (0.50)
adj. R2 0.43 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.38
DW 1.97 2.13 1.99 2.13 1.92 2.11 1.91 2.06
N. of obs. 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
ρ 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.86
t-statistics and marginal significance levels in parenthesis
*, **, *** for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
b ECT : particular error correction term, i.e. with or without Y 3, S and I.
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